2000 Annual Report of the Comptroller and Auditor General and Appropriation Accounts: ›
Vote 10 - Office of Public Works (Resumed).
Contributions 174–342 of 511. This sitting's record is too long for one page, so it is split into 3 parts.
I cannot comment on that because we have not been involved in day to day contact with executive services.
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You read the papers and you heard what the Comptroller and Auditor General has said. You heard what the Chairman said if the contract runs for five years.
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The only person who could have a valid view on that is the Secretary General of the Department of Tourism, Sport and Recreation. It is not for me to say.
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I will ask Ms Hayes about that and also about the corporate governance aspect of it and the checks and balances between the board and the executive. Are you happy with that in your capacity as Secretary General and Accounting Officer?
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As regards the integrated role of chairman and chief executive, as early as last June, which was within six months of taking over responsibility for this project, the Minister, Deputy McDaid, brought his proposals to Government with the heads of a Bill to put the company on a statutory basis. Those proposals included provision for the separation of roles. We had concerns about the workload this put on one individual and we were concerned that when we moved to a statutory basis the separation would be an integral part of the statutory provision. In relation to other corporate governance matters, on the executive services contract we have had correspondence and meetings with both the project director, who is the head of the executive services team, and with the executive chair. We have taken the contract as a given and have expressed our concern about achieving value for money for the contract now in place. Most of our concern has been concentrated on the structure of the service being offered, the skills and capabilities included on the team and where resources are being deployed given this phase of development of the project. We have written to the team and have discussed these issues with the executive chair. Since we first raised these issues a number of significant events have taken place including the High Point Rendel review and its recommendations and recent events. As recently as last night, we discussed this matter with the board and it has indicated it has the matter and structure of the contract under active consideration and that in response the finance and audit committee will look at proposals from the executive services team to address our concerns and others raised both by HPR and the board.
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It would appear from what you have said that the High Point Rendel criticism of the expertise and management was valid. You made the criticism prior to the High Point Rendel report.
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There were similar comments that we had made already.
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Mr. McCarthy, did the Department of the Taoiseach seek the Attorney General's opinion on the contracting authority's legal advice?
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The Department did not seek the Attorney General's opinion. The advice from the contracting authority's solicitors was received. It was clearly from a well-established legal firm that was known to have advised a number of Departments on procurement issues, including our agents in this context at the time, the Office of Public Works. The contract had been executed at the time the copy of the advice was received by us so no opinion from the Attorney General was sought on it.
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Would it not be normal for an outside contracting authority to come in with its legal advice? Would it not be normal on a multi-million pound project of this scale to seek the advice of the Attorney General?
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The position is that the contract had been executed by the contracting authority. Our primary concern was to establish that in doing so it had acted on the basis of legal advice. We confirmed that was the case and had sight of it. It appeared to be persuasive.
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It was already in place. The regulatory body for public procurement in Ireland is the Department of Finance. Were there discussions with that Department? I know you said there was in respect of other matters, but in respect of public procurement, were there discussions with the Department of Finance?
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There were in relation to the broad practice to be followed. It was a matter of explicit communication between ourselves and CSID that it would abide by the procurement guidelines which, as the Deputy will be aware, have a number of different dimensions to them, some specifically in relation to capital projects, some in relation to, more narrowly, governance procedures and then the more general procurement issues, including the EU dimension. We confirmed both directly and through sight of the company's procedures manual and in other ways that the company was both aware of and committed to abiding by those procedures.
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Did the Department of Finance approve the execution of this contract in any fashion?
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It was notified, but it was at a point where, as with us, the contract had been executed.
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Did the Department, even post hoc, make known any views about it to your Department?
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It did. It raised concerns about the cost incentive issue, which is perhaps the best way to express it, as has been referred to already. Our view on that issue was coloured to some extent by the understanding which I believe was explicitly reflected in the contract between CSID and the executive services team that the intention was to proceed on the basis of a design, build, finance, operate and maintain process. In that process there would be, at a minimum, the expectation of a firm estimate of cost and that the risks inherent in cost escalation would be borne by the contractors rather than the contracting party. In that context, the exposure from the fee implicit in the executive services contract would be a known entity rather than one that had the potential to escalate further. We were also aware of the fact that there was a termination provision in the contract that, in the event, economic advantage would be secured by terminating the contract with a view to renegotiation or substitution, albeit on payment of a termination penalty. That option was available to CSID, of which we were aware. While conscious of the concerns in relation to a fee or percentage based structure, we were also aware of factors in the structure of the project that would serve to mitigate those concerns.
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Is there a view in the Department of the Taoiseach on the contract going from £30 million to £48 million?
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The estimate of £30 million implicit in the Government decision of July 2000 to proceed with the aquatic centre was on the basis of analysis prepared by independent consultants, in this instance PricewaterhouseCoopers, which indicated that was their estimate of what would be required on the basis that the total capital cost would be of the order of £48 million and a sum of £18 million or more might be negotiated from a contractor on the basis of the cumulative value of the surplus of operating a facility over a period of 30 years. In that report the extent to which that was a challenging objective was made clear. That was made known to Government at the time of the decision. In the event, as it appeared, there was not a willingness in the market to commit a capital sum of that scale.
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We will return to this. I know my colleagues want to contribute. Does £500,000 from the private sector not cause alarm bells to ring in so far as the notion of expectation of significant private sector involvement is replicated in the greater project?
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Clearly, it is a matter of concern, but there are differences between projects having regard to their scale and nature and also the extent of the likely level of income to be generated from usage. It would not be reasonable to assume that an aquatic centre was entirely representative of the range of sports and amenity facilities envisaged for the wider campus project. What it points to is the need for clear project specification and effective negotiations.
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In regard to the aquatic centre, I do not believe there was a lack of specification on the nature of the project. What was clear was that the market interest and the market calculation of the surplus to be generated over a period of 30 years were not at the optimistic end of the PricewaterhouseCoopers spectrum.
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It was related to the period of months' notice to be provided which we can provide later.
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As I understand it, it depended on the amount of notice given. Taking both ends of the spectrum, if six months' notice was given, it would have worked out at £400,000 and if no notice was given, it would have worked out at £1 million approximately.
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How is it posited that you could give six months' notice if you felt it necessary to get rid of somebody?
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I do not know. I can only presume that as they would have been earning £100,000 per month for those six months in working out their notice, effectively the termination payment would have been about IR£1 million.
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From what we have heard so far, much of the discussion will break down between the old departmental arguments of going ahead, trying to get a job done and meet deadlines or going for the slow steady slog with a different approach. We will deal with that in the next few meetings.
I appreciate the Chairman's stance, that he is not responsible for what is said at the Committee on Finance and the Public Service but the term "corruption" has been used. As we are dealing with the accounts and Mr. Purcell's report it is very important to put on record what was said: "reasonable assurances that the financial statements are free from material misstatement whether caused by fraud or other irregularities or error". That is a specific statement regarding the financial statements. On page 5 there are outlines regarding the finance and audit subcommittee of the board of CSID which was established and a few points about corporate governance. Do they deal with the concerns raised earlier by the Comptroller and Auditor General?
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Yes, they would. The existence of an active and effective finance and audit subcommittee is an essential element of corporate governance. That would go some way towards meeting my concerns. It would be clearly an essential building block of any proper system of corporate governance.
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When we look at Mr. Teahon's report we will debate the issue of trying to build a centre within a given time and whether certain methods might be slower than others. I join in the compliments to the Office of Public Works and to everyone involved but we will be thrashing this out. It has been stated on several occasions that no firm estimate of the cost was available. I appreciate that some Deputies have become experts on this over the past two years and various figures have been mentioned - £1 billion was a handy one to latch on to. Is it true that there was no firm estimate of the cost? Mr. Teahon has produced figures and I know we will deal with those later. He has stood over them during the week but everyone else says they are not firm figures. Is that correct?
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Mr. Murphy might deal with it. The figure of £1 billion is often mentioned but it is in the context of the infrastructure, relocation of the Department of Agriculture, Food and Rural Development and road entrance to the stadium.
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I mentioned earlier that the Office of Public Works has not done any independent costings. The High Point Rendel report has a range of costings in it. They are not to hand but I am sure someone here has them. The range of costs is set out in that report.
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I understood Mr. Murphy to say in reply to Deputy Rabbitte that one of his concerns was there was no firm estimate of costs available. I am not quite sure if I heard it from another source also. Either there was a firm estimate of costs available or there was not. It may not be accurate and some might say it could not be delivered on but the evidence we are given must be factual.
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I will answer that in two ways. There was an estimate of costs from the Office of Public Works on the aquatic centre only. That was borne out in the event. Campus and Stadium Ireland is working to that cost. In regard to the overall, that is where the argument arises and it is why the High Point Rendel report has a range of costs. The report also refers to the fact that a difficulty is that the actual requirements for the stadium are not tied down.
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So there are figures and estimates available but they are disputed. Campus and Stadium Ireland Development Limited has one set of figures and you are suggesting that other people have different sets of figures.
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These sets of figures are set out in the High Point Rendel report. It also states that one of the jobs to be done is to state the requirements clearly.
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We will obviously need time to establish the credibility of these sets of figures. As Deputy Lenihan mentioned earlier, we are dealing with the report and accounts of Campus and Stadium Ireland and we would want to put very carefully on the record that whatever about procedural difficulties there is no question or suggestion of financial irregularities in thereport.
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I confirm that absolutely. We are talking about getting value for money, organising affairs in a way that allows one to act as efficiently and effectively as possible with due regard to transparency and accountability.
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In the accounts for the year 2000 there is a figure of £397,000, almost €400,000, for consultancy fees. Who were the consultants and what were they consulted about?
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There is expenditure of £49,750 for travel and entertainment. I would expect there would be a fair amount of entertainment in a campus stadium and sports complex but not before it has been built. How did that arise?
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Without wishing to pre-empt what the executive chairman might wish to say, if one wants to build something one must go and see similar edifices elsewhere and how they are run. I would imagine that would involve a fair amount of travel. As I recall it, that accounts for most, if not all, of that figure.
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The Comptroller and Auditor General said in his report that the main project was in limbo. From what I recall from my penny catechism limbo is a state or place of rest where some souls suffer for a time before they go to heaven.
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Mr. McCarthy, you were addressing the question of the specification. From whom is the specification obtained?
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The basic brief description for what was to be procured was based on the feasibility study presented to the Government which had been prepared by PricewaterhouseCoopers. It outlined the essential elements in terms of both the wet and dry facilities, so to speak——
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In particular in the context of its availability for the Special Olympics, the nature of the project to include a 50 metre pool, a diving pool and other facilities including those for a given number of spectators as well as support or ancillary services such as catering.
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That was a brief given by Campus Stadium Ireland Limited which was authorised to do so by Government in January 2000 and the report was submitted in July.
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PricewaterhouseCoopers was selected as the company to deal with the provision of the specification.
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Are there any particular skills or aspects that you would need to have in your Department in order to make a prudent assessment and evaluate such a specification?
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The basic criterion was to ensure that the analysis was robust in terms of its financial and design aspects. It was not a detailed design specification. What the feasibility study essentially did was to estimate the likely cost ranges of producing a facility which would meet, in the first instance, the Special Olympics brief but which would be comparable to the best aquatic centres with leisure facilities operating in Europe.
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In effect the report that was produced was an analysis of what the implications of matching best practice would be and the initial capital costs, operating costs and the likely revenues that might be generated. What was called a benchmark option or scenario was presented.
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I presume the consultants, from their own expertise and network of support, would have reviewed——
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You referred to PricewaterhouseCoopers. Did you establish the veracity or the surety that would be essential for you in the context of their specification?
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This committee has often found that on close examination of auditors' reports and accounts of situations they are not necessarily as accurate as they should be. In that regard it is necessary to be able to test them against what they are basing their calculations on. From that point of view, one cannot speak about cost effectiveness or value for money unless one knows what one is talking about and is able to either make it stand up, see it in an amended form or dismiss it in its entirety.
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In carrying out this assignment PricewaterhouseCoopers consultants engaged Faulkner Browns, a UK firm of architects with particular and significant experience of aquatic facilities to work with them. The question of their expertise is not one I would have any reason to doubt. In terms of the value or accuracy of their report, it is validated by the fact that their estimate of the capital cost of producing what they outlined as the benchmark project was in line with the market when tenders were received and examined. The order of magnitude of what it would cost was borne out in the marketplace. The question of what a private operator would be willing to invest by way of equity in the project, which they regarded in the report as the challenging aspect of the brief, was not borne out on the optimistic end when the market had produced its tender.
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Thank you. I am happy that the Comptroller and Auditor General is in a position to say there is no irregularity in the expenditure. This committee must first and foremost acknowledge that it is not engaged in a formal inquiry such as the one we have had. It is wrong that the integrity of very competent and well-intentioned senior persons would be impugned or damaged by very serious and worrying reporting that could do harm and damage to individuals. We must always be conscious of that and I am delighted the Comptroller and Auditor General is in a position to correct that.
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——and we should not allow that. This committee has always worked well and I have always found my colleagues to be very generous in their attitude and sincerity of approach. To depart from that in any way that would sully the name of any individual is grossly wrong and damages the credibility of the committee.
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You have made your point forcibly. As Chairman, I have tried to be constructive throughout the meeting and I respect what the Comptroller and Auditor General had to do in this instance. It was not like reviewing the Department of Tourism, Sport and Recreation. There was no statutory basis. It is only right for the committee to probe the area of executive services. It is a new dimension as regards procurement policy. I have certain reservations about what is happening. That is my view on it. Legal advice was sought on this aspect. I believe it will be queried in the future. Perhaps it would be no harm for Barry Murphy, who is used to procurement policy, to access that legal advice because it is an issue that will arise. It is giving rise to an unfair tendering process. Prior to this meeting I received telephone calls from people in the construction industry who are concerned about this type of executive services. Their concern is that they have to tender for a project and it must be advertised in the European Journal. I make no apologies for raising that dimension publicly. I am still concerned but that is another day's work.
I thank Mr. Teahon for being so tolerant and listening to all the questions. You can make your opening statement now and respond to some of the questions. I know some questions were raised earlier. I would like the permission of the committee to publish Mr. Teahon's opening statement.
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I thought the approach was that Mr. Teahon would respond to the issues of governance before proceeding with his opening statement.
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People have been waiting to hear Mr. Teahon's opening statement but if he wants to respond to questions before making it that is his privilege.
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Chairman, I would prefer to make my opening statement. People have it and I would prefer to do that. I am very happy and would like to make a number of comments at the end of the opening statement in relation to the points that have already been made.
I welcome the opportunity to meet with the Committee of Public Accounts and I am grateful to you, Chairman, and to the committee for agreeing to hear an opening statement from me. I will concentrate on two main issues that have generated recent controversy. I will be happy to answer any questions the committee has.
I would like to begin by asking the committee to consider an invitation that I am happy to make to you to visit and see the work in progress on the National Aquatic Centre. Very significant progress has been made in a very short period of time towards completing the aquatic centre as what I believe is a world class facility. The committee, if it decides it would be appropriate for it to visit the site, will see for itself work that represents significant value for money.
I would now like to address the two issues on which there has been significant controversy in recent times and on which I value this opportunity to set the record straight as far as I am concerned. These issues are the High Point Rendel report and the contract for the National Aquatic Centre. I will take the High Point Rendel report first. It has been said in the media that on the evening of the publication of the HPR report I gave an emotional response. I would prefer the phrase "significantly concerned". I remain significantly concerned both at some of the contents of but more particularly about the interpretation that has been put on the HPR report.
The significant concerns I would have apply, in particular, to two assertions now attributed to the HPR report. The first is the report was and is widely quoted as having asserted that Sports Campus Ireland would now cost €1 billion and as having undermined my assessment that the project could be delivered at a net cost to the Exchequer of £350 million or just under €445 million. The second is ever since its publication the HPR report has been quoted variously as having been "savage" or "merciless" or "scathing" in its criticism of the inexperience of the team entrusted with this project. I am seriously concerned about these because, in fact, neither appeared in the report, yet I suspect many people who have not had an opportunity to read the report genuinely believe that they did. I want to set the record straight that they did not.
Let me take the issue of cost first. It would take a long time to go through the figures point by point, but in my judgment the basic facts are these. The HPR report contains three estimates of cost as set out in the table appended to this statement. One of them is the CSID estimate which is based on the bids we actually received at the outline bid stage. The other two are HPR's estimates of what certain aspects of the project would cost. The first HPR estimate relates to what it calls the outline bid brief. The second relates to the project that HPR calls the post-bid stage. The second estimate is considerably smaller than the first and, in fact, the second estimate, if people look at the table, is almost identical to the CSID estimate, yet for reasons that are not clear to me, almost everybody has seized on the higher HPR estimate. HPR says in its report at paragraph 4.12 that after the outline bid stage CSID amended the scope and size of certain facilities. HPR then went on to say at paragraph 4.14 that CSID's costs "are a viable estimate". However, it then makes a qualification. Our figures, it says, are wrong because we are basing our design on what is called a sunken bowl concept. Excuse me for getting into what is a technical concept, but I believe it is very important. HPR, to be honest, in my view, has got this wrong. At all stages of HPR's work we tried to make it clear to it that we did not intend a sunken bowl in the sense that it has used the term. In getting it wrong about the sunken bowl HPR effectively added a very significant sum to the cost of the stadium.
HPR then went on to add a figure of £66 million for contingencies to this total and to allow that the project would attract total income of £95 million, somewhat lower than our estimate of IR£127 million. Even if its figures under these headings are correct - I do not agree with them - that leaves a net Exchequer exposure in mid-2001 figures of IR£445.2 million which includes the aquatic centre.
Somehow or other this figure has been translated into a "billion euro project" which has become part of what I see as the mythology surrounding this project. I say, as I have said before, that there is no basis for the assertion that this is a billion euro project. Furthermore, the commentators who quote HPR always seem willing to add the cost of moving the State laboratories to which Barry Murphy has referred to the total, even though in its report HPR said it should not be added.
I remain of the view that the Sports Campus Ireland project can be completed in its entirety for considerably less than HPR's higher estimate. I am also confident that we will secure more income than it has suggested. I stand by the figure I have consistently put forward that the cost of this project to the Exchequer will be of the order of IR£350 million or, as I said, just under €445 million in mid-2001 terms.
I now turn to the issue of experience and the "savage" or "scathing" criticism in the HPR report. HPR makes two particular comments on that subject. The first is:
The outline management structure of the combined Executive Services and Project Management teams provides the basis for a management structure for a project of this nature.
A perfectly acceptable statement as far as I am concerned. Second:
In our opinion the breadth and depth of skills available in-house within CSID should be reviewed as it is our view that the CSID's in-house team needs to be strengthened to create a well rounded in-house management team.
I have no difficulty with this. I readily admit to the committee that this is the first time I have been entrusted with the construction of a stadium and a wide range of associated facilities, although I do have experience of complex negotiations at local, national and international level. However, I have always accepted and believed that no one person, or even a small group, can have enough expertise at their disposal when it comes to ensuring value for public money. It is precisely for that reason we have sought from the very beginning of this project to be advised by what I believe are world class professionals as well as having local knowledge and expertise. The companies we have appointed, in all cases following open tender competitions, all have the highest reputations in their field.
I do wish that HPR had made clear in its report that it had discussed this issue with me and that I had said to it that we, in CSID, fully appreciated the need to add people with particular experience of the different facilities that were to be put in place as part of our in-house management or assessment processes. I also made clear to it that we intended to act on that basis in relation to the stadium and other campus facilities. I did say that I believed such expertise should be brought on board as required, not necessarily at the start of the project.
As particular examples, I believe the executive services team has significant experience in the delivery of complex renewal projects on time and in budget. I also believe that the project managers CSID appointed, again after open tender, Davis Langdon/PKS, have significantly more experience in relation to stadia than do HPR. This may well explain the difference that has arisen in relation to the sunken bowl.
I would now like to turn to the more recent controversy, the one surrounding the awarding of the contract to build the aquatic centre. When the Government decided in July 2000 to include an aquatic centre in the campus it was clear to us that if we were to reach the target of hosting the Special Olympics in the summer of 2003, we would have to have the aquatic centre ready, functioning and tested well before that date. It is, in fact, a requirement under the rules of the Special Olympics. In order to achieve this, we set ourselves the first target of applying for planning permission before the end of the year 2000. That was the specific target we set ourselves, otherwise the pool would not be in place for the Special Olympics.
Within five days of being asked to build the aquatic centre by Government we sent off to the Official Journal of the European Communities an advertisement for a contract to design, build, finance, operate and maintain an aquatic and leisure centre. That began a process of tendering that was intended to culminate in a decision to appoint a contractor by the end of the year if possible. Fair-minded people who have experience of public procurement processes, especially for large and complex projects, will, I hope, appreciate the amount of work involved in that stage of the process, especially in view of the target we had set ourselves of end year 2000.
Expressions of interest were received from eight consortia comprising more than 20 companies on 25 August 2000. Those expressions of interest were assessed on Monday, 28 August 2000 by a panel consisting of senior CSID and Office of Public Works personnel, with technical and legal support. At that stage the assessors examined all the original information furnished by the different consortia, including financial and economic information received. In the view of the panel, five consortia qualified for the next stage. These included a consortium - it is important to underline the fact that it is a consortium, there is not somehow a separate arrangement with Waterworld (UK) Limited. We are dealing and have dealt with a consortium.
It is worth pointing out that this particular consortium at that expression of interest stage consisted of Multi Development Corporation NV for the Netherlands with €336.9 million turnover in 1999. It also included S and P Architects as designers with a very substantial track record of successful design of swimming pool and leisure facilities primarily in the United Kingdom, including a Cambridge parkside pool, Tonbridge swimming pool and more than 15 others, including be it said the Aquadome in Tralee. It also included Waterworld (UK) Limited as operator of the complex. Waterworld (UK) Limited was described at that stage as closely linked to a leading aquatic operator, Schlitterbahn, and a significant manufacturer of leisure pool attractions, NBGS, both US companies. Waterworld (UK) Limited outlined in its submission that the operation of the pool at Abbotstown was well matched to its portfolio and capability and that NBGS would offer site planning and patented attractions. This submission was signed by Keith Palmer, director of Waterworld (UK) Limited.
Following this initial assessment, Multi Development Corporation NV withdrew from the competition. Rohcon Limited replaced MDC NV prior to the consortium making an outline bid. The replacement was accepted on the basis that the consortium would have pre-qualified had Rohcon been party to the original consortium and that a replacement was allowed under EU procurement rules on that basis. CSID sought and received legal advice to this effect.
In addition to this consortium, four others were qualified to make outline bids. In fact, three qualifying outline bids were received on 9 October 2000. The outline bid in respect of the consortium which now included Rohcon made it clear that Waterworld (UK) Limited was closely linked to NBGS International, a US company with many years of design, manufacturing and consulting in the waterpark industry - "the NBGS executive management team has decades of experience in building and operating waterparks." In addition, details were provided on Schlitterbahn, which is owned by the same people and a major waterpark operator in the United States.
Meanwhile CSID commissioned PricewaterhouseCoopers to carry out a detailed review of the many different companies involved in all the bidding consortia right across the three consortia with which we were still dealing. These searches were commenced on 22 November 2000 and inquired into 13 different companies altogether. They were carried out in advance of entering into a contract with whoever would emerge as the preferred bidder out of the detailed bid process.
The issue was notified to us by PwC on 18 December and said Waterworld (UK) Limited was a dormant company. In my judgment, what one looks for in such cases is adequate evidence of the bona fides, capabilities and financial strength of the people involved in the company. I did not explicitly bring the word "dormant" to the detailed bid assessment panel's attention because I regarded the issue which I would have to deal with was that of their financial standing. The panel's brief was to determine the quality of the bids rather than their financial standing. I believe it is very important to underline this fact for the committee. The brief of the panel at detailed bid stage was to determine and make a judgment on the quality of the bids, in particular in terms of the most economically advantageous bid, not to make judgments on their financial standing. I did, however, tell the panel - I believe that is what was important - that there was a funding issue with this bid which would have to be dealt with.
I might also mention to the committee that a number of the other companies examined also required further investigation and information, for example, the company known as Dublin International Arena Limited, DIAL, had been incorporated at the start of that year and never traded.
As I have said, because Waterworld (UK) Limited was part of the consortium which had already pre-qualified and submitted the bid which our assessment panel judged to be the best - so the detailed bid assessment panel judged that consortium, again the consortium of which Waterworld (UK) Limited was part - I advised the assessment panel on 19 December - I quote from a note prepared at the time by PricewaterhouseCoopers:
The Waterworld proposal was not the best funded, and there were issues to be resolved particularly in this area with them.
I also decided, on legal advice, that we should not at that stage declare the consortium to be the preferred bidder. The normal situation would be that if it was judged to be the most economically advantageous, you would, in fact, say to it that it was the preferred bidder. Instead, later on the same day, 19 December 2000, and on my instructions, CSID wrote to Mr. Keith Palmer, a director of Waterworld (UK) Limited and told him there were certain matters in respect of which we required clarification and confirmation by each member of the consortium. Our desire to proceed with it as the desired bidder was, the letter said, subject to these clarifications and confirmations.
The issues raised with Mr. Palmer were: (1) that a special purpose company should be formed comprising each of the consortium members, we are still dealing with the consortium; (2) that the obligations of the special purpose company should be guaranteed by the consortium members in an appropriate format; (3) that satisfactory heads of agreement and the contract sum should be agreed in further negotiations; (4) that they supply satisfactory financial information on the standing of NBGS in the United States and their agreement to guarantee Waterworld (UK) Limited for the purpose of operation; (5) that they would furnish satisfactory details for the financing of any cashflow required from the commencement to the completion of construction.
On 21 December 2000 CSID wrote to each member of the consortium, including Waterworld (UK) Limited again with further details of our requirements and setting out a range of issues that required further negotiation before we could make a final decision on who would become the preferred bidder. In that letter I said we hoped to appoint them, the consortium, as preferred bidder on or before 31 January 2001, subject to agreement being reached on the range of issues I outlined which again included a number of financial guarantees and assurances. I also wrote to S&P Architects on 19 December regarding using their scheme for planning permission purposes because of our deadline that we had set ourselves. We lodged their scheme for planning with Fingal County Council on 22 December 2000.
I hope it will be clear from the brief account I have given that we were fully aware that the issue of the financial standing of Waterworld (UK) Limited was an issue on which we needed assurance before we could proceed. It was only one of the issues. Many of the others were more demanding and onerous as I have pointed out in the issues we raised with it.
I dealt with the Waterworld issue as a problem that had to be solved. I did so acting, as I saw it, on the basis of delegated authority from the board of CSID. In this connection, the board's report to Minister McDaid on 8 March 2002 states:
The Board had established parameters for a process in relation to the award of the contract for the Aquatic Centre and had delegated the implementation of that process to the Executive. The Board is satisfied that the process established was appropriate.
I did not, as I have said, see the issue of dormancy as the essential issue that needed to be dealt with. What I said to the detailed bid assessment panel reflected my view that the essential issue was the financial standing of the consortium and Waterworld (UK) Limited as a member of that consortium. I do regret - I wish to underline this - that I did not say clearly to the panel, the Department of the Taoiseach and the board of CSID that Waterworld (UK) Limited had been found to be dormant and that I believed the issue could be dealt with along the lines on which we acted in CSID. I regret, very genuinely, any embarrassment that has arisen because I did not use the word "dormant". My purpose at all times was to handle this matter as efficiently and expeditiously as possible, but I now accept that if I had explained the position fully to the assessment panel, the board and the Department of the Taoiseach, then much, if not all, of the concerns that have arisen in the recent past could have been avoided. The actions I put in place to resolve the problem that arose were designed to resolve the problem. I believe they did so. I accept again that my communication in the matter was inadequate. I have accepted this and I am prepared to accept that I made a misjudgment in not giving fuller reports and information. I will not accept, however, any suggestion from any source that my actions were designed with any dishonest or improper motivation in mind.
I will now deal with the issue about which Deputy Rabbitte spoke earlier and would like to make an interpolation into what I have to say. As just one example - there have been several - on RTE radio a member of the committee, Deputy Rabbitte, a member for whom I have - I genuinely mean this - always had the highest respect, suggested that one possible explanation was that this project was - I quote from a transcript I received of what Deputy Rabbitte had to say - "always intended for the three principals in the Kerry equation" and went on to imply - I quote again from the transcript - "break all procedures, EU procurement procedures and so on in order to contrive to give it, if that's what happened, to the people now responsible." In saying this, Deputy Rabbitte was, I judged before hearing him today, offering, in my view, to say the least, an innuendo that I was involved in a conspiracy of some sort to divert public money to people on no basis other than that they were from Kerry.
I have heard what Deputy Rabbitte said. I fully accept what he said that he did not intend any innuendo. I still have to say that I have a problem with much of the comment that has been made in relation to the issue of these three people being from Kerry and Tralee, in particular. I have that problem at two levels. One is there would appear to be an implication that because people are from Tralee that somehow they are less good or will be less good at running aquatic centres than people from anywhere else in the world. I do not believe that is fair. Second, there is an implication in some of what is being said that I knew these people and was somehow involved in a conspiracy with them. I want to put on record that I did not know any of the three people concerned before they became involved in the project. I had never met any of them. I have no connection with their families. I want to put that clearly on the record.
I did not believe I would find myself in the position after what I believe has been a long and committed career of public service of defending myself against innuendo of that kind. I fully respect what Deputy Rabbitte said earlier, but hope he and, more particularly, some of the others involved in what, in my view, is similar innuendo, will find the grace to admit that they were wrong and unjust.
I accept, as I have accepted for many months, that it is entirely appropriate that in a project as complex as this one there should be a full-time chief executive. I have made it clear that I do not wish to be a full-time chief executive. It has been suggested that I should resign as chairman over this affair. To do so would, in my view, be to accept wrongdoing. There has been no wrongdoing. I regard it as a fundamental principle that the public's money must be protected and managed well and have honoured that principle in this transaction as in every other in which I have been involved in the Irish public service.
I could and should, as I have said, have communicated better, but since the day I was appointed as chair of this project I have sought to implement the decisions of the Government in relation to it without favouring anybody. I have, in particular, sought to implement the decision of having the aquatic centre in place for the Special Olympics. My commitment in that regard has been to contribute to the building of a set of facilities on time and in budget, of which the people of Ireland will be proud. I believe we will succeed in doing so.
Comment on this
It is fair to say that all the members of this committee, including Deputy Rabbitte, accept the bona fides, reputation and integrity that precedes Mr. Teahon. It is not the objective of this committee to besmirch his character or reputation. Our concern is for the proper management of a project that will involve millions of taxpayer's money. That is the principal concern of the committee. I do not envy Mr. Teahon in his task because this, unfortunately or fortunately depending on which part of the political equation you position yourself in, has become an intensely politicised project with the Opposition making a very clear point that it will scrap this project if it is in government after the next election. It is intensely political and has become intensely politicised. I hope the way we conduct ourselves in this committee will mean that we do not join in what I can only describe as an Opposition lynch mob, particularly Fine Gael——
Comment on this
——determined to destroy the character and reputation of a very eminent civil servant who has served us extremely well.
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The Deputy is talking about external factors outside this committee. Everyone is trying to be constructive in this debate and he should be, too. I will move on to the next speaker if the Deputy does not conduct himself.
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It is important to point out that neither the Tánaiste nor the Taoiseach is a member of any Opposition lynch mob.
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I ask the Deputy to withdraw that remark. I have tried to be constructive in this debate and manage it as best as is possible. It is a difficult discussion and I will let people such as Mr. Teahon make an assessment on whether the debate has been balanced. I ask the Deputy to continue with his questions. I do not want to hear another Ard Fheis speech from him.
Comment on this
The Chairman is being partisan again. I will not talk about his Ard Fheis. Mr. Teahon, on page 9 of your statement you indicate that the issue of dormancy was notified to you by PricewaterhouseCoopers on 18 December. Many people have been engaged in hyping and exaggerating the implications of dormancy for a company of this kind set up for a special purpose to bring a consortium together. What was the nature of the notification from PricewaterhouseCoopers? This is very important. Was this a heavy or light warning or was it "by the way it should be noted" that this company was dormant and not in the true sense of the word an operating company?
Comment on this
I do not believe that it was "by the way". As far as PricewaterhouseCoopers was concerned, this was an issue that had to be dealt with. That is how I saw it. My reaction was to say that, in my judgment, it was not unusual that in making a bid of this nature the company might be dormant. That was not the issue for me. The issue I believed needed to be dealt with and it went back to the consortium because it is important to keep saying we were not contracting, and did not contract, with an individual company, Waterworld (UK) Limited. People who listened to media presentations would believe that we contracted with one company called Waterworld (UK) Limited. That is not the case. We contracted with three members of a consortium. We contracted with Rohcon Limited, Dublin Waterworld Limited, the special purpose company, and Waterworld (UK) Limited in a minority position. When I saw the PricewaterhouseCoopers notification I was clear that this was an issue that it believed, and I believed having read it, needed to be dealt with. That is the action I put in place. I first saw the report on 18 December and, as I said in my statement, put the action in place having mentioned it in the way I did at the assessment panel on 19 December 2000.
Comment on this
What is your concern about dormancy or what was that PricewaterhouseCoopers' concern?
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The issue I believe is not one of dormancy. Dormancy means that the company is not trading or has not traded. There are two concepts that have been in the public domain, one is shelf company and the other is dormant. A shelf company is one which is put in place and then converted into another company. I understand this is a vehicle which has been used in many business transactions from recent comment in the media, including in the takeover of Eircom in recent times. A shelf company is something that would not be found unusual in the business community.
Dormancy means that the company has not traded in recent times. That would raise the issue of why it had not done so. That is what led me to say that we need to be sure, in moving forward to contract and confirm as preferred bidder this consortium, that the financial standing of Waterworld (UK) Limited has been examined. In practice, what happened was it said to us that two US companies, the NGBS company in particular, would provide a parent company guarantee. In practice, what happened was that did not prove possible. We were offered, and consulted PricewaterhouseCoopers on accepting the letter from Anglo Irish Bank, £3 million at that time which was secured per the letter on the assets of John Moriarty, the majority shareholder in Dublin Waterworld Limited. That is where the trail led.
Comment on this
To be clear, the company was a dormant shelf company, but you had secured financial guarantees from the participants in the consortia to ensure there would be no loss to the Exchequer and it would not be a case of a contract being given and suddenly there was no financial wherewithal to carry through the ambitious project envisaged. Is that the position?
Comment on this
In my judgment, what I put in place on the day after seeing for the first time, on 18 December, a reference to dormancy was a process that led to the financial standing of the consortium, in my view, being solved.
Comment on this
You deal on page 10 with the issues raised with Mr. Palmer that a special purpose company should be formed with each of the consortium members and the obligations of the special purpose company should be guaranteed by them. Was that achieved?
Comment on this
The contract that was eventually approved and signed is with three companies, Rohcon, Waterworld (UK) Limited in a minority position and Dublin Waterworld Limited. Under a system of joint and several liability, that contract is guaranteed at a level of IR£750,000 plus a separate guarantee of IR£360,000. That was what eventually emerged from that process through the letter from Anglo Irish Bank which referred to IR£3 million.
Comment on this
You are happy in the unforeseen event of anything going wrong with this company that there will be no liability for the Exchequer because of the structure and the guarantees you have entered into.
Comment on this
The guarantee, in effect, would be called in where the operating company, in particular, was not able to continue to run the aquatic centre. Most people will make a judgment on the guarantee in relation to the cost of running the centre. Contrary to some reports, the expected return from the centre is IR£100,000 annually. We are not talking, therefore, about millions of pounds but a centre which will, if it operates well, return IR£100,000. The guarantee has to be set in that context. In my judgment, it is adequate to cover the expenses of putting an alternative operator in place, but I hope that never happens.
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I am very happy with that. Were all five issues resolved? You dealt with one of them, the satisfactory financial information from the American company, for instance.
Comment on this
They were satisfied, but not in the form set down. As I explained, the parent company guarantee that it was said to us in December could be provided by NGBS in the United States did not happen. The guarantees now in place were in substitution for it.
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I do not believe they are stronger, but as a result of what were difficult negotiations, we have put in place a guarantee that is adequate for the purpose that I explained to you of covering the cost of putting an alternative operator in place, which I hope will never arise, in the event that the operator does not continue.
Comment on this
There seems to be a shock horror reaction to the dormancy issue. I am sorry to harp on about it, but as regards the concern expressed by PricewaterhouseCoopers regarding dormancy, was it the case that it indicated this is a dormant company and you would need to verify its finances before proceeding to the next stage of formal contract? Was that its concern on 18 December?
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I would not wish in what I say to attempt to minimise what PricewaterhouseCoopers said.
Comment on this
It said what it said. As far as I was concerned, there was an issue that needed to be dealt with. As I explained, I believe I put in place a process that led to the issue being dealt with.
Comment on this
What did it say, Mr. Teahon? Was it that you should not consider Waterworld (UK) Limited on account of it being a shelf company?
Comment on this
No. It was a statement of the outcome of its research on the company in question. There were a number of companies, as I have said. It is a tabular statement of the outcome of its search on these companies.
Comment on this
Therefore, PricewaterhouseCoopers, a very eminent company, did not put any caveats or express any reservations about you proceeding to deal with Waterworld (UK) Limited?
Comment on this
It certainly did not put any caveats. I believe it was satisfied because it participated in the production, with our legal advisers, of the letter of 19 December. There was a meeting of the assessment panel, as I have pointed out. It was not the function of the assessment panel to make a judgment on financial standing. We have legal advice to this effect. That was not its role. After the meeting of the assessment panel and the remarks I made to it, PricewaterhouseCoopers, McCann Fitzgerald, our solicitors, and the executive services team, on my instructions, produced the letter that went to the consortium.
Comment on this
PricewaterhouseCoopers was not unhappy with you proceeding to deal with Waterworld (UK) Limited. I am sure it made you aware that the company was based in the Virgin Islands and had a £4 share at the time. You were happy to proceed, even in the context of what has been heard about the Virgin Islands, the Caymen Islands, Ansbacher and so on and public's perception of this. The ordinary person in the street believes there is a smell off this project on the basis of what has been revealed in the media.
Comment on this
In terms of what has been said in the media we did not contract with Waterworld (UK) Limited on its own. We contracted with a consortium of Rohcon, Dublin Waterworld Limited and Waterworld (UK) Limited. As regard the issues raised by PricewaterhouseCoopers, it was party to the production of a letter with which I believe it was fully satisfied that went to the consortium and led to the contract that was eventually signed.
Comment on this
On the basis of what you have said, PricewaterhouseCoopers, the consultants, was happy, having carried out its assessment of the bona fides of Waterworld (UK) Limited that it was a company with which you could do business. Is that what you are saying?
Comment on this
In the sense that it participated and agreed a letter, as I have stated in page 10 of the statement. I believe the answer is, "Yes".
Comment on this
A dormant company is one which is not trading at the time. It never traded subsequent to being part of the consortium. The reason I am giving the explanation is that I believe "dormant" means it did trade previously, but that was not an issue for us.
Comment on this
The point is that Waterworld (UK) Limited was pulled into the consortium on the basis that the Government instructed you to ensure the best possible management expertise of international projects was brought in and involved in this project. You mentioned Waterworld (UK) Limited and that it is associated with Schlitterbahn, a company involved in water based rides. Waterworld (UK) Limited took you for a water based ride on this issue.
Comment on this
I do not think there is any justification, Chairman——
Comment on this
I do not believe there is any justification for you making a remark of that nature.
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With respect, Chairman, you did not say it would appear that way. You stated it as a fact.
Comment on this
Sorry, I will change it. It would appear that way to many people. We can obfuscate all we like, but that is what it appears like.
Comment on this
I respect your honesty in your responses. I am saying what the ordinary person is saying. If you are oblivious to that, you are oblivious to reality. I believe that is what people are saying.
Comment on this
I have tried to bring out - I hope the perception changes as a result of my statement - that people have come to that conclusion and have also come to conclusions about the HPR report on the basis of comment that is not well informed.
Comment on this
I accept that. I accept the HPR report and your analysis, but in case you think I am making a definitive statement, that is the perception.
Comment on this
I was giving the public's perception of it. People say that to me because they see it in the context of what happened in the past with Ansbacher and the Caymen and Virgin Islands, tribunals and so on. They read of a shelf company with a shareholding of £4 associated with the Virgin Islands and cannot understand how it is part of this consortium.
Comment on this
With respect, when they read in The Irish Times that the company which acquired Eircom was a shelf company they did not reach an equivalent conclusion because of the way in which it was presented.
Comment on this
Now that the Chairman has raised the issue of how the ordinary person might feel about this, perhaps it is important to clarify PricewaterhouseCoopers' view of dormancy. Its view of dormancy was not one of alarm bells ringing and something must be done, we must verify and check out this and that. It was not the highlight of that section of the report.
Comment on this
I have a difficulty answering that question. I do not want anything I say here today to suggest that I came here to minimise what PricewaterhouseCoopers said. I have said that, in my judgment, the issue was not dormancy but the financial standing of a consortium, not the financial standing just of one company. I do not want anything that I say in reply to imply that I am somehow trying to minimise what PricewaterhouseCoopers said.
Comment on this
There were no alarm bells ringing in the report. There was nothing to say look at this about dormancy.
Comment on this
It did not come to you in a tizzy following its report to you saying you must deal with dormancy, it is vital.
Comment on this
My problem in a sense is that perhaps if I had used the word "dormant" at the time, we might not be here today.
Comment on this
I do not want to say it is not the issue. Maybe if I had used the word "dormant," we would not be here today. I was very genuine in stating the regrets that I now have. I do regret that I did not give a full account of this at every stage and do not want now in commenting after the event to in any way suggest I am trying to minimise it. I am not.