I welcome the Minister, Deputy O'Callaghan, and his officials to this part of our meeting, to commence Committee Stage of the Garda Síochána (Recording Devices) (Amendment) Bill 2025.

It is important to note that in order to participate in a division in committee, members must be physically present. We will now proceed with consideration of the Bill.

I move amendment No. 1:

In page 4, line 2, to delete “in relation to a case to” and substitute “in a case to”.

I also intend to move amendments Nos. 3, 4, 17 and 20. All are technical amendments and I will state what they are. Amendment No. 1 is a technical drafting amendment to align the language of the new definition of an "applicable code of practice" in paragraphs (a) and (b). Amendment No. 3 is a minor technical drafting amendment for consistency in style.

Amendment No. 4 will insert a new section into this Bill to amend section 7 of the principal Act. The amendment inserts a new subsection (1A) into section 7 to ensure that applications for community CCTV schemes that are pending decision, prior to commencement, may continue as if section 38 of the Garda Síochána Act 2005 had not been repealed. Where an authorisation is granted to one of these applications, the authorisation will be issued for a period of less than four years and section 38 of the 2005 Act will remain enforced with these authorisations. There is also a minor change to section 7(2) to account for the insertion of the new subsection (1A). There is a commencement provision to ensure there is no confusion over the order of commencement of the transitional arrangements in the 2023 Act and the amendment to section 7 in this Bill.

Finally, amendment No. 17 removes a stray comma in section 8 and amendment No. 20 ensures the correct cross-reference, where it refers to the commencement of the section.

I thank the Minister for that. Do any members wish to make a comment? No.

I move amendment No. 2:

In page 4, between lines 7 and 8, to insert the following:

“ ‘crime against humanity’ means any of the acts specified in Article 7 of the Statute of the International Criminal Court;

‘genocide’ means any of the acts specified in Article 6 of the Statute of the International Criminal Court;

‘war crime’ means any of the acts specified in Article 8.2 of the Statute of the International Criminal Court;”,”.

I have a couple of general points in respect of the Bill at the outset. The Garda Síochána (Recording Devices) (Amendment) Bill comes before us at a time and against a backdrop we discussed at an earlier meeting, of a serious Garda numbers problem. As of yet, and as we contended to the Minister, there has not been enough done in respect of tackling the levels of recruitment to bring the Garda to the point it needs to be at. I do not believe we have employed the type of new ideas or innovation that are necessary.

We also know members of the Garda will face unprecedented challenges this year, particularly in the second half of this year, as a result of the Presidency of the EU Council from July to December. This is, of course, in addition to decisions such as that of the FAI to go ahead with Ireland's Nations League match with Israel in October. I believe that in the second half of 2026. we are going to experience significant policing measures.

As regards the biometric recognition this Bill deals with, Sinn Féin supports the appropriate use of this type of technology in tackling serious crime, security matters and missing persons cases. However, we also believe there must be safeguards for how and when this technology is used. When we are dealing with this type of technology, we need to be very mindful of the risks of discrimination, excessive surveillance, data misuse or weak safeguards.

That is why, with the amendments we will be bringing forward, I would contend that the code of practice is very important in ensuring the deployment of this technology begins with a pilot programme, so that we can tease out all of this. We have to be mindful of the experience of misuse of PULSE in the past, and the vastly more far-reaching implications of this technology. There have to be strong authorisation rules and I will discuss another amendment that proposes this has to be done by way of requiring authorisation from a chief superintendent or higher.

There needs to be safeguards around the storage and processing of data and there has to be a ban on using surveillance technology from states or countries involved in war crimes and genocide. While biometric tools may assist in investigations, they must not lead to an overtly surveillance-based society and they have to be accompanied by robust oversight, transparency and accountability.

In respect of amendment No. 2, which is being taken alongside amendment No. 10, this deals with the use of technology from states engaged in war crimes and genocide. The reason for bringing forward these amendments is that we know the Garda in the past has- and is likely to still be currently using - Israeli surveillance technology. Given Israel's record, that is highly problematic from a national security perspective but also because it is essentially supporting a state that is engaged in a genocide and is using the same technology to target Palestinians today.

In 2023, the Garda paid €278,000 to a company called Cognyte. It is an Israeli surveillance technology company. Cognyte's main product is an investigations and analytics platform that uses AI, facial recognition and data aggregation to analyse communication, CCTV, social media and other areas. The company has a very controversial history. Its tools have been used in Indonesia to monitor LGBT and religious minorities and in Myanmar and South Sudan for mass interception. A Brazilian investigation alleges that a Cognyte system was used under Bolsonaro's regime to track political opponents. We need assurances that such companies would not be used for the provisions of the Bill we are discussing today.

An Garda Síochána has paid hundreds of thousands of euro to an Israeli cyber defence company that has worked with Israeli authorities to target Palestinians during the current genocide in Palestine. That company, Cellebrite, has deep links to Israel's military and intelligence apparatus and has previously been criticised by rights groups for selling its technology to repressive governments. That company has been used by Israel during the current genocide in Gaza to target Palestinians. In 2021 alone, the Garda spent €200,000 on that company's services.

While accepting and understanding it is important the Garda has access to the technology, including decryption technology required to detect and prosecute serious crimes, alternatives have to be found for using companies from states engaged in war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity. I would make the same points were the Garda engaged with companies based in Russia, for example. Without enshrining this in law, I do not believe we can be given that assurance. The experience to date has been that it will not be prevented unless we have very clear protections in place.

In 2024, the Government banned future purchases of military equipment from Israel due to the actions of the Israeli Government in Gaza. However, the ban did not apply to An Garda Síochána and that was an anomaly that needs to be corrected. Acceptance of these amendments would be consistent with the position the Government has already taken, and this is the right decision, in respect of the purchase of military equipment.

It would also be important from a national security perspective as it would make absolutely no sense to procure this type of technology from a state that has been openly hostile to Ireland and, in the case of Israeli companies, simply for our rightful position in defending international law and standing up against genocide in Gaza.

I hope the Minister will be able to accept the amendments as I have outlined them, or indicate that he will bring forward appropriate wording that would provide these types of assurances to the Irish people.

I thank the Deputy. I remind members that amendments Nos. 2 and 10 are related and therefore may be discussed together.

Do any members wish to make any comments? No.

I thank Deputy Carthy for his amendment. The amendment we are discussing here is amendment No. 2, which is an amendment to the definitions section of the proposed Bill, which would set out three definitions for crime against humanity, genocide and war crime. As the Leas-Chathaoirleach said, it is important to note that this amendment should be discussed alongside amendment No. 10, which sets out what is described as being a prohibition on procurement or use of certain technologies.

I understand Deputy Carthy's concerns but I do not accept that procurement restrictions should be put into legislation. For that reason, I will not be accepting amendments Nos. 2 or 10.

As the Deputy and members will know, public procurement is governed by EU rules and national regulations. These provide for an open, transparent, competitive and non-discriminatory public procurement environment. The public procurement guidelines for goods and services already permit contracting authorities to exclude at the selection stage from further consideration any tenderers on many grounds. The mandatory exclusion grounds are where a tenderer has been convicted of one or more of the following offences: participation in a criminal organisation; corruption; fraud; terrorist offences or offences linked to terrorist activities; money laundering or terrorist financing; child labour and human trafficking-related offences; and the breach of tax or social security obligations. I therefore suggest we have sufficient levers within existing procurement guidelines to address the Deputy's concerns. I cannot accept amendments Nos. 2 and 10.

I should also point out that amendment No. 10, as proposed by Deputy Carthy, aims to prohibit the procurement, licensing or entering into a contract by the Garda, or any public body, with a company that is incorporated, headquarted or substantially operating in a state engaged in war crimes, crimes against humanity or genocide. Deputy Carthy and I can agree here on what happened in Gaza but, without a conviction, this coming before a court would be an issue for contradiction, discussion or debate as to whether a state was engaged in war crimes, crimes against humanity or genocide. We may agree in respect of certain states that are proposed here but other states could be proposed as well. Generally, when there is an exclusion on the basis of criminal activity, such activity has resulted in a conviction for the criminal offences I outlined previously. In order to determine whether we are going to even consider the inclusion of this, we would have to be able to say it was related to states that were convicted of these crimes before the International Court of Justice. It is better that procurement restrictions are dealt with within the guidelines as they are at present. It is unusual to put into legislation an express prohibition on saying we cannot enter into a contract with a company based in a country that is involved in the crimes Deputy Carthy outlined.

I will mention one thing I should have mentioned at the outset. I will bring forward amendments on Report Stage, not related to the amendments we are discussing, which will relate to international co-operation. I am seeking legal advice on these regarding how to ensure the Garda can ensure effective co-operation with international partners in the context of biometric analysis. I will also highlight that some amendments may be necessary to address technical drafting issues, as may be agreed between myself and the Attorney General's office.

I thank the Minister for his response. I get what he is saying in terms of legislating for this matter. The difficulty, as I mentioned, is that in August 2024 the Taoiseach stated very clearly that the Government and Defence Forces would cease purchase of Israeli military equipment. Any ongoing contracts at that stage were put under review. The same thing has never happened in respect of policing equipment. I do not know why that is the case. I would welcome the Minister giving us an affirmative statement that he will ensure the same provision that has applied in respect of the Defence Forces will apply to the Garda. If he will give us that commitment today, I will take him at his word on that. Without that, the only vehicle open to the Opposition to bring forward is to press the amendment. This is because of what I consider to be the very real concerns of the Irish people if we were to adopt legislation that allowed for a substantial new piece of technology to be used by the Garda, without having the assurance that that equipment, or related software, would not be accrued from companies based in Israel, for example. On that note, I would welcome the Minister giving us that assurance, but if he cannot or will not, I will press the amendment.

I support Deputy Carthy's amendment, but I wish to speak more broadly to the definitions within the Bill. Is this the appropriate place to do that?

No. We are only dealing with amendments Nos. 2 and 10.

I will speak about it when we get to the section. That is no problem.

We will check that out.

I will do it at the end of the section.

Perfect.

I thank Deputy Carthy for his contribution. I cannot accept the amendment because I believe it is inappropriate to put such a restriction within primary legislation. I also think it is very vague. I am sure there are a lot of people who believe that at present states other than Israel are engaged in war crimes, crimes against humanity or genocide. This amendment would leave it up to a court to determine whether I or the Garda is complying with it. There would have to be hearings as to whether states in which companies are based, with which the Garda wanted to enter into contracts, were involved in war crimes, crimes against humanity or genocide. It is not feasible or operational.

On the Deputy asking me for a commitment on procurement, I cannot do that on the hoof in respect of matters such as that. He has seen the way it has operated before. Obviously, the Garda, if it wants to get technology, cannot procure all the technology just from within Ireland. I know the Deputy is not suggesting that, but it needs to be given the opportunity to see what technology is available. I am unsure. The Deputy's focus here is exclusively on Israeli companies. I am not aware of the extent of the contracts entered into between the Garda and Israeli companies, but it is not a matter to go into legislation. I cannot give the Deputy the assurance and I cannot agree to the amendment.

I am surprised that the Minister said he is not aware of any contractual relationships the Garda might have with Israeli-based companies. I suggest the Minister makes it his business to find out, in the first instance. It is something that the Minister and more broadly the Irish people should have an interest in. He mentioned that many states could be in breach of international law or engaged in war crimes. In fact, very few have provisional rulings against them from the International Court of Justice. Very few have leaders under warrant from the International Criminal Court. If the Minister is looking for standards, those are two good ones to start with. As I mentioned, I would be quite satisfied if the Minister were to indicate he supports the principle of this amendment and wants to bring forward a different amendment that would deal with the issue, or even if he were to give us an assurance in respect of the technology we are talking about not being procured from states such as Israel.

I would just be repeating myself if I responded, so I will not take up the Deputy's invitation.

I move amendment No. 3:

In page 4, line 16, to delete “or subsection (5) or (10) of section 47A” and substitute “or section 47A(5) or (10)”.

I move amendment No. 4:

In page 4, between lines 17 and 18, to insert the following:

“Amendment of section 7 of Principal Act

5.(1) Section 7 of the Principal Act is amended—

(a) by the insertion of the following subsection after subsection (1):

“(1A) Notwithstanding the repeal of section 38 of the Act of 2005 by section 6(1) and the revocation of the Garda Síochána (CCTV) Order 2006 (S.I. No. 289 of 2006) (‘the Order’) by section 6(2)—

(a) an application for an authorisation that was made before 2 April 2025 under section 38 of the Act of 2005 but not yet determined before the coming into operation of this section shall continue to be assessed under section 38 of that Act and the Order as if that section had not been repealed and that Order had not been revoked,

(b) an authorisation given under the said section 38 of the Act of 2005 in respect of an application referred to in paragraph (a) shall, subject to subsection (2), remain in force, and

(c) the said section 38 shall remain in force in respect of an authorisation referred to in paragraph (b) for a period of 4 years after the date of the coming into operation of this section.”,

and

(b) in subsection (2), by the substitution of “subsection (1) or (1A)” for “subsection (1)”.

(2) Subsection (1) shall come into operation on the day on which sections 6 and 7 and Part 5 of the Principal Act come into operation.”.

I move amendment No. 5:

In page 4, between lines 20 and 21, to insert the following:

“Amendment of section 20 of Principal Act

6.Section 20(2)(a) of the Principal Act is amended—

(a) in subparagraph (iii), by the substitution of “the State,” for “the State;”, and

(b) by the deletion of subparagraph (iv).”

Amendment No. 5 will insert a new section into the Bill to amend section 20 of the principal Act, which is the Garda Síochána (Recording Devices) Act 2023. This is a technical amendment. It will delete subparagraph (iv) of subsection (2)(a). There are three main purposes which are repeated throughout the Act. These are the prevention, investigation, detection or prosecution of criminal offences, safeguarding against and the prevention of threats to public security, including securing public safety and public order, and the protection of the security of the State. Subparagraph (iv) of section 20(2)(a), following further consideration, is deemed an unnecessary provision as the occasions for which it was included, such as the search for a missing person where no offence is suspected, are already adequately covered by subsection (2)(a)(ii), that is, the safeguarding against and the prevention of threats to public security, including securing public safety and public order. It is just deleting subparagraph (iv) and making a slight typographical amendment in the first part with the reference to the State.

I move amendment No. 6:

In page 6, between lines 14 and 15, to insert the following:

“(4) A member of An Garda Síochána shall not deploy biometric analysis unless authorised in advance by a member of An Garda Síochána not below the rank of Chief Superintendent, who shall record in writing the grounds of necessity and proportionality for such deployment.”.

This is a straightforward amendment. It is about ensuring that there are safeguards in terms of how this technology could be used and to ensure that there is no overreach by ensuring that any deployment of biometric analysis must be authorised in advance by a member of An Garda Síochána not below the rank of superintendent. During Second Stage discussions on the Bill, I mentioned previous misuses of the PULSE system in the past that were well documented. They related to a very small minority of gardaí, but nonetheless they occurred. There was one particularly horrendous case in which a former member of the Garda was jailed last July for inciting strangers to rape a colleague. That individual pleaded guilty to the unauthorised disclosure of Garda and PULSE personal data on 14 individuals. That is a unique case. It is not reflective of all. The experience of the misuse of PULSE reinforces the need to have proper protections in place in respect of technology that can be used to garner sensitive information.

We must have proper protections in place to ensure that the technologies are only used where appropriate, are properly authorised and are necessary for the investigation of serious crime. Therefore, I think it is appropriate to say that authorisation should come from a superintendent or higher rank.

I support the amendment and ask the Minister to provide a definition of biometric analysis. Is it a categorisation, an identification or remote biometric identification? Before we even discuss safeguards, this seems to be a term that was invented for this Bill and some parts of it seem to be in direct contradiction with the EU AI Act. Under the EU AI Act, it is a requirement to conduct a fundamental rights impact assessment, a data protection impact assessment, ensure human oversight, keep logs, report serious incidents and, possibly, seek authorisation, and in some cases not use it at all. Can the Minister define this term?

If Deputy Carthy will permit me, I will first deal with Deputy Gannon's request. Biometric analysis is the automated processing of biometric data in images or video footage. Its use would mean that the Garda could sort, filter, compare, recognise or cluster relevant images from a collection of images or footage. That is its technical definition.

The best way to understand biometric analysis is to understand that there are four types of recognition technology that can be used: biometric analysis, which I am introducing in this Bill; biometric identification, which I am not introducing yet although I do intend to do that; and what are referred to as live biometric analysis and live biometric identification. To be frank, they are more controversial provisions, but they are not being proposed here.

The biometric analysis that I am proposing is what is referred to as retrospective biometric analysis. It will be used for the purpose of trying to identify a missing child, a missing person or somebody who is the victim of sexual abuse. There will be an image of the person and you will be able to identify, from looking at the video footage generally, whether that person is contained within it. There will not be a database of faces or characteristics against which the Garda will search.

I will outline how retrospective biometric analysis will operate in practical terms. In a Garda investigation, a garda may see a person of interest in video footage that they have. The garda sees the person coming out of, for example, Tara Street Garda station and then sees the person near the scene of a crime in, say, Rathmines. The garda does not know who the person is but retrospective biometric analysis will enable the garda looking at the footage to say that the person coming out of Tara Street Garda station is the same person as the person who was near the scene of the crime in Rathmines because the images are similar, if not identical. It is not just facial recognition. This technology can also be used for the purpose of recognising other characteristics, such as a person's gait, size and so on.

Deputy Carthy has proposed an amendment that calls for an authorisation process to be put in place to state that the Garda or a garda could only ever use biometric analysis if it had been approved by a chief superintendent or somebody of a higher rank, and the chief superintendent had recorded, in writing, that this was necessary and proportionate for the purpose of the investigation. That authorisation process is excessive and unnecessary for the purpose of the Garda using a useful investigative tool. The Bill proposes that gardaí may carry out biometric analysis to sort and filter images, video footage or other documents gathered in the course of an investigation where "it is necessary and proportionate" in that specific investigation. That term is already identified. In order to use biometric analysis, the criteria in the Bill, as it stands, will need to be fulfilled. Biometric analysis can only be deployed in the context of a serious offence, that which has a penalty of five years or more, for matters relating to the security of the State or for missing persons, where it is necessary and proportionate to do so, and can only be used on footage that is obtained in the course of a specific investigation and for certain persons specified in section 43C.

There are only certain data subjects who can be searched and investigations, by their nature, are to be geographically and temporally limited. We are looking at a technology that can aid investigations. The use of biometric analysis will provide gardaí with investigative leads only. It is an investigative tool and provides leads. A human review of any footage or data will be of the utmost importance, as an identifiable person will be responsible for any decisions made in the course of an investigation, including by giving evidence in court. Therefore, any use of biometric analysis will have to be justified. Authorisations must be reserved for the most intrusive uses of cases such as the use of this technology in real time, which as the Deputy will know is not proposed here.

The imposition of an authorisation process would pose operational difficulties, particularly where we are looking at child sexual abuse material. It is important for the gardaí in investigations of this kind to be able to sort through this material as quickly and efficiently as possible to remove victims from harm and bring perpetrators to justice. If we take this example, when examining a lawfully seized electronic device, gardaí may be looking at what can be over 100,000 images per device, with multiple devices seized during an investigation. To then require a chief superintendent to authorise each use could involve thousands of authorisations for searches for victims or suspects in one single or overarching investigation. A typical search using biometric analysis could be for a particular hair colour or distinctive facial feature. To find instances of a suspected child abuser across a seized device should not require an authorisation, particularly where gardaí need to move quickly to find victims. This is neither an effective nor efficient use of Garda time and resources.

The type of searching we are looking at is to provide investigative leads. It is the potential to group relevant images together or find relevant frames in CCTV footage gathered during an investigation into serious crime so that an identifiable person can review the relevant footage or have a starting point for that review.

I am not going to agree to the Deputy's amendment because it would impose an excessive burden on the Garda where all that is happening is gardaí are just conducting an investigation. Nobody is being convicted on foot of it. It just a lead in a case.

The Minister has clearly set out the parameters within which this technology will be used but I think any reasonable person could see instances arise where the question of whether this technology was appropriate in a given case became a matter of distinction, in that different people might have differing views. Therefore, in terms of accountability, there needs to be some mechanism for authorisation. Otherwise, if this was available to every garda, it would be for them to adjudicate on it.

As per the example given by the Minister, my amendment does not set out that separate authorisation would be required for several thousand images in the same case. My amendment reads: “A member of An Garda Síochána shall not deploy biometric analysis unless authorised in advance by a member of An Garda Síochána not below the rank of Chief Superintendent, who shall record in writing the grounds of necessity and proportionality for such deployment.” My amendment is reasonable, as it provides protections to the Garda and addresses concerns in terms of any potential misuse of this technology.

I have more information to give in respect of Deputy Gannon's question on why the term "biometric categorisation" is not being used when that is the term used in the EU AI Act. Biometric categorisation is a subgroup of biometric analysis. Biometric analysis covers elements of a number of key concepts within the AI Act, including biometric categorisation, but should not be limited to that term.

Regarding Deputy Carthy's response, it is important to emphasise that this is about trying to facilitate gardaí who are investigating issues and speed up the process for them.

I visited Store Street Garda station last year and there were a couple of retired gardaí who had been brought in. They were going through video footage of the Dublin riots to try to identify if the person on O'Connell Street was the same person they subsequently see on it. This is a tool that would facilitate that. If you were to need an authorisation for each search, it would become unnecessary and excessive. Ultimately, this is just a tool of investigation. The gardaí do not have to get authorisation from chief superintendents to do other types of investigations, such as questioning people. I think the amendment is unnecessary.

I will be brief. This is potentially very powerful technology to use to be able to identify or categorise people. The Dublin riots is actually a very good example because a judgment would need to be made as some of the crimes committed during that riot probably would have carried maximum sentences of above five years but others would not. Who would make that adjudication?

In my view, the person best suited to do that would be a senior experienced garda making that adjudication. I will state it again: it is certainly not the spirit but I do not think the wording of this amendment suggests for one minute that in that type of a case, separate approval would be needed for each image. In fact, the amendment is very clear in saying that once the grounds were established, the authorisation would be provided in advance.

I will briefly reply and I will not repeat myself. Deputy Carthy is proposing the amendment into what will be the new section 43C and he wants to ensure it is only used when it is necessary and proportionate. I point out that section 43C(4) states "The carrying out of biometric analysis by a member of Garda personnel shall be presumed to be so necessary and proportionate if it is in accordance with this Part and any applicable code of practice." There are measures in place to ensure it has to be proportionate and necessary.

If you look at section 43C(3), it says "The carrying out of biometric analysis by a member of Garda personnel shall not be carried out unless it is necessary and proportionate having regard to the principle purposes of the biometric analysis concerned." A lot of the concerns that Deputy Carthy has are dealt with and provided for in subsections 3 and 4 of section 43C. I do not think it is necessary to accept the amendment.

Not to labour the point but who decides whether it is necessary and proportionate? I press the amendment.

I move amendment No. 7:

In page 7, between lines 7 and 8, to insert the following:

“(11) The Policing and Community Safety Authority shall have oversight of the use of biometric analysis and biometric categorisation under this Part, including powers to—

(a) audit and inspect records,

(b) review authorisations and logs maintained under this Part,

(c) assess compliance with any applicable code of practice, including the evaluation of any discriminatory or disproportionate impacts arising from the use of such technologies, and

(d) publish annual reports on the use, governance and impacts of such technologies.”.

I understand amendments Nos. 7 and 8 can be discussed together. Amendment No. 7 just seeks to ensure the Policing and Community Safety Authority takes a proactive position in terms of the oversight and monitoring of the use of these technologies, including in respect of any evidence of any discriminatory practices or anything like that which might occur.

Amendment No. 8 seeks to ensure that Fiosrú has full jurisdiction to investigate any issues that might arise through any potential misuse of the technology. I believe these amendments will be important facets to ensure full public confidence in the technology and the use of it by An Garda Síochána.

I thank Deputy Carthy for amendments Nos. 7 and 8, which respectively seek to put in express statutory oversight by the Policing and Community Safety Authority and Fiosrú. Obviously, oversight of An Garda Síochána is a hugely important issue for the organisation and for the public at large. This oversight role has already been very much legislated for through the Policing, Security and Community Safety Act 2024. Section 122 of that Act provides the Policing and Security Community Authority's objective, functions and powers, which include, among other things, determining policing priorities for An Garda Síochána which identify areas that require extra focus or attention to improve the policing service delivered to the public, assessing policing performance against these priorities and An Garda Síochána's strategy statement and annual service plan and the national strategy for community safety. It also provides for undertaking inspections and making recommendations to improve policing services and engaging extensively with communities and stakeholders to understand and listen to experiences of policing and being policed.

Within the current Bill, oversight is already provided for by a High Court judge who, as per section 49 of the principal Act, will have to provide a report annually to the Taoiseach. The report will also be laid before the Houses of the Oireachtas, subject to any exclusions that would prejudice the security of the State. The High Court judge will include any matters relating to the operation of the Part that the judge considers appropriate to be reported. He or she will have access to premises or places where biometric analysis has been carried out, including any documents related to its use. Therefore, amendment No. 7 is not considered necessary as the Bill already provides for an independent oversight of the provisions through a High Court judge and the Policing and Security Community Authority's role is already established to oversee and assess the policing services provided by An Garda Síochána and operates independently and transparently. Therefore, it is considered its functions are set out in the Policing, Security and Community Safety Act 2024. The authority already provides sufficient oversight of the organisation.

In respect of amendment No. 8 from Deputy Carthy, it is a similar amendment but this time it is in respect of Fiosrú. The amendment is not required because Fiosrú automatically has oversight, without it being set out here in the legislation. If a person has a complaint about the conduct of a member of An Garda Síochána, they can make a complaint directly to Fiosrú, formerly GSOC. On receipt of a complaint against a member of an Garda Síochána, Fiosrú will determine if the complaint is to be deemed admissible or inadmissible. There are then two avenues available to Fiosrú when investigating admissible complaints as per section 199 of the Policing, Security and Community Safety Act, that is, to determine if it is suitable for resolution by An Garda Síochána or to investigate the complaint itself. A person can also make a complaint directly to the Garda in line with section 196 of the Act.

Where a person has a complaint about how their personal data is being processed by the Garda, he or she will have the right to lodge a complaint with the Data Protection Commission. There are also other rights that a data subject has, which are subject to certain restrictions, including the right to access, the right to rectification and erasure and the right to restrict processing in certain conditions. That is the current situation in respect of complaints. I do not think it needs to be set out again in the Bill since what Deputy Carthy seeks to do in amendment No. 8 is ensure Fiosrú will have overriding responsibility for any complaints in respect of the use of biometric analysis. That already exists.

It is always crucially important that when we have oversight and statutory bodies, we are crystal clear they have authority in the areas where issues could potentially arise. That is why I submitted both amendments. In respect of the Policing and Community Safety Authority, I submitted the amendment to make it abundantly clear that body would have oversight of the use of biometric analysis and be able to audit and inspect records, review authorisations and logs maintained and assess compliance.

The Minister can say that is already provided for by interpretation of other Acts but I think it would be very beneficial to provide it in a very clear way - likewise with Fiosrú. Yes, Fiosrú can investigate any complaint but in respect of biometric analysis or categorisation, which is being legislated for the first time, it would be prudent to make its authority crystal clear, in that respect.

I know the Minister referenced the Policing, Security and Community Safety Act but he has not mentioned in his response the EU AI Act. When I ask is that purposely done, I do not mean that in an accusatory way. I am just trying to understand why the EU AI Act is not factoring into any considerations in the responses he is giving. Obviously, there are particular obligations under the EU AI Act when it comes to categorisation, identification and biometric identification but is biometric analysis just being used as a way of - I do not want to say not adhering to as we have all been here for a few hours but is that why we have that particular classification and not any of the others?

First, I thank Deputy Carthy again. I have concerns about the amendments Deputy Carthy has put in. If we look at amendment No. 8, he is setting out "Fiosrú shall have jurisdiction to investigate any complaint.".

If I put that in here, some smarty-pants lawyer is going to turn around and say that for Fiosrú to have jurisdiction to investigate a certain issue, there has to be a separate statutory provision in the legislation. There is in respect of recording devices, in respect of biometric analysis, but there is not in other ones.

It is worthwhile having the debate about it. It is absolutely essential that any gardaí using biometric analysis powers, in the same way as they use any of the other extraordinary powers they have, that they use them proportionally, reasonably and for the legitimate purposes of investigation. If they do not, or if they are in breach of their code of conduct, they will be held up in respect of it. Obviously, it is open to an individual to make a complaint to Fiosrú and the complaints procedure is there.

Going back to Deputy Gannon’s question in respect of the AI Act, as I said in an earlier answer, biometric categorisation is a subgroup of biometric analysis. The term "biometric analysis", which is used in this legislation, is a broader definition than what is contained in the AI Act, and I do not think the Oireachtas should be restricted completely in terms of what is contained in the AI Act. I could give the Deputy a lot of detail on the background to the EU AI Act but I suspect he would stop me halfway through it and say that he knows it. I do have a lot of detail in respect of the AI Act and how its framework will apply to different sectors, including to the use of AI systems for law enforcement purposes. This does not, however, contradict it or is not inconsistent with it but I do want to include biometric analysis as it covers more than biometric categorisation.

When the Minister talked about smarty-pants lawyers, I was going to say it would take one to know one but I decided I would not be so cheeky. I will make the point that virtually every new statutory body established will have a provision in the legislation in respect of accountability before the relevant committee and the Committee of Public Accounts of these Houses. This is the case even though there is primary legislation that makes this abundantly clear, and it is done to ensure that a smarty-pants lawyer does not suggest that the Committee of Public Accounts does not perhaps have oversight. It was in that spirit that these amendments have been moved. I will press them.

Not to keep jumping on to Deputy Carthy’s amendments, and perhaps he will forgive me for doing so with this one, we do also have obligations under the EU AI Act. If this is a subgroup of a categorisation, are we are still going to be doing a fundamental rights impact assessment and a data protection impact assessment, ensuring human oversight, which the Minister clarified, keeping logs and reporting serious incidents? Will there be the possibility of seeking authorisation? Those are the obligations under the EU AI Act. Will we be adhering to those?

Issues concerning that will be contained within the codes of practice that are going to be produced and drafted and introduced by statutory instrument. They will govern how the Garda have to use it.

Okay.

I move amendment No. 8:

In page 7, between lines 7 and 8, to insert the following:

“(11) Fiosrú shall have jurisdiction to investigate any complaint, conduct matter or relevant incident arising from the use of biometric analysis or biometric categorisation under this Part, including alleged misuse, unauthorised access, discriminatory impacts, or breaches of data protection obligations.”.

I move amendment No. 9:

In page 7, between lines 27 and 28, to insert the following:

“Processing and storage of data

43E.Biometric data processed under this Act shall—

(a) be retained only for the minimum period strictly necessary,

(b) be stored and processed exclusively on servers located within the European Union,

(c) not be accessible to private contractors, and

(d) be deleted immediately once no longer required for the purpose for which it was collected.”.

Our principles should be explicit in legislation. These are that any biometric data that is processed under the Act should "be retained only for the minimum period strictly necessary; be stored and processed exclusively on servers located within the European Union, and to which, therefore, EU law is applicable; not be accessible to private contractors; and be deleted immediately once no longer required for the purpose for which it was collected.” The amendment seeks to ensure greater protection in terms of where the data is processed and stored and that the data is only retained for the necessary time.

As we permit the use of this kind of technology to assist gardaí doing their job in terms of detecting crimes and catching criminals, we need to ensure, as I have said on a number of occasions, that there are safeguards in terms of where data is stored and processed, who has access to it and that it is not being retained for any longer than necessary. This is what this amendment does and why it is important. When we are talking about this type of technology, there will always be concerns that if we do not have the proper safeguards in place, there will be a risk that we would end up slipping into a surveillance society or that the intention of the Bill as we discuss it here today would be stretched at some point in future. It is important, therefore, that we have legislative safeguards in place.

I thank Deputy Carthy for the amendment. This is a provision he wants to include in respect of processing. I should point out that there is already a processing provision contained within the Bill. If we look at section 43D, we will see that it provides for a power to process data. It states that: "A member of Garda personnel may, for a principal purpose, and in accordance with an applicable code of practice, process data (including personal data) obtained as a result of the carrying out of biometric analysis under this Part".

My view is that this provision in section 43D would be supplemented by the code of practice. In effect, what Deputy Carthy is seeking to do is to provide an abridged version of the code of practice within his amendment. It is much more preferable that we would have detailed codes of practice, and I therefore do not think it is necessary to accept Deputy Carthy’s amendment. The code of practice section, section 47A, which is to be inserted by section 8 of this Bill, already sets out requirements for what is to be included in the code. This includes provisions relating to retention, access, storage, erasure and destruction of data obtained. If the Deputy looks at section 47A(2) and section 47A(3), he will see that.

Obviously, also, the power provided for in this Bill is for the Garda only to deal with it. If we look at section 8 of the Bill, there are the codes of practice for Part 6A, and it sets out all the details that should be included within the code of practice, namely, that it shall "include provisions relating to the procedures to be followed by members of Garda personnel in [the Act]; [the] parameters for use of biometric analysis, including geographical and ... temporal limits of such use". Ensuring there are temporal limits is one of the things that Deputy Carthy wants to ensure. Also included is "the confidentiality, security, storage, access, retention, erasure and destruction of data" and "those sections of Part 6A that provide that a matter is to be specified, or otherwise contained in, or to be the subject of, a code of practice." The processing provisions will be dealt with in the code of practice and, therefore, I do not propose to accept Deputy Carthy’s amendment.

As the Minister knows, I will have amendments in respect of the code of practice because I do not believe it is in any way sufficient in terms of how to proceed as this legislation stands. We are being told that there will be a code of practice at some point in future, without seeing precisely what that code of practice will be. There should be minimum safeguards in the legislation in respect of this type of technology for the reasons I have already outlined.

Would the Minister like to comment?

I have said everything I want to say.

I move amendment No. 10:

In page 7, between lines 27 and 28, to insert the following:

“Prohibition on procurement or use of certain technologies

43E.(1) An Garda Síochána, the Minister, or any public body acting on their behalf shall not procure, license, contract for, deploy, or otherwise make operational use of any biometric analysis technology, surveillance technology, software, hardware, dataset, or related service supplied by—

(a) a company incorporated, headquartered, or substantially operating in a state engaged in war crimes, crimes against humanity or genocide,

(b) a subsidiary, affiliate, or parent undertaking of such a company, or

(c) any entity that develops, trains, sources, or operates biometric or surveillance systems using data, infrastructure, or technology originating a state engaged in war crimes, crimes against humanity or genocide.

(2) For the purposes of this section, ‘surveillance technology’ includes any system capable of biometric analysis, facial recognition, behavioural categorisation, pattern of life analysis, or the processing of biometric data within the meaning of the Data Protection Act 2018.

(3) Any existing contract, memorandum of understanding, or procurement arrangement that contravenes subsection (1) shall not be renewed, extended, or varied, and shall be terminated at the earliest date permissible under contract law.

(4) Nothing in this section shall prevent the Minister from authorising the temporary retention of data or equipment solely for the purpose of evidential preservation, forensic examination, or legal compliance, provided that no further operational use is made of such technology.

(5) No biometric data collected, processed, or retained under this Act shall be transferred to, processed by, or stored on any server, cloud service, or technological infrastructure—

(a) located in a state engaged in war crimes, crimes against humanity or genocide,

(b) controlled by an entity referred to in subsection (1), or

(c) operated using software, firmware, or backend systems originating in a state engaged in war crimes, crimes against humanity or genocide.”.

I move amendment No. 11:

In page 7, between lines 30 and 31, to insert the following:

“(a) contravenes section 43C(1);”.

The amendment is moved on the basis that what is not permitted remains prohibited. Checking a person's image against a database of images seems to remain prohibited. It seems the only way to emphasise this is to make it an offence in the Bill. The Bill criminalises falsifying, concealing or destroying information obtained by biometric analysis. It does not, however, state that a contravention of the Bill itself is an offence. The purpose of the amendment is to make it an offence without lawful authority or reasonable excuse knowingly to contravene section 43C(1), which states that "A member of Garda personnel shall not carry out biometric analysis other than in accordance with this Part and any applicable code of practice."

This is a pretty obvious amendment whereby if somebody contravenes the Bill, it is an offence. This needs to be explicitly stated.

I thank the Deputy for his amendment. As he indicated, what he wants to do with this amendment is to make it a criminal offence if there is a breach of section 43C(1), which states: "A member of Garda personnel shall not carry out biometric analysis other than in accordance with this Part and any applicable code of practice". It would be excessive and draconian to say that if somebody breached a code of practice, he or she would be committing a criminal offence. We discussed earlier about prosecutions against An Garda Síochána. We could find a situation where a garda has used biometric analysis and was inadvertently in breach of the code of practice.

That is not how this is meant, though.

That is what it says. The Deputy has to look at what it states. It states it would be a criminal offence if somebody contravenes section 43C(1). That would be excessive. Under the legislation, it is a criminal offence is for a garda to falsify, conceal, destroy or otherwise dispose of information obtained as a result of carrying out biometric analysis. It would also be a criminal offence to permit the falsification, concealment, destruction or disposal of the information. That is all pretty bad behaviour – concealing, destroying or falsifying – whereas when it comes to someone who fails to comply with a code of practice, that is something someone could do inadvertently and innocently and it would be unfair to say therefore that they have committed a criminal offence. Any inadvertent use would then be subject to criminal sanction whereas it would be far more appropriate that such activity be considered in a disciplinary context as opposed to gardaí prosecuting other gardaí in court and giving rise to difficulties in respect of that.

I will take on board the Minister’s comments. That is not what was intended. I will look at redrafting that with regard to Report Stage.

Amendments Nos. 12 to 14, inclusive, Nos. 16, 18, 19 and 21 are related and may be discussed together.

I move amendment No. 12:

In page 8, between lines 5 and 6, to insert the following:

“(b) in subsection (6), by the substitution of “to revoke or replace an existing code of practice” for “to amend, revoke or replace an existing code of practice”,”

The amendments inserts a new subsection (b) in the section.. This will remove the word “amend” in subsection (6). Since any changes to a published code of practice will involve the full code of practice being restated as part of any ministerial order, it is unnecessary to include the word “amend”. This will also align the text of section 47 with the text in section 47A, which is being inserted by section 8 of this Bill.

Amendment No. 14 will substitute subsection (8) of section 47 of the principal Act to also remove the reference to amendments of the code.

Amendment No. 13 will amend the new subsection (7)(a) being inserted into the principal Act to include a cross-reference to subsection (9), which sets out the types of minor amendments that can be made to a code of practice.

Amendment No. 21 is similar to amendment No. 13. It amendments subsection (10) in Part 8A, which is being inserted by section 8 of this Bill to ensure a cross-reference to subsection (11) sets out the types of minor amendments that can be made to a code of practice.

Amendments No. 16 relates to the code of practice the Minister has referred to. It proposes to insert:

clear and specific limits on the circumstances in which biometric analysis or biometric categorisation may be used, including prohibitions on use for general surveillance, population-level monitoring, or speculative searches, objective thresholds and evidential standards that must be met before any biometric analysis may be initiated, safeguards to prevent disproportionate or discriminatory impacts, including mandatory risk assessment procedures, technical and operational parameters governing accuracy, reliability, and error rate thresholds, and mandatory documentation, authorisation procedures and audit trails to ensure accountability and prevent misuse.

It is not satisfactory that so much of this legislation is left to a code of practice that we have not seen before adopting the legislation. It moves too far away from the sphere of democratic oversight that this committee and these Houses should have. Because so much is left to the code of practice, there is a real lack of detail on safeguards, data limits, oversight and practical use rules for device use as I mentioned earlier. The section on the code of practice itself gives far too much discretion to a single individual, the Garda Commissioner, who drafts, amends and controls the consultation process for codes that regulate the Garda powers. The safeguards are not fixed in legislation. That means there are limits in the assurance the Houses can have in relation to any concerns that might be there.

The additions in amendment No. 16 strengthen the requirements relating to the code of practice by requiring strict limits, objective evidential thresholds, anti-discrimination safeguards, technical accuracy safeguards and full authorisation and ensuring biometric powers remain properly controlled, transparent and accountable.

Amendment No. 18 is a complementary. It requires that the code of practice be laid before the Dáil to ensure there is democratic oversight.

Amendment No. 19 is a simple amendment. It states the first review of the code of practice would take place after two years and then five years thereafter. It would be appropriate that the first review would take place after two years.

Amendment No. 12 revises the sections so the Minister can no longer amend an existing code of practice so that it can only be revoked or replaced entirely.

Could there possibly be instances where a Minister would need make a small amendment to deal with an issue that arises? Will the Minister elaborate on the rationale behind this? I support the other amendments tabled to this section. In fact, if I had moved them myself I could hear the Minister's arguments against them. They are appropriate amendments to the legislation.

I will deal with the amendments tabled by Deputy Carthy in the first instance. These are amendments Nos. 16, 18 and 19. We already have an example of what a code of practice will look like because we already have codes of practice in respect of CCTV and Garda body cameras. This is the type of detail we will be looking at in respect of the code of practice that will be generated under section 47A of the Bill. I do not consider necessary the proposed additional text to section 47A on codes of practice that is in amendment No. 16. There are clear prohibitions on mass surveillance and indiscriminate searching utilising biometrics in the data protection Acts already. The provisions to be inserted by the Bill, as per section 4 of the principal Act, are without prejudice to the provisions of the Data Protection Act 1988.

One of the things of concern to people in respect of biometric analysis is that there could be profiling or racial profiling. We know already that under section 89(3) of the Data Protection Act 2018, profiling that results in discrimination against an individual on the basis of a special category of personal data shall be prohibited. The use of biometric analysis has to be in the context of a specific investigation and any search conducted must be for the data subjects as set out in section 43C(6). With regard to the code of practice for the carrying out of biometric analysis in the proposed section 47A, which starts on page 9 of the Bill, subsections (2) and (3) already provide for procedures, confidentiality, security storage, access retention and parameters for use. Further to this, it can provide different provisions in relation to the types of biometric data or the circumstances in which it is to be carried out. I do not think the amendment is necessary.

I also believe that amendment No. 18 tabled by Deputy Carthy is not necessary. The proposed section 47A sets out what is to be included in a code of practice. This includes the parameters for which it can be carried out. The code of practice for the carrying out of biometric analysis will be laid before the Houses of the Oireachtas for positive resolutions. This means the Houses will have the opportunity to scrutinise the code alongside the provisions required by section 47A. I have no doubt that colleagues will be scrutinising the codes of conduct when they are laid before the Oireachtas.

Amendment No. 19 proposes changing the review period for a code of practice from five years to two years. The Bill provides that the code of practice is to be reviewed not later than five years from the date of the order or the date of previous review. This aligns with what is in the principal Act. In certain circumstances, a code of practice may need to be reviewed after several months or even one year. The preparation of a code of practice in accordance with the statutory assessment and consultation requirements is a lengthy and detailed process. Accordingly, five years is the appropriate mechanism in respect of it.

Deputy Carthy asked about the removal of the words "to amend". Since any change to a published code of practice will involve the full code of practice being restated as part of a ministerial order, it is unnecessary to include "to amend". If a change is to be made to a code of practice, the full code of practice has to come before the Oireachtas. I hear the point he has made in respect of whether I should be able to slightly amend it but it is important that there is Oireachtas supervision of changes made to the code. I thank Deputy Carthy for his amendments.

The Minister is very welcome; I thank him for throwing them in the bin.

I am not throwing them in the bin. This process is important. Sometimes I have to say I feel guilty about rejecting amendments. Notwithstanding the considerable work put down by Deputy Carthy, and if there is an amendment I think will be consistent with the rest of the legislation I will accept it, but I have to be careful about including provisions. A drafter has put this together and there is coherence between pieces of legislation. I am concerned about putting in an amendment that would seem to be unnecessary. I welcome the discussion we have had and the efforts of colleagues in tabling amendments.

I would contend that my amendments would strengthen the legislation and ensure proper oversight. It is for these reasons they were tabled. I hear what the Minister has said but I am not aware of him accepting any Opposition amendment to any Bill.

Give me time.

We are not through this legislation yet and perhaps the Minister will surprise us before the end of the debate.

In terms of the difficulty with the code of practice regarding the oversight of the Houses, we have heard concerns expressed about the potential misuse of this technology and that it could have a use beyond what might be the intention of those of us discussing the Bill today. We are told that all of these concerns will be dealt with by a code of practice. The difficulty is that the code of practice will not be made or approved by this House as it stands. Therefore, it is appropriate that the Oireachtas would set out some parameters for assurances in terms of what the code of practice ultimately does. If I may say so, amendment No. 16 fits very fluidly in the document and any drafter would agree.

Does the Minister wish to respond?

I do not. I am not being disrespectful by not responding but I will not repeat myself for the sake of everyone here.

I would have thought amendment No. 19 would have been a very uncontentious proposition. We always have to be mindful when putting in place review clauses that we do not end up with a scenario whereby almost immediately that one review is finished the next review starts, but we are speaking about new technology and potentially it will be five years before the first review takes place. The amendment does not call for every review to take place within two years; it states the first review would take place within two years. I ask the Minister to reconsider his position on this because it would be good practice to ensure we have an assurance. It might be shorter but it would not be any longer than two years. This would be an appropriate change.

I move amendment No. 13:

In page 8, line 9, to delete "Where" and substitute "Subject to subsection (9), where".

I move amendment No. 14:

In page 8, between lines 26 and 27, to insert the following:

"(d) by the substitution of the following subsection for subsection (8):

"(8) The Commissioner of An Garda Síochána shall take all reasonable steps to ensure that an applicable code of practice has been brought to the attention of members of Garda personnel.".".

I move amendment No. 15:

In page 9, between lines 2 and 3, to insert the following:

"Pilot Programme for Biometric Categorisation Technologies

8. The Minister shall ensure that no national deployment of biometric categorisation technologies shall occur until a pilot programme has been completed and independently evaluated, including assessments of—

(a) accuracy and error rates,

(b) discriminatory impacts,

(c) compliance with data protection law, and

(d) impacts on privacy and fundamental rights,

and the evaluation shall be laid before both Houses of the Oireachtas.".

I will be very quick about this because the Minister essentially made the argument in support of it already when he outlined the process employed for body cameras. Essentially, this amendment would ensure the same process would be in place and that a pilot programme would be deployed. This would allow a good opportunity for evaluating the accuracy and effectiveness of the technology, as well as identifying any issue that would need to be addressed prior to the wider roll-out. It is the same as previous new technologies being the subject of pilot programmes.

I thank Deputy Carthy. The carrying out of a pilot project or a pilot scheme for the roll-out of any new technology is an operational matter for the Garda Commissioner. I do not think it is appropriate for primary legislation. The Garda has yet to decide which technology will be utilised but the accuracy and safety of that technology will be the decisive factor in coming to that decision. The Garda will only use the most accurate AI systems for this work, such as those which are already being utilised by member states in the EU.

We are a bit of an outlier in not having this. Section 47A, which is to be inserted by section 8 of this Bill also provides for data protection and human rights impact assessments to be conducted before deployment of any technology so again, regrettably, I do not think the amendment is necessary.

I feel like banging my head against the desk.

I move amendment No. 16:

In page 9, between lines 20 and 21, to insert the following:

“(c) clear and specific limits on the circumstances in which biometric analysis or biometric categorisation may be used, including prohibitions on use for general surveillance, population-level monitoring, or speculative searches,

(d) objective thresholds and evidential standards that must be met before any biometric analysis may be initiated,

(e) safeguards to prevent disproportionate or discriminatory impacts, including mandatory risk assessment procedures,

(f) technical and operational parameters governing accuracy, reliability, and error rate thresholds,

(g) mandatory documentation, authorisation procedures and audit trails to ensure accountability and prevent misuse,”.

I move amendment No. 17:

In page 10, line 25, to delete “may, by order” and substitute “may by order”.

I move amendment No. 18:

In page 10, between lines 30 and 31, to insert the following:

“(6) When making an order under subsection (5), the Minister shall lay the code of practice, together with an explanatory memorandum outlining the safeguards, limitations and parameters governing the use of biometric analysis and biometric categorisation, before each House of the Oireachtas.”.

I move amendment No. 19:

In page 10, line 39, to delete “5 years” and substitute “2 years”.

I move amendment No. 20:

In page 11, line 7, to delete “this section” and substitute “section 8 of the Garda Síochána (Recording Devices) (Amendment) Act 2026”.

I move amendment No. 21:

In page 11, line 14, to delete “Where” and substitute “Subject to subsection (11), where”.

I move amendment No. 22:

In page 12, to delete line 14 and substitute the following:

“designated judge considers should be reported,

including, without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing, whether those Parts operate in a manner calculated to secure confidence in the impartial performance of policing functions without disproportionate impact n persons of particular national or ethnic origins.”.

I will not press this but I want the Minister to consider it on Report Stage. This is about designating powers for the terms of reference for the judge in relation to this issue. There is quite an amount of power that is being given over here. The amendment is to ensure that the Parts of the Bill operate in a manner that is calculated to secure the confidence in the impartial performance of policing functions without disproportionate impacts on persons of particular national or ethnic origins. It is obviously to ensure there is not profiling happening but, more importantly, it is to ensure that the terms of reference of the judge and how he or she reports on the operation of this Bill are done appropriately and in a way that is sustainable and gives confidence. I am conscious that we must have confidence in how this will work in the future. We do not want to allow ourselves to be left in any vacuum whereby there will be a lack of confidence among the public.

I am also quite conscious that legislation moves on. Compare the manner in which we are going about this vis-à-vis a couple of decades ago. How a judge operated then when mobile phones needed to be intercepted and so on is basically obsolete now. We have heard about the investment in various different technologies, some of them emanating from Israel. It is my understanding that the number of actual requests going to the judge who is designated in relation to this space has dropped immensely because that technology has moved on. I am not sure that what is being done with the use of these technologies is legally covered under the current legislation but that is for another day.

The amendment is here to expand the terms of reference of the judge. I will not press it but I am telling the Minister straight off here that if he came forward with something to deal with this on Report Stage, I would support it. Otherwise, I will bring forward this amendment again.

I thank Deputy Kelly for the amendment. I will consider what he has said. Obviously, the role of the High Court judge will be important once that judge is designated. The Deputy will note from the provision that is there already that he can report to the Taoiseach concerning any matters relating to the operation of the Parts that the designated judge considers should be reported. I will take on board what the Deputy says. What he is proposing relates to a disproportionate impact on persons of particular national or ethnic origins. I have mentioned previously the data protection legislation, which prohibits any form of racial profiling.

I will consider it and-----

It could be even wider than that but the Minister gets the point.

Even if it is not included, I will discuss it with the judge. He or she is at large in respect of it.

How stands the amendment, Deputy Kelly?

I will bring it forward on Report Stage if the Minister does not bring forward something.

I thank colleagues for their time and hard work over the past three and three quarters hours. I thank them for their commitment and I am sorry it took longer than we had envisaged.

I thank the Leas-Chathaoirleach for her chairing and the officials for their work. I hope the Minister is more open to being amenable when we get to Report Stage.

He will get a break from looking at us all nearly all of the time for a week and a half. He will be more amenable the next time.

On behalf of the committee, I thank the Minister and his officials for their attendance at both sessions today.