COMMITTEE ON FINANCE. - VOTE 3—EXECUTIVE COUNCIL.
Contributions 1–136 of 275. This sitting's record is too long for one page, so it is split into 2 parts.
Before proceeding, I wonder could we have some general ruling as to the scope of the discussion on this Vote of the Executive Council. I understand on this Vote there could be a general discussion on the whole policy of the Executive Council as such but we have a President here who has combined many offices, including that of Assistant Minister for Finance, Minister for Defence, Paymaster General, Commander-in-Chief and various other titles and offices. This Vote only deals with the Executive Council. I asked you when the discussion began on the Vote for the Ministry of Finance whether we were at liberty to discuss the whole financial policy of the Government on that Vote. You said that could be done. Can that be done also on this Vote? Can we discuss the financial, economic and military policy of the Government at length on this particular Vote, or how can you distinguish that from the general policy of the Executive Council? May I point out that we have already discussed the policies of two members of the Executive Council, the Minister for Education and the Minister for External Affairs.
Comment on this
Yes, any questions of policy in which the Executive Council are collectively responsible can be discussed on this Vote, but the difficulty that arises is, as the Deputy himself has pointed out, that we have already dealt with the Estimates for the Ministry of Education and the Ministry of External Affairs. If an amendment is to be moved which is to be made a question of confidence, I would allow the fullest possible discussion, except that we should certainly not have a discussion again on the Ministry of Education and the Ministry of External Affairs. If there be any discussion on them it should be on points which did not arise on the Estimates.
There is another matter. The Executive Council, of course, cannot now be arraigned for Acts which have been passed by the Oireachtas,, for example the Old Age Pensions Act, because that is no longer a matter for which the Executive Council is responsible. The Oireachtas is responsible. There is another difficulty in regard to the question of the Finance Bill which we have disposed of here, and which has gone to the Seanad. It was very fully debated, and the difficulty is whether the question of Protection, which was the main question raised by the Finance Bill, could be introduced. I would prefer it were not, but I would not go to the length of ruling it out if, as I say, a question of confidence were arising on the Vote. But I think Deputies should keep from details as much as possible. Detailed matters can be raised on the Estimates.
Comment on this
Before the Deputy proceeds to move that, can we discuss the general policy, or lack of policy, of the Executive Council, for instance in regard to their failure to provide money, and although the provision of that money may mean the introduction of legislation, can we discuss to that extent their failure to introduce certain legislation?
Comment on this
I think it is a rule that in a discussion on the Estimates the question of legislation cannot be dealt with. The question is rather more difficult here in the case of the Executive Council.
Comment on this
Even on an ordinary Estimate a Minister cannot be arraigned for having failed to introduce legislation. He can only be criticised from the point of view of administering money which he has got under the then existing law. Reforms which would necessitate legislation cannot be advocated, but in this particular instance I am afraid it would be impossible to enforce that rule, particularly if Deputy Esmonde, as a matter of confidence, is moving to refer the Vote back.
Comment on this
I would like to explain that if I take part in this debate I have nothing to say against the Minister but against the body of six who are charged with the Government of this country and their failure to bring in legislation to deal with certain matters.
Comment on this
I would regard that as an excellent way to deal with this particular Vote, because it solves the question of not going over again discussion which has taken place on the Estimates or on which discussion will take place during the week on the Estimates.
Comment on this
This is the point I am in difficulty about for in discussing the financial policy of the Government we would have to go in some detail into figures on which that policy is based and figures which have been given to the Dáil. That would take some time, and I wonder would this be the proper time for a discussion as to the principles on which the financial policy of the Executive Council is based.
Comment on this
I think the time is when the motion to refer the Vote back is being moved. At any rate it would be impossible to rule upon all the contingencies.
Comment on this
We are under a certain difficulty in this Motion on account of the fact that the President is here. Everybody knows he is overworked, and he has collected a great number of duties upon his shoulders. I hope, after the vast amount of correspondence that passes between the Acting-Minister for Finance and the Minister for Defence that they are on friendly terms, and that the relations between the Paymaster-General and the Commander-in-Chief are, at any rate, cordial. But I think that this assumption of a great number of duties by the already overworked President is a most subtle manner of making it difficult for us to criticise him too severely. The Session is coming to an end, so far as this year is concerned, and I think it is only right, before the Dáil breaks up, that there should be a discussion as to whether the policy that is being pursued by the Executive Council is likely to attain the results which are claimed for it, and attain the objects which the Dáil presumably has in view, and which the Government has claimed to have had in view. No one would wish to belittle the work of the Executive Council during the last two or three years. The task which they had to perform during 1922/23 was a very difficult one, but it was a very simple one—the task of saving the State. The State was saved, and now the task before them and before this Dáil is a different one. It is the task of leading the nation, and the question is whether they are leading the nation, or are being forced in various directions by various sections without any clear coherence, or any definite policy which can give any confidence or increase the confidence in the country. At the root of all the difficulties with which we are faced in the Dáil is the financial policy of the Government.
It is all very well to criticise any particular department of State, but there is always a satisfactory answer for all their shortcomings, and that is that they have been unable to get the money required from the Ministry of Finance, and I presume that the main object of the Executive Council in their financial policy is to re-establish, if possible, the credit of the State. Well, speaking in the French Chamber the week before last the new Prime Minister of France described credit as simply a learned or scientific translation of the word confidence, and it is well known that no number of bank financiers can give credit to a State which does not possess it, however willing they might be to do so. In this country the credit of the State does not depend on what the bank of England thinks of it; it depends on what Irishmen think of it. If the people of Ireland are wholeheartedly behind the Government, then and only then, can the State have credit and can there be confidence in the country. And in this matter any action which the Executive Council may take which tends, or any omission of the Executive Council which tends to turn a section of the people against the State, that very fact tends to lessen the credit of the State. In this matter it is difficult to distinguish between the financial policy of the Government and the general policy which is based ultimately on their financial arrangements. Measures have been passed which we cannot discuss here, within the last twelve months, which have in the opinion of many members of the Dáil turned large sections of the people against the State. I am satisfied that the decision to sponsor these measures on the part of the Executive Council, the decision not to reduce the heavy taxation we are suffering from, the decision not to allow the various expenditures absolutely necessary for the recovery of the nation, these decisions have been reached, as far as I have been able to discover, in a very hasty and irresponsible manner by the Executive Council, and they have been reached more in a spirit of panic than by any clearly thought out plan. Instead of encouraging and giving confidence to the people, they have always taken the darkest view and given the most gloomy interpretation of figures which are themselves, and have been proved to be very inaccurate, not to say fantastic. The only financial method which the Executive Council have proposed in order to re-establish the credit of the country has been to balance the Budget. Well, what exactly did they mean by balancing the Budget? What Budget was it proposed we should have to balance? Was it proposed we should have to balance the whole Budget, and if not, on what principle are certain items to be excluded from that balance and other items to be admitted?
I would seek guidance from some of the statements which have been made. Speaking on behalf of the Executive Council, the Minister for Finance, on the 2nd November, 1923, stated that "On the best scrutiny of facts available, it appears certain that the normal operations of the Government at present entail an expenditure which exceeds revenue by at least something more than £1,000,000." Two weeks later he made a further statement, on the 15th November, when he said that "More than three million pounds must be saved if we are to balance our budget in the financial year, so far as the ordinary recurrent expenditure is concerned. That postulates an army which will cost not more than £2,000,000. I do not contemplate paying £4,000,000 out of revenue for the Army. I believe that we will have to borrow to the extent of £2,000,000 to meet the Army charge." Finally, last month, we had a statement from the Minister for Finance, when, in answer to Deputy Magennis, I think, on the 4th ultimo, he said: "I think I should say we are not endeavouring to meet out of revenue any of these abnormal expenses such as arise from Army charges, or from the cost of compensation." Here, at any rate, we have a definite statement that the abnormal Army charges and the cost of Property Losses and Personal Injuries Compensation, are to be omitted from the ordinary budget, and that there is a justification for going outside the ordinary revenue for meeting these charges. I would like the Dáil to consider whether in actual fact the Executive Council have done that during the last two years, from the Appropriation Accounts of 1922-23. The Property Losses and Personal Injuries amounted to £1,000,000, and the extraordinary Army expenditure, according to the official computation of the Minister is very nearly £5,500,000, and these two sums total £6,500,000. From the Estimates of last year, so far as we have been able to correct them from official statements made from time to time by the Minister, Personal Injuries and Property Losses amounted to £4,500,000 and the extraordinary Army Expenditure to £9,250,000. Even if we take the sum which is the annual sum and compare these two years of extraordinary revenue with the £3,300,000 stated to have been refunded by the British, in respect of compensation, you find that the total during these two years is nearly £18,000,000 on these extraordinary services alone, and yet at the beginning of this year the total National Debt was little more than £13,000,000, and there was a cash balance of nearly £3,500,000 in the Exchequer, so it is quite evident that during the last two years a very considerable portion of the extraordinary expenditure of these two items alone was paid for out of taxation. But that is not all; that is only the beginning.
On what principle are these three charges alone to be selected as lawfully to be excluded from the ordinary recurrent budget? Are there no other charges directly resulting from the Civil War, and if so how large are they? We have a rough estimate of their extent in the statement of the Minister for Finance. On the 22nd February, this year, he said: "I have no hesitation in saying that the destruction of the last two years can be taken to be solely responsible for this particular cut." That was the Old Age Pensions. "I am aware that apart from the Army charges, apart from the compensation charges, and apart from the charges which that destruction is directly responsible for there would be a comparatively small deficit in the revenue. That deficit would be such as could be met by ordinary savings that we would be able to make in the Departments, and that are now being effected in those Departments." So that according to the official opinion of the Executive Council the extraordinary charges resulting from the Civil War, either out of the Army Charges and the Personal and Property Compensation, are so great that without them the whole budget would be balanced. Yet these other charges for which the Irregular destruction was responsible have been included in the ordinary budget, which must be balanced according to the opinion of the Executive Council. What I want to know is, on what principle are these three items alone selected from the ordinary budget, for we find included in that budget, enormous charges consequent not only on the Irregular destruction, but on the foundation of a new State, and the struggle which led up to that foundation. In my computation of £18,00,000 for the last two years there are vast omissions, which you can find in the Appropriation Accounts which appear on the various other Votes: for instance, gratuities of various kinds, which are not recurrent—at least, I hope they will not be permanently recurrent;—I am leaving out pensions —property losses advances, commandeered premises, reconstruction of Cork, military and Civic Guard buildings, offices, the cost of setting up a new Government, the cost of furnishing their offices, the cost of setting up new Law Courts, the cost of setting up a new customs frontier, and the cost of training, clothing, housing, and sending out throughout the country a brand new police force. All these charges are put down as ordinary current expenditure, that the taxpayers of these few years have got to pay. It would seem to me from this that the Executive Council, if these are ordinary charges, must be expecting that a new State will be founded every five years.
That is only as far as the past is concerned. As a result of the over-taxation of the past, we began this year with three and a-half million pounds in the exchequer, whereas we began last year with less than £200,000. We were informed by the Minister for Finance that the deficit this year would be a little over eight and a-half million pounds. Nothing which has happened since that time, and none of the subsequent legislation, has very materially altered that figure. There have been some increased charges from legislation, and other reductions, such as the Army reduction, in the Estimates. As to that eight and a-half millions, what extraordinary expenditure can be written off against it this year? We have compensation charges scattered throughout the Estimates amounting to very nearly eight and a-half millions —£8,422,000. They are scattered through half-a-dozen Estimates. There may be more, but I have collected that much. There are abnormal Army charges, according to the original computation of the Minister, amounting to £1,800,000. Those two charges alone come to ten and a-quarter million pounds. That is so much admitted extraordinary expenditure which the Executive Council are willing to admit should not be paid out of taxation. But the only item to be found in the Estimates of extraordinary revenue is a sum of £1,730,000 which the British Government are expected to refund us for compensation this year. Even deducting that, you are left with eight and a-half million pounds of extraordinary expenditure, which is practically the same as the deficit.
The Minister may say that there are other items which do not appear in the estimates of revenue—other items of extraordinary revenue which might be described as extraordinary taxation. That is a different thing. It does not matter whether taxation is ordinary or extraordinary; it is the taxpayers who have to pay anyway. It is no excuse for the Minister to say that taxation should not be reduced simply because some of the taxation which we are suffering from this year is of an extraordinary nature. In any case, the Minister has not been able to give us any figures as to how much this extraordinary taxation revenue will come to.
To return to the expenditure of this year. I have only dealt with two items which are admittedly extraordinary expenditure. What about all the gratuities which are being paid now as a result of the struggle for independence and as a result of the civil war? What about the cost of setting up Government Departments and offices, the cost of the furnishing, the clothing of the Civic Guards, the housing of the Oireachtas and other matters which to the average man would seem to be expenditure consequent upon the establishment of this State? Finally, there is the very important item of the rebuilding of Government property. On what principle is it considered right that money which has to be spent on rebuilding private property should be excluded from the ordinary Budget, while the rebuilding of Government property, of national property, must be borne as an ordinary charge upon the shoulders of the taxpayer? I do not see how the Government can expect private individuals to rebuild, or to show sufficient confidence to rebuild, when the Government themselves do not show sufficient confidence, and are not rebuilding, except to a very limited extent.
The figures which have been supplied to the Dáil, as I say, are extremely confusing. On many occasions they have been proved to be extremely inaccurate. Yet, on these figures the Government have decided, without any apparent principle, to continue the present high rate of taxation and to continue to refuse any considerable expenditure which would tend to revive and to re-establish the confidence of the country. I do not think it is fair to the Dáil or the country that the Government should not clearly divide ordinary and extraordinary expenditure in their Budgets. The policy of dividing them has been adopted by almost all small well-run modern countries at present. I would like to compare some of the figures of these countries. We would be entitled to compare our situation with that of small countries which have recently been established and which have had very heavy initial charges on the foundation of their State. Of course, these countries never dreamt of balancing their Budgets. If they had done so from the beginning they would never have established their States at all. As a result of not balancing their Budgets it is true their currencies declined. But these currencies have nearly all been established and are rapidly returning to normal. Had they slavishly clung to the idea of balancing Budgets they would never have reached a normal stage, and they would be at the present time faced by constant revolutions within their borders.
I will now deal with these new countries. I will compare our position with the small long-established countries which are the countries held up to us as models to be followed—countries like Denmark, Holland and Switzerland, which are always held up to us as models of good government and efficiency in administration. As far as Denmark is concerned, in the last eight years there has been a deficit in the ordinary Budget amounting to over fifteen million pounds. In the last Budget statement, while there was an estimated balance in the ordinary account, there was still a deficit in the two Budgets, the ordinary and extraordinary, of twenty-six million kroner, or over one million pounds. Switzerland for the last three years had a deficit on the ordinary Budget of twelve million pounds, and this year a deficit of twenty-eight million Swiss francs. As to the extraordinary Budget, it has never been balanced, and in the present year the deficit stands at something like five and a half million pounds. Yet there can be no denying that Swiss credit is one of the highest in the world, and the currency is quoted above the pound sterling. It was twenty-three yesterday, and the official quotation is twenty-five—so it is quoted above the pound sterling. The same applies to Holland. The deficit in the ordinary Budget this year is over £8,00,000, and on the extraordinary Budget over six and a half million pounds. Yet, their credit is also one of the best in the world, and their florin is also quoted above the pound sterling. These countries are not slaves to the fetish of balancing their Budgets, and these are the countries which are able, and have been able during the last few years, to subsidise agriculture and other industries and to take the place which we formerly occupied in the British market.
The fact remains that a balanced Budget is not the one essential for national credit. For instance, this year Bulgaria is balancing its Budget. Yet, nobody would suggest that Bulgarian credit was as good as Swiss or Dutch credit at present. Far more important than balancing the Budget, from the point of view of national credits, is first of all the political stability, the productivity and the trade balance of the country. How does the Executive Council propose, with its present financial policy, to improve political stability, to increase the productivity of the country, or to recover the trade balance which is at present in such a serious position?
These things are not improving. On the contrary, they are getting worse. There is a general feeling amongst great numbers of people that there is something seriously wrong with the financial arrangements of the Government at the present time. If we want to get our finances in order, we must employ experts to do it. If the finances of the country are to be put in tune with national requirements, we must get some kind of a financial Colonel Brase to put them in tune. Otherwise they will never be put in tune. Ministers outside the Executive Council have not shown that fear of experts that is shown by members of the Executive. The Minister for Agriculture has been willing to set up an Agricultural Commission, and he is slowly carrying out many of its suggestions. The Minister for Local Government has set up a Commission to advise him on Local Government, and it is hoped he will carry out many of its recommendations. It is only in matters of finance that the Executive Council are afraid to call in experts in order to improve the situation.
The book of Estimates which we have before us is a very striking example of the confused mentality, as far as the finances of the country are concerned, of the Government at the present time. It is quite obvious that it is a slight improvement on the Estimates of 1922-23, but it substantially retains the same form. We find in it innumerable historical funds, grants and appropriations-in-aid, that have no particular meaning, but which are retained simply because they were retained under the old regime. It may be said that the simplifying of Estimates would require a lot of work, but I think the work will be far greater if we are to continue indefinitely such an amount of complication in our national finances. At present all up-to-date countries are simplifying their expenditure, as far as possible, in the interests of what is described as intelligent democracy. You cannot have an intelligent democracy unless the people know exactly how much money they have got and how it is being spent. That cannot be done at the present time. It is possible that some people in Government Buildings are not anxious that there should be intelligent democracy in this country.
In the ancient past it was alleged that before the arrival of St. Patrick a class of people known as Druids preserved their power by being able to interpret mysterious signs and wonders of their religion. At the present time I suspect that we have Druids in Government Buildings who are alone able to interpret for Ministers the mysterious and historical funds, grants and appropriations-in-aid, some of which were granted by statutes of George III. and George IV. Members of the Executive Council referred to the business community in this country as "antique furniture." I think, before making that statement, they should have, at least, taken the trouble to see that they had removed any pre-historic cromlechs and ogham stones from their own Departments.
There is one very serious problem of national finance which the Government has not dared to tackle, and which is paralysing them in every direction. That is the problem of Article X. of the Treaty. It can be seen from the statements of the Minister for Finance, and other Ministers, that, however willing they might be to reduce expenditure on their Departments, they are paralysed at every point through the fear of Article X. It was never intended by the signatories of the Treaty, on one side or the other, that Article X. should for ever stand in the way of the establishment of an efficient and economic administration in this country. It is quite obvious that the present operation of that Article was never contemplated, with the result that, at the present time we have a very swollen administration. Leaving out the Army, the D.M.P., the Civic Guard and Pensions. we are paying actually over £10,000,000 in salaries alone, whereas smaller countries than ours pay less than half that amount. That Article was part of the price we paid in establishing the State, and it should be considered as such. Various schemes have been suggested for the purpose of removing the evil effects of that Article. I am not in a position to say which of them is the best. I do not suggest for a moment that the Executive Council should in any way break Article X. of the Treaty, but many schemes have been proposed for relieving the evil effects of that Article. The Government has hitherto shown no signs of being willing to set up any kind of Committee to investigate these proposals and decide how, if possible, Article X. of the Treaty should be removed from the capacity of a sword of Damocles hanging over the head of the Executive Council and preventing a reduction in administrative expenditure.
To conclude, I would say that the present financial policy of the Government is causing a great deal of dissatisfaction amongst a large section of the people. It is turning, and has turned, sections, not only against the Government, but against the State. It is increasing, rather than removing the lack of confidence at present in the country. It is postponing indefinitely the permanent establishment of a real State. At the same time, it is leaving an impression in the minds of the people, and of the outside world, that the State and everything connected with it is entirely temporary and provisional. Finally, it is making impossible by the over-taxation which all admit the real revival of industry or the recovery of the adverse trade balance from which we suffer. There comes a time in the Government of any country when to play for safety, as this Government is playing for all the time, is a most dangerous thing. I am satisfied that time has come at present. I would ask the Executive Council whether in the first place they would be prepared to call in experts, and not civil servants, to investigate the national finances and put them on a sound basis? I would ask them if they are prepared to simplify the Estimates for next year? I would ask them are they prepared to divide the budget into two sections, extraordinary expenditure and ordinary expenditure, as other small nations have done and include in the extraordinary expenditure the reconstruction of Government property and the initial charges for the foundation of the new State.
I would ask them if they are prepared to set up a Committee on the lines of the Geddes Committee in England, for the purpose of cutting down the administrative expenditure, and at the same time making a careful investigation into all the possible solutions of the problem presented to the Executive by Article X. of the Treaty. I would also ask the Executive Council if they have formed any opinion as to what is the exact minimum figure which should not be reduced as regards the ordinary Exchequer balance, the ordinary Treasury reserve. I do not believe that they have formed any idea as to what should be a normal minimum sum to be retained in the Exchequer. If they have formed such an opinion I would like to know whether they intend that that sum should in the first instance be raised by taxation. Finally, I would ask the Executive Council whether they can promise any definite reduction in taxation for the next year. If they can give answer "yes" or "no" to these questions we would at any rate know where we were. If they gave an affirmative answer even to one of those questions that would be so much good done. It is this financial policy of the Government which is at the root, I suggest, of all their failures in every Department. Reasonable schemes may be put up by every Department for the purpose of alleviating the present situation in making headway towards a return to confidence, but they are always met with the same answer that there is no money, with the result that the economic proposals which have been put forward by the Government in the form of legislation are to the average man perfectly inadequate to relieve the situation.
We have had proposals for small doles of one kind or another of a temporary nature, and they are giving very restricted and very provisional relief in the present difficulty. We have had the adaptation of the British Trade Facilities Act which is, at any rate, an extremely modest proposal and admitted to be such by the Minister who introduced it. Yet it is all that the Government is apparently capable of doing in order to relieve the economic position of the country, due, in my opinion, solely to their extremely stingy financial policy. It is not seriously contended by the Government, although I heard some statements by the Minister, that the few small measures in the way of economic improvement which they have introduced can have any appreciable result within the next two or three years upon the situation, which is so serious at present. The same applies not only to their action with regard to the Ministry of Industry and Commerce, but to all other Ministries. However willing these Departments may be to get a move on to get us out of that backwater in which we find ourselves at present, they are always prevented from doing anything by what I describe as the stingy financial policy of the Executive Council, and that is hardly the way to restore confidence and to relieve unemployment.
There are other items in the Government policy which tend equally to lessen rather than to improve the stability of the State. There is, for instance, their policy with regard to the Army and the one matter that these two policies have in common is the fear of the Government to do anything to improve the situation. We are supposed to have an Army, but what exactly is that Army for? What could that Army do? We have a Ministry of Defence. Is that Ministry capable of defending the country? I doubt it very much. However willing the officers and men in the Army might be to do all that is in their power to defend the country as far as we are able to see, particularly from these Estimates, the officers and men in the Army are getting no chance to do so. The President is Commander-in-Chief and Minister for Defence, but I doubt if the President could defend Dalkey Island against an invasion. How many guns has he got? I am informed that we have only four guns which are capable of going off at all. I do not know how many machine guns the President has. He may say that for the purpose of the defence of the country he is covered by Article VI. of the Treaty under which the English Government for the next two and a half years will take charge of the defences of the coasts, but what guarantee have we that if any danger arises the British Government will not invite the Lord Chief Justice of New Zealand to discuss their responsibilities under this Article? I doubt if the President even inside Ireland could defend the capital. I doubt if he has enough machine guns to hold the line of the Boyne. I am told that he has not. The Army is not being equipped as an army should be, as an ordinary small efficient army is in other countries.
Comment on this
It is being equipped as an armed police force, and it should not be called an Army if it is not the intention of the Executive Council to make it a real army. It is not the fault of the individual officers or of the High Command. It is the fault of the Executive Council who will decide the policy in this manner. I do not know if we are entitled to discuss the Army crisis now, but the Executive Council wriggled out of that without any particular glory. The Minister for Education referred to that crisis as the growing pains of the new State, but was it treated as such by the Executive Council? Why were not these various war lords who created this crisis told to proceed with their work and given work to do instead of the action which the Government took on that occasion? The Army Council was removed, and we were informed by the Executive Council that although they were removed for a particular act, still it was found that they were not the particular men to deal with the mutiny. But was the Executive Council the particular Executive Council to deal with the Army Council, or with the mutiny itself? The Executive Council were as deeply involved in the affairs which led up to that mutiny as the Army Council. They were as deeply involved as anyone, and instead of treating the Army crisis as the growing pains of the infant State, the Executive Council suddenly turned round, deeply involved as they were, and decided to stand upon a dignity which they did not possess.
Comment on this
What does the Deputy mean by saying "deeply involved in the conditions which led up to the mutiny"?
Comment on this
All the members of the Executive Council, as came out in the various debates, had been involved in this quarrel for practically a year before the Army crisis came to a head.
Comment on this
I have not got the Debates with me, but I think that was the general impression in the country.
Comment on this
Instead of treating this matter in a broadminded spirit they decided to stand on a dignity which, as I say, I claim they do not possess, and they donned the motheaten cloak of righteousness and decided to crush both the A's and the B's equally severely, and, in the opinion of the outside public, equally unconvincingly. But one would not blame the Ministers for being involved in the events that led up to that crisis if they had not dealt with it in such a narrow manner when it came to a head. I will compare the way that the Ministers dealt with that crisis with the way in which an identical crisis was dealt with in a country very similarly situated to our own. I will read from the "Morning Post," May 2nd: "Army Crisis. A large number of officers demand the replacement of the present Commander-in-Chief and the dismissal of other former Russian (Imperial) officers from high posts. The Minister of Defence resigned."
Comment on this
On a point of order, considering the reputation which this journal has in this country, is it in keeping with the dignity of this House to read a quotation from it?
Comment on this
"In view of the serious issues at stake and the obstinacy of both sides in the dispute it is difficult to prophesy how the affair may be settled." I will now quote from a paper less offensive to Deputy Hughes, that is "Europe Nouvelle," of June 28th. It describes how an army crisis in Finland was dealt with; it says: "Dissatisfied with the high command of the army, and believing that they could not be of further use. a large number of officers resigned some time ago. There was great excitement in the Press. After the establishment of the new government, supreme control of the Army was confided to Colonel Malmberg, Chief Commissioner of the Finnish Civic Guard, an officer of rare energy; the `dimissionaires' withdrew their resignations. The Government will proceed without delay to carry out long-delayed reforms. The first measure will be the creation of a superior military school. where two important chairs would be reserved for French instructors." I remember last year reading a speech by the President of the Executive Council of Finland in honour of the President of our Executive Council, in which he referred to the striking analogy between the two countries. I can only regret that that analogy was not carried out a few months longer.
Comment on this
Yes. Well, I suspect that it is too late to try to get the President of the Executive Council to complete the analogy between us and Finland, but I would like to ask him two questions before I sit down. One of them is—is the Executive Council willing to call in experts to train our army as a real modern army should be trained, and secondly, is the Executive Council willing to equip our army as a real modern army should be equipped? If the President will answer these two questions in the affirmative, possibly some good might come out of the crisis of this year. I will not detain the Dáil. I have spoken for a considerable time but I think that in all the branches of the Executive Council's activities they have shown a remarkable lack of cohesion, a remarkable lack of confidence in themselves, and that can only have a very bad effect on the credit and the stability of the country.
Comment on this
In seconding the Motion I propose to deal with another aspect, an entirely different aspect to that dealt with in the main portion of the speech made by Deputy Esmonde. That is, I propose to deal with the latter portion of his speech in regard to the Army situation which has passed— passed, if we are to believe what we are told or what we were told on the last occasion by the President.
I am forced to the view that the Inquiry which was promised and which I accepted in this House at the time of the crisis was only, to use a very common phrase, a gag—to gag me and others with me for the time being. I am absolutely forced to that conclusion in view of the manner and the methods adopted by the Executive Council towards the Inquiry and since the Report of the Inquiry was issued. I am satisfied that they were not genuine when they stated in this House that it would be absolutely necessary to have a searching Inquiry into the causes which led up to the crisis. Now they have their responsibility. We were told, when the questions and the points were being argued as to who and what type of person shall constitute that Inquiry, by the nearest approach to an Executive Minister, that is, an extern Minister, the Minister for Agriculture, and I suppose when he speaks here he speaks with authority, particularly if it is not contradicted, that this was a matter for the Executive Council. Certain information had been given them recently, but they had not all the facts. They were not satisfied, and consequently they would have to inquire into the causes leading up to the crisis, and they proposed to set up this court to do so and it was up to any member of the Dáil, after a certain period had elapsed, to ask the Executive Council the result of that. Now I hold that the attitude of the Executive Council since the Report came along was one of no responsibility. But what happened when the Report was published, as it were—published, as far as the Dáil was concerned? It was handed round; not a word as to whether it was accepted or rejected, simply handed round.
Comment on this
Yes, portion of it.
It was unfortunate that an effort was made to discuss it, and to my mind that effort was made in a wrong way, made in a way certainly, as far as I and some others concerned with me, could not discuss the report. We were deprived of an opportunity of discussing it, and there is no opportunity except on this Vote to discuss it. The actual findings of that committee I do not profess to discuss, at any rate in detail, but I think that the Executive Council deserve the censure of the Dáil for the manner in which they have treated the Dáil. They have, as Deputy Johnson rightly said, given the Dáil portion of the report which they received. They did not say: "We held this inquiry. This is the result; we are satisfied that a real searching Inquiry has been held into the causes, and that is the result, and we accept it. We have examined the evidence on which these conclusions are based, and we are completely satisfied."
It is due to the Dáil that they should either get that from the Executive Council or something like this: "To be honest, the Inquiry is over, the crisis for which and about which the Inquiry was promised is passed; we would prefer to let the matter drop." They should give to the Dáil either of these statements. They have not done so, and, as I have said in the beginning, I am satisfied and I know a number of others who are satisfied, that the crisis, to their mind, is passed. Certain officers, who perhaps they wanted to get rid of for a long time, are gone; others that were giving trouble, perhaps in another direction, are gone, and as the President said here on the last occasion, if it has brought about peace it is well.
Now, as regards their attitude towards the Inquiry, I hope to prove to the Dáil that they did not take up an attitude consistent with their promise. What effort did the Executive Council as a whole, or any member of it, make to give help to this Army Inquiry? I am not speaking from any real knowledge I have as to refusal on the part of the Executive Council. I am speaking now on the facts from the views gained in a short conversation and short correspondence that I had with the Committee of Inquiry.
I attended the Committee of Inquiry, put my case before them, and pointed out my difficulties. I also pointed out that the Executive Council could give as much information as I could. I was asked to put that in writing and I did so. I further entered into correspondence and pointed out that there were certain documents that should be available and would be of use to the Committee of Inquiry, and I am satisfied from the correspondence that followed that there was difficulty put in the way of the Committee of inquiry in getting, at least, some of the documents. Again, I am only going on correspondence, because I was definitely asked to state officially what the documents were and I am entitled to come to the conclusion that I should not have been asked that, because if the Executive Council were serious when they said that they would have a searching inquiry it was up to them without being asked for it by the Court of Inquiry to put every single detail and document before them. I myself made the suggestion in correspondence also to the Court of Inquiry as to what I thought, in the circumstances, were the best means whereby they could get the necessary evidence.
Comment on this
I suggested that official notification should be sent through official channels to people in the Army who naturally would not, and could not, come forward of their own accord because their so doing would be taken as meaning that they were coming forward in the capacity of accusers. Consequently I suggested that some form of notification should be sent throughout the Army asking for information upon these points, and at the same time that these people should be indemnified. Surely, if the Executive Council was serious about their business they would, at least, have done that. They would have gone to any and every trouble to bring forward the necessary witnesses if, as stated here, it was intended to have a really searching inquiry. It might be said I failed to turn up and substantiate the charges I made. That can be said and truly said. I have already given my reasons, but the Minister for Justice himself said here in the Dáil: "The proposal of the Government, as stated by the President, is that we are prepared to institute a most searching inquiry into Army administration arising out of the allegations made by the Minister for Industry and Commerce. Naturally and necessarily, quite apart from the allegations made by the Minister for Industry and Commerce, an inquiry would be necessary because of the situation that has arisen in the Army, because no one believes that that situation simply sprang up in a night. Everyone believes it must have a particular genesis and history and the time for inquiry into that would be when the situation that it created had been dealt with."
What effort did they make to get at the real genesis and history of this? We are told in the Report by the Committee of Inquiry that something I think like twenty-nine witnesses were examined, and that they were satisfied that they had got the necessary evidence. Twenty-nine witnesses were examined. If the names even of the witnesses were given to the Dáil one would be able to form some conclusion as to whether there was anything like a searching inquiry. But the names are withheld from the Dáil. I certainly do not know who they were. I never inquired, but had that information been given, even apart from their evidence, one might be in a position to say, well a decent effort was made. On that I appeared before the Inquiry and they admitted to me that they did not know where to start. They could not get a starting point, and it was admitted in this House that there was no prosecutor asked for. I hold it was the duty of the Executive Council, if they did not appear as a prosecutor, to have helped the Inquiry in such a way that they would be able to say here in the Dáil: this is the result of a searching inquiry.
Again we had the refusal, I can call it so, of the Executive Council to give an indemnity to any officer who would come forward. The President said on the last occasion, and no doubt he will say it here again to-day, that they could not, or would not, guarantee that any man who came forward to give evidence, and who held a position in the Army, would get promotion. That is putting it the wrong way. They ought to be in a position to say—and if they were not they should say so—to any officer coming forward: "We will at least guarantee he will suffer nothing as a result."
We come now to the personnel of the Inquiry, and I say the personnel selected proved to me at the time, and I mentioned it here, that it was the wrong personnel. I now say that it was deliberately picked because they were not serious about the inquiry. I mentioned here, I believe that he personnel was drawn from the wrong class. I explained what I meant to the Inquiry, because I feared at the time that I might have been taken up wrongly, but they were satisfied with what I told them.
Deputy Cooper said in this Dáil, and he repeated it at the Inquiry, what I believe to be the correct thing regarding the persons, at least some of them, from whom the members of the Committee should have been drawn. If I may quote what the Deputy said on that occasion, it was: "As the Minister for Home Affairs very truly said, this episode has its roots in the past. Therefore the persons to enquire into it should be persons well acquainted with the persons who had been in the I.R.A. for some considerable time. I think anyone else would make a false start. That is the suggestion I make, as I honestly wish to be helpful and am honestly anxious to put forward some alternative that would be practicable." That, I think, was the general impression of each individual forming that court. They were placed in the position of being asked to act, and they did so. I can at least point to one finding in the report that would never have appeared were it not that the wrong individuals were selected, or, at least, that they were selected from the wrong type of men. That is paragraph 6 on page 5. As I said here before, some evidence has been given here by the late Minister for Defence, and portions of evidence was read by other Deputies. The paragraph that I want to refer to is as follows:—
"Paragraph 5.—In our opinion the evidence presented to us has established the following facts, all of which caused or led up to the late mutiny."
"6—That the organisation which brought about, and many members of which joined in, the late mutiny, was in existence at least in embryo, before the outbreak of the Civil War, and that many of the officers who mutinied, and of those who encouraged and abetted them had become a problem to General Collins before his death in August, 1922."
Now, I do not doubt for a moment that they had some evidence to form that conclusion, but I say with all due respect to them that that conclusion is unfair both to the living and to the dead, and if that tribunal had been formed of the right type of people they could not possibly come to that conclusion, and I will tell you why. If such evidence had been put before them they would know whom to summon and whom to look to for corroboration of such statements.
Comment on this
They would know whom to go to and ask for corroboration. I am asked would these people come? I am referring now to people who are not concerned in this business at all and who could not be got. I am very anxious to know on whose evidence this conclusion was reached. I mention that to prove that what I said regarding the personnel of the committee is to my mind, at least, correct. Since the last occasion on which this matter was discussed I certainly have got a bit of a surprise. I, for the first time, heard of a certain meeting having taken place. I think the Minister for External Affairs said something similar. I never heard of this famous meeting, although a member of the Executive Council at the time, that took place in June, 1923. The late Minister for Defence, after reading over portion of the evidence given by him before the Committee of Inquiry, stated that his evidence related to negotiations, if you can call them so, that went on with the Irregular leader, Tom Barry, and with a member of the Army Council at the time, the late Quartermaster General. He stated subsequent to that, that on the 10th June, 1923, "I with the late Chief of Staff and with the late Quartermaster General interviewed the President, the present Minister for Justice and the Minister for Education. We discussed matters arising out of these points, and discussed our general action with regard to the organisation." Now, as I say, that was the first I learned of such a meeting. It was the only time I ever heard of such negotiations with the Irregulars, although a member of the Executive Council at the time and for many months afterwards. I do not want to hold that any Minister has not the right to consult one, or two, or three, or four, or up to one member of the Executive Council on a point. That is not the point I want to make, but the point I want to make is this, that those discussions were going on with the Irregulars.
Comment on this
There was no discussion going on with the Irregulars. There was the receipt of one letter and the consideration of one letter.
Comment on this
Well, we will allow that—the receipt of one letter and the consideration of one letter. I expect that Deputy Mulcahy means that he received one letter and considered one letter. Is that correct, I ask?
Comment on this
The receipt of one letter by the then Quartermaster-General and the consideration of one letter by me when it came to me direct from the Quartermaster-General, as Minister for Defence, and its consideration at the meeting that I spoke of.
Comment on this
I well remember being told by, we will call them the mutineers, towards the latter end of last year that the then Quartermaster-General had been in negotiation with the Irregulars, naming an Irregular, and I will tell you exactly what I said when told that. I said "I do not believe it." I did not pay attention to it, and, mark you, when you consider that the mutineers, as we call them, had suspicions of the Army Council and of their society, having those suspicions and knowing that negotiations were going on with the Irregulars, we cannot blame them for having no respect whatever for the members of the Army Council, and it was hard to expect them to be disciplined. It is not good enough for the Minister for Justice to make a statement such as he made here on the last occasion in his own defence. His statement was as follows:—"I did not consider myself at liberty at a meeting of the Executive Council, subsequent to this informal discussion, to use anything that was said there in support of my very rooted and deep seated objection to secret societies. I made no reference in public or private to that until this unfortunate mutinous pot that had been simmering and brewing in the Army boiled over, and the Inquiry was set up in regard to it." On the same day while taking Deputy Mulcahy over the coals he said that on the first occasion when he learned of the existence of a secret society he asked for and could not get information. In the course of his speech he said:
"I charged to General Mulcahy in February, 1923, that officers were being summoned up from the country to sit in uniform at Portobello under the Chairmanship of Lieutenant-General O'Muirthuille who was then Assistant Adjutant-General for the purpose of re-organising the Irish Republican Brotherhood within the Army—resurrecting and re-organising it. I charged that the staff of the Army were for all practical purposes an inner circle or upper circle of that secret society and these two accusations were blandly denied by the ex-Minister of Defence."
Because they were denied and because, perhaps, he could not get any further on that account he did nothing, but in June, 1923, it was not rumour with him. The then Minister for Defence and two of his chiefs come to tell him that such is the case. It is not good enough to come and say that they disapproved of his actions or their actions. They had very definite information laid before them and it was their duty—the duty of each of the three of them—to come to the Executive Council and there make an order one way or the other about it. Had I known at that time, had I been aware of it or brought into contact with it at that time, I certainly would have made one effort to finish it once and for all and had I not succeeded in that way I would have got out and perhaps saved the situation by letting the people know why I got out. You may be told that I was in favour of a secret society in the Army. I say, and I said it all along, that I was in favour of one society as against two societies. But the three members of the Executive Council chosen perhaps because of their wisdom, are consulted and keep this matter to themselves. I do not claim that I had any right more than the others who were left out, but I had as good a right as each of the three or the three altogether to be present at that meeting. I do believe that if this had not happened the crisis would never have come. Something would have happened that would have snapped it across before it reached fruition. The allegation I made here I made with one deliberate intention, that of preventing bloodshed. In this House I made the allegation that this crisis was brought about by muddling, mishandling and incompetence. When I said that, I meant it. My real intention was to let the Dáil and the people, who should be consulted in this matter, know that there were two sides to the question. Even though we took no part in the Inquiry, the result given to us, as it is nakedly, proves that there were two sides to it. It proves also that with all this knowledge—and particularly the knowledge that the three specially-selected individuals who were members of the Executive Council had—the Executive Council rushed mad-headedly on the receipt of the ultimatum to arrest the signatories and shoot every dog that would bark. That is where they lost their heads. Again, as Deputy Cooper pointed out, in one of his speeches, if an Inquiry was necessary afterwards, it was also necessary and should have been instituted on the Friday when the ultimatum, as it was called, was received. That is practically all I want to say with regard to the Inquiry.
I am sorry there are not more of the Government Deputies present, because I wanted to refer to the statement made by the President on the occasion when he was taking to task the Independent newspaper for publishing misleading statements. He stated that there were to be no more demobilisations. I want to ask the Deputies supporting the Government what has happened since. I saw numbers of them hardly able to speak with grief for the officers in their areas who made it possible for them to come here, many of whom had been thrown out on the roadside, while ex-British officers and ex-officers of other armies were retained. They got promises then. There was to be a Committee of Inquiry into all this. These mistakes “could have been made, and probably were made, in the rush.” That committee “would be appointed to inquire into all that.”“Everything would be all right; send us the names.” Have they swallowed all that? Are they satisfied to allow ex-British officers to remain in the Army while the men who, they know, made it possible for them to come here are to remain on the roadside? I will probably be told that the new Army scheme, which is to replace the old-new Army scheme, will necessitate some resignations or some demobilisations. I do not know myself how the President will get over that. But at the present moment—or at least up to ten days or a month ago—you had in this Irish Army of ours over 150 foreign officers.
Comment on this
There have been no demobilisations since. I am satisfied that my information is correct. At that time there was an officer-strength of 1,400, which meant one in nine. What the new strength is going to be, or how they are going to get down to the new strength, I do not know. But I understand it will be in the neighbourhood of 1,000 or 1,100. Then there are going to be no demobilisations. What is to happen? Are all the officers with foreign service to go? In spite of the President's denial, I say that there are over 100 officers in the Army ——
Comment on this
And that forty of that one hundred—they are my own figures—saw no service at all in the I.R.A. The difference between one hundred and forty—the other sixty—claim service in the I.R.A. at some period, some of them in March, 1921. Some of the ex-British army joined in March, 1921, and fought like good ones up to June. One of those gentlemen paraded Parnell Street on a certain night with his famous Thompson. Another of them claimed service longer than he is entitled to. The famous individual—that brave, good General, whose name was brought before you on the last occasion—has another claim to I.R.A. service for a long period prior to the Truce. In that sixty the words of the officers themselves are taken without check. Leaving that on one side—I am not in a position to give figures—a number of officers in the army saw no service in any army— British, or Irish, French, or German. These men are at present occupying positions in the Army. I know some of them personally. Some of them I tried before I left the Executive Council to have removed from the Army, and I was told they were indispensable, though they were only common clerks. A thousand of our own men were being demobilised. Perhaps three or four hundred of them had good pre-Truce records. That is the position to-day. There is to be no more demobilisation. No cases will be investigated, and the men you people sobbed about——
Comment on this
I am taking your own words. You stated on the last occasion that there were to be no more demobilisations. Perhaps that was a gag also, like the Army Inquiry, for the time being, to keep things quiet in the Army. There are some of you, Deputies, on the Government Benches now who admitted that you would never have appeared near this Dáil, nor would you dream of staying in it, unless something were done to get back certain individual officers who were demobbed before the crisis, or left as a result of the crisis.
Comment on this
I am not going to keep you very long, because it seems to me that it does not matter a brass button what you say to the present Executive Council. They carry on with their heads in the sand, as I said many times before They do not mind. They put their Whips on, although, on a recent occasion they escaped defeat by a very narrow majority, and on the last occasion when they took the Whips off they were beaten, with the result that the Bill dropped. The present Executive Government remind me of a Government we had at one time in an English gaol. Anybody who disagreed with them was supposed to be disloyal. They have been told in their own party—and sometimes outside their own party—ever since this Dáil met that there was no alternative Government. They have acted in the belief, and they have carried on as if they believed that there was no alternative Government. They have forgotten that Glasnevin Cemetery is full of indispensable people. If you criticise the Government, the President will tell you that you are making doleful speeches that are doing more harm to the country than anything else. The most doleful speeches ever heard in this House came from the Ministerial benches. The present Minister for Finance, who I am sorry, is ill, and the President, when he was Minister for Finance, were responsible for the most doleful speeches that were made in the Dáil. The financial mentality of the Government reminds me—I am tempted to say it—of the man who went into a penny bazaar and asked for the bargain basement. They expect the country to be doing something, to be advancing, and they get up in those benches and they display absolutely no confidence in the ability of the country to recuperate. Their attitude all the time has been: "We have no money; we cannot do this."
The External Ministries and other Ministries that are not, perhaps, external, blame everything on the Ministry of Finance. We are told that we must balance the Budget. What is the good of a balanced Budget to a starving people? The President said we had spent more money on the relief of unemployment than any Government in Europe. What happened the money granted for the relief of unemployment last year? It was not spent on the relief of unemployment. If he will refer to the Appropriation Accounts, he will find it was spent in relief of rates. I say that the Government never rose above what the British Government did in 1846 and 1847 to relieve unemployment. Charity work on the roads! They have not done one single thing to give another man another day's work. The other day, in answer to a question from one of the Labour Deputies, the Minister for Agriculture made a remark about an officer, that he was a man who was a loyal subject prior to the Truce, and since then proceeded to develop a record. Now, I do not know whether that was serious. But I know it applies to ninety-five per cent. of your civil servants and to the military service and to very nearly all the police. Every man with pre-Truce or pre-war service was got rid of quickly. The last demobilisation was a deliberate attempt to clear out of the Army every man with pre-Truce service, and it very nearly succeeded. What it lacked in success on demobilisation was nearly completed by the unfortunate decision of the decent fellows in the Army to resign on the suggestion of the Minister for Justice.
Comment on this
It was not on my suggestion that they decided to resign.
Comment on this
I say, and I repeat, that the Minister for Justice, at a Party meeting, about 2 o'clock in the morning, suggested that if these men resigned the matter would be dropped. With regard to the Army Inquiry, the Army Inquiry was started in a panic, or, rather, it was promised in a panic. Deputy McGrath, before the setting up of the Inquiry, had more or less obviated what looked very much like a big row. We were promised an Army Inquiry, and we asked that the Dáil should be allowed to appoint the people who would hold the Inquiry.
Comment on this
I said "No," and I would like to know whether Deputy McGrath subscribes to that statement of Deputy McGarry's.
Comment on this
Nevertheless, it is a fact. The Government were in a panic. We were promised everything. When Deputy McGrath succeeded in averting what was a very serious situation, the attitude changed. I was invited to go to that Inquiry, and I asked that I should get an indemnity for witnesses. Six weeks after General Collins was killed I went to the President and I made some statements about army officers. I asked him for an indemnity and he said he could not give it. I gave him two specific instances of what I regarded as abuses. He promised he would look the matter up, and he sent to the officer responsible for the abuses a letter asking him to look the matter up. It was bound to be looked up in those circumstances. If everything in the garden was lovely with regard to Army affairs, there is no reason in the world why every member of this Dáil should not know what transpired. As regards the Inquiry, I got a reply stating that witnesses would be indemnified against legal proceedings, criminal or otherwise, in respect of any evidence they might give at the Army Inquiry. But that was not an indemnity. If you have got two or three honest men still in the Army who were willing to come forward and state that they knew certain things were occurring, why would they not get an indemnification. And there are one or two honest men left in the Army, who are willing to come forward and give evidence at any inquiry. But some of them are in this position, that their work for the last seven or eight years has kept them out of civil occupation. They are practically fitted for nothing else but Army work, and if they came forward and gave evidence they would be sacked. The President would not give an in demnity for them.
The President has denied the statement made by Deputy McGrath that there are a certain number of ex-British Army officers kept in the Army while the old men who made the Army are demobilised. The President denies the accuracy of Deputy McGrath's figures. Deputy McGrath's figures are not accurate. Nobody knows how many ex-British soldiers are officers in the Army because they have not gone to the trouble to find out. The records of the officers you have in the Army at the present time are not correct. If you make a complaint you are told that these men are efficient, and they are doing their work efficiently. Nobody doubts it. I do not. But did any of the men who made the Army get an opportunity to prove themselves efficient in these positions? In the one ship you have, the "Helga"—the Navy, or the Armada, which it was called in a Spanish paper—you have got the crew at the present time that shelled us in 1916. You may be told they are efficient. But that is a fact, and I challenge denial of it.
As regards the prisoners, I suppose I am the last man in the Dáil who would be expected to say a word for the prisoners, but I do not know what the policy of the Government with regard to the prisoners is. I do know this, that there was a man tried last week for the robbery of £134 from a bank. I do not think he was sentenced. He probably will not be. But I do know that there was another man in the custody of the Government who was responsible for the robbery of £18,000 from a bank. He was also responsible for signing orders for the confiscation of property in the South of Ireland belonging to Unionists. At least four men were executed for robbery under arms, carried out under his orders.
That man is walking about in Clare at the present day. The men who fought against such men and beat them have been demobilised. I do not care whether you keep the prisoners in or let them out.
Comment on this
I do not care whether they are in or out. I have very little reason to care about them, but I do say that there should be some settled policy with regard to the prisoners, especially when a man who robs £18,000, and gets fellows executed, can walk about the streets, and a man is tried and kept in prison for a couple of years, because he took £134. I do not think I have anything more to say except this, that if members who are on the Government Benches would vote as they talk outside this thing would be carried.
Comment on this
I would like to draw the attention of the Dáil to what I believe is a scandal; that is, the case of the Contracts Committee. There are files in the Ministry of Finance going back for the past twelve months recommending a change in that Department. Their contracts system would not be tolerated in a rural district council let alone in a Government Department. That information was put before the then Minister for Finance, the President. I pointed out to him that even the Dublin Corporation system of opening tenders and giving away contracts was absolutely ideal as compared with the system carried on by the Government. I take it in that case some official came along and told the Minister for Finance "everything is all right in the Contracts Committee," because when an official goes to a Minister and tells him something, that is the end of it. You had an Extern Minister coming to this Dáil and listening to complaints about illegal trawling. He told the House that he could not get a boat; that he had only one boat, and that the Minister for Finance said he could not have another. What is the use of paying a Minister for Fisheries if he cannot get a boat to protect the fisheries? It is only throwing money away. That is another case where, I take it, the Minister for Finance did not go into the cost of one or two boats. Some official came along and said it could not be done, that they could not balance their Budget. The result of it is that the Minister for Fisheries is getting paid for doing nothing. It is not his fault, of course, because the Ministry of Finance will not give him the money necessary for the boats.
Comment on this
Might I suggest that the Dáil would adjourn for tea now, for the Minister apparently would seem to be too weak to intervene until he has had some refreshment.
Comment on this
I do not want to make a speech now, for it seems to be an indication of an attempt to treat this motion with contempt by remaining silent until those who have spoken in criticism have concluded, and then we may get a short, curt reply, or there may be an avalanche of eloquence from the Ministerial Bench and no one to reply to it. I do not think it is treating the motion or the Dáil seriously.
Comment on this
If I have to reply, I have not heard much to reply to. Perhaps the Deputy would supply the remainder.
Comment on this
That Motion does not require a seconder, and it is not necessary to report progress. The sitting can be suspended.
Comment on this
On a point of order, the Motion to report progress has been moved. There has not been any Motion hitherto on this Vote of that nature, and I submit it is within your right to report progress in view of the fact that no member of the Ministerial Party has replied to the criticism of a responsible section of the Dáil. Therefore, it is to be presumed that they are waiting to consider the challenge that has been put to them, and to enable them to make up their minds I suggest that the Motion to report progress is in order.
Comment on this
I submit that Mr. McCarthy's Motion is not in order, that we are in Committee, and you must take the Motion moved by Deputy Morrissey.
Comment on this
Question: "That progress be now reported"—put.
Do you agree with this result?
On a point of order, I think there was a motion agreed to that we should adjourn at 6.30.
Comment on this
No. It was not necessary to move a motion to that effect. The order that the Dáil should sit until 10.30 has up to the present carried with it an adjournment for at least half an hour, in or about 6.30—not necessarily at 6.30.
Comment on this
If that is the case I would not have challenged the last vote. I do not propose to give away on that now. The Dáil has decided that we do not report progress, and consequently we cannot have an adjournment at present at any rate. We must have some order in the method of conducting business.
Comment on this
The Dáil has always been very generous with Ministers, as far as I know, both when I was in the Government and out of it, but if the President likes to throw out this challenge and break a rule that has been carried out for some time past, let him do it, and we will give him all he wants.
Comment on this
The President says we cannot suspend the sitting for a period. We can.
Comment on this
I would have been willing, if Deputy Milroy had moved the adjournment, to take it so that he could speak when we came back. I understood it was a question of getting rid of the situation, because Deputy Johnson said we were not ready to go on. However, I am ready to go on now, and I want to hear the whole of the case. One particular Party in the Dáil has devoted two hours to making up a case. Not the whole of that Party has spoken. I wanted to hear the whole of it, and I have not heard much up to this.
Comment on this
Does the Minister take the view that the whole of a discussion on a motion of no confidence, which, in effect, is what has been moved, must take place before any member of the Ministerial Party shall reply?
Comment on this
The point of order is whether the vote to report progress was not the vote of the Committee on Finance, and whether that having been declined, the Committee still remains in existence.
Comment on this
The Committee still continues but it is quite feasible to suspend the sitting for half-an-hour, three-quarters of-an-hour, or one hour, as has been done on several occasions before. The defeat of the motion to report progress does not make it impossible to do that now. That is the point I am called upon to decide. Of course, I cannot adjourn the Committee. That is a different question.
Comment on this
Might I suggest that I think it is the general desire of the Dáil to have a brief adjournment for a meal. If the President, on the grounds of principle, thinks that impossible, I have had something to eat and I am willing to talk for half-an-hour while others get off.
Comment on this
No. The only objection I have to an adjournment is that Deputy Johnson thinks we could not talk unless we had time to make up something. I do not know that that is an imputation that we should allow to pass.
Comment on this
My position is, as a matter of Parliamentary practice, when a responsible party in the House makes a case which has called for frequent interruptions from the Ministers, it requires a reply in the course of the discussion so that the discussion can continue as a Parliamentary discussion.
Comment on this
No, Deputy Milroy wanted to know if we could not adjourn. I wanted to know if he was going to speak, and whether we would hear the whole case. I am prepared to go on and I do not require an adjournment to make up a reply, not in the least. If the Dáil wishes to adjourn for tea I am prepared to give way.
Comment on this
These questions are not questions for me to decide. I could not give a decision on any of these questions except that if the Committee wants to have a suspension for tea it can have it.
Comment on this
I think, after the motion to report progress has been defeated, we should have the views of the President.
Comment on this
I think the usual practice ought to obtain. We gave our votes on the division a minute ago because we thought it was want of confidence or something like that.
Comment on this
I think I am expressing the view of most Deputies when I say that an adjournment is wanted.
Comment on this
There were four speeches on this motion so far, none of which dealt with the subject-matter of the Vote, and all of which were concerned with events which happened principally during the last three or four months, and some, I take it, which occurred previous to the period which is usually described as the Army crisis period. The attack, as far as I can gather, was under four heads. There was criticism of the financial policy of the Government; of the Army Inquiry Committee, its personnel, its report, and various matters which came before it; the failure of the Executive Council to take up the matter according to the opinion of Deputy McGrath; of the Government's Contract Committee; and then an instance which Deputy McGarry stated he had brought under my notice somewhere about 1922. As regards the first of these, which occupied most of the time, extending to something like an hour, the three particular countries which were brought under review, and which, it was said, should have borne some relation to this country, were Denmark, Holland, and Switzerland. I do not know whether it is really suggested from the point of view of a financial expert, or a person having experience in the matter of finance, that a comparison should be made with three highly-developed, well-organised countries, which are free from internal disorder and from any external aggressions. They had all the advantages arising from their situation during a war period lasting four or five years. The war lasted a little over four years, but its reactions went on a little longer than that, and these countries were in a position to reap considerable advantages out of these reactions.
I think the Minister for Agriculture sighs sometimes when he hears of Denmark and its highly developed agricultural policy; its traditions, the advantages that it has had, its opportunities for development and the fact that there was a Government there for a great number of years highly interested in its development whose sole concern ought to have been to see that its agricultural policy should be shaped to suit the needs of that particular country. It is said that the Government here has failed in its duty during the last three or four months, because, I take it, that is the period which forms the basis of the criticism. Up to that time at any rate, we had the advantage of the counsel and the wisdom of practically all our critics and, to some extent, I should say, also their confidence. During those four months we have allowed Denmark, Holland and Switzerland to get beyond us. They have been portrayed as countries which were unable to balance their Budgets during the last three years or, at least, last year, and that they present a much better comparison for us than any of those countries which have recently got their liberty and whose financial policy has not resulted in maintaining what somebody, in a letter in this morning's "Freeman," called "stable currency."
Discussions on matters of finance are very serious things. Criticism as to balancing a Budget is very easy. Nothing lends itself to such a great display of oratory, and to holding forth prospects of employment and of development, constructive genius, and so on. It has been stated in foreign countries, and sometimes in this country, that we are a people without experience. But we have had some experience of balancing Budgets. One finds it in local authorities, and if there was anything to commend the action of the British Government in this country it was the genius with which they framed the accountancy or administrative sections of the Local Government Act, which insisted upon local authorities balancing their budget. The result of it, at any rate, has been that every item has got to be weighed, the value must be received during the year, and the people must be asked to pay for it during that year. Anyone who has had experience in the management of local authorities and of their finance knows quite well that in the early part of the year, before the rates come in, when there is no money in the Exchequer and when they have to get accommodation, the first question that is asked by the directors of a bank when they apply for accommodation is: "Have you estimated and struck a sufficient rate to meet your expenditure during the year?" If the answer to that be in the negative you will have to look elsewhere for your financial accommodation. It is a well-known principle. If the new Party, this great new National Party, from which we had an exhibition of oratory this evening, has got a better financial policy than that, something sounder, something which will open up those great avenues of development and of constructive policy for the improvement of the country, there is a great field for them, not alone in this country, but in many others—very many others.
Comment on this
It would not be big enough to hold them if they could table a better policy than that.
Comment on this
The dreams of Napoleon would not be sufficient for them. The Alchemists themselves, who failed in their day to solve this question, could be written down as children in the matter. The great financial geniuses of our time could succeed, where everybody else has failed. There is nothing cheaper, nothing easier than to say it is bosh to balance your Budget. Nobody realises how hard it is to do that better than we do. It is not on a motion like this of want of confidence, lightly proposed during a discussion of a single Vote for the Executive Council, that you are going to teach the Executive Council how to do their business, if they do not know it. Those countries that have not balanced their Budgets, and which are without the tradition that Switzerland, Holland and Denmark have got, what position are they in? What position would this country be in if we went on not balancing our Budget, with deposits of over £150,000,000 in our banks? That is the sheet anchor in this country at present. You can destroy it, you can make it valueless, and put money in the pockets of the bank shareholders if you like by disturbing that particular equation——
Comment on this
When I say balancing the Budget, I mean what is known to everybody. We are getting out of a war period. You can easily take a cycle of probably ten years in which there should be that equation, or equilibrium.
Comment on this
The Deputy is an excellent judge of morality. I would not like to interpret it for him.
Comment on this
It would be better if the President was allowed to continue his statement and was not interrupted.
Comment on this
It is occasionally stated that certain items appear in our Estimates; secondly, in our Appropriation Bill, and subsequently in our balance sheet, items, the burden of which should be spread over a number of years, and that is one of those cases in which it is stated that our balance sheets are not true. We know that they are not true. They are true to this extent, that they are an accurate picture of the exact state of affairs, but we have not yet arrived at a period when you can say that the amount in the capital debt, or the national debt of this country, whatever you like to call it, is so much of the service on that debt as the corresponding five per cent. equivalent to it, together with whatever sum is needed within a given number of years to wipe out that particular liability. We do know that in respect of sums that we have put in that they are insufficient. We do know that more money will be required, and we further know that if there is one thing more than another which animated investors to put money into the National Loan, it was that they had that particular head line that we were not going to live beyond our means, and that is another method of saying that you are going to balance your Budget. Deputy Esmonde stated that credit is only confidence.
Comment on this
I see. Well, I take it if they were used by the French Prime Minister they are probably very wise words. But what is this confidence we are losing? A week ago the National Loan was at 93. I understand that notwithstanding the importance of this motion it is at 94 this afternoon.
Comment on this
On a point of order, have we nothing to do here but listen to this Deputy interrupting?
Comment on this
I am not so sure that it is the possibility that the Government is going out of office that has been responsible for this increase in the value of the Loan. It is not at all likely, within the next couple of years, until we see what the actual cost of the compensation will be, that you will get Estimates framed in such a way as that you can say: "That is a normal Budget; that is a normal expenditure," and that you can calculate your revenue accordingly. But why is it put to us that this particular heavy taxation should not be imposed in these years? The answer to it is very simple. Huge sums of money have been disbursed. We did not spread their disbursement over three or four years. We disturbed them last year to some extent, this year to a large extent, and the year before, and if these years cannot bear the burden of heavy taxation, what prospect is there in a few years' time, when there is no such disbursement of capital moneys, that the people of that time will be able to bear the taxation that they want us to pass on to our children? Deputies say that legislation that is being introduced, and that the Acts that we have passed have weakened the confidence in and the popularity of the Government. I suppose they have. The Government that goes in for pandering to popularity can buy it at an exorbitant price. Nothing is easier than to pass on the liability to the people that are coming after you. But we have such respect for the new National Party, and for the rights they should have when they come on these Benches, that we would not think of doing such a thing as that. We trust their task will be very easy, and their troubles light, and they will get every assistance from us when they do take on these onerous duties. When Deputy Esmonde as President, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Minister for Finance, and probably Minister for Defence, is struggling under the weight of that policy, nobody would say to him what the Minister for Finance said about his duty as President, and what the Commander-in-Chief said about him as Minister for Defence. I regret that the Minister for Finance is ill, very seriously ill, to a very large extent due to the burden of the work that he did, and a complaint never reached us from him as regards the strain that was put upon his physique. I regret he is not here to deal with this matter of finance, but I am satisfied that other than embellishing what I have said, and putting it before you in a way that would be more easily understandable, that he would agree with the foundations and the basis of the arguments I have used. The Government is in this position. It got a great measure of support at the time of the signing of the Treaty. Immediately legislation had to be introduced, and as universally happens you cannot introduce legislation which would satisfy everybody. Take some of the measures which you have recently passed, and which, I suppose, some of the Deputies are now dissatisfied with having voted for. They have not said so, but I take it that they are dissatisfied.
Comment on this
I would not say that it is their consciences, because they have absolutely clean consciences. They are men without sin, and all that they are sorry for is that all the sins in this country are committed by the Executive Council. Take, for example, the Railways Bill. How many interests did we antagonise by that? Quite a large number. Take the Housing Facilities Bill. How many people were dissatisfied about that? Quite a large number. If we were only to bring in a vote for unemployment, and that County Kerry got £5,000 more than County Clare, Deputy Hogan would get up in his wrath and would himself demolish the Government by his maledictions. But while all that is the case, the fact of the matter is that until four months ago we possessed the confidence of a very large number of the people, and four months ago or thereabouts I offered Deputy McGrath an Army inquiry. I did not ask for it myself. He made certain statements, and I said: "There is only one way of settling this matter, and that is by having an inquiry."
Comment on this
Were the statements news to you? In case there is any objection to interruptions, if the President would adopt a different attitude in his speech there would be no interruptions.
Comment on this
Perhaps if the President addresses me instead of people who are opposed to him it would be simpler.
Comment on this
I thought I heard somebody speak, and you might not have heard him, and I wanted to assist you. An inquiry was asked for. We agreed to give an inquiry. If Deputy McGrath had not asked for the inquiry I hesitate to think that an inquiry would have been held. Possibly it might have been held. It was held as a peace offering to the person who asked for it, or, rather, the person at whose instigation it was held, or in respect of some statement that was about to be made. When the inquiry was held he did not attend, and he said: "The Executive Council have all the information." Now, there were documents in my office, and I had forgotten that they were there.
I suppose I would have been inclined to say that there were no such documents. They were discovered for me. I did not know they were there, and when Deputy McGrath says: "Documents are available; the Executive Council has the information," I submit in all fairness that it is not a fair way of putting it. I am not blaming Deputy McGrath for not attending the inquiry. That is his own business. I do say that it was not my responsibility to bring evidence there, since it was not at my instigation that the inquiry was instituted, and I say that it is too late in the day now to find any fault with the personnel of that Inquiry, its constitution, its complexion, its political complexion if you like, or anything of that sort. The way to have done that was to have brought up a motion—I would have given every facility for debating it, and to have suggested another method. The circumstances did change from the time I offered the Inquiry first, and when the Inquiry was set up, because General Mulcahy was at that time outside the Executive Council, and in these matters one must be just. The Dáil was put in possession of every tittle of information, and the personnel of the Inquiry was adapted to suit every party in the Dáil.
Comment on this
On a point of order. I would like to point out, fearing the President is speaking without having heard me, that I distinctly stated, and it is on record that I did so, at the time the personnel was put before the Dáil that it was not a proper personnel. Further, I want to remind him that I did not ask for an inquiry. He put it up as a means of getting out of the difficulty that he and other members of the Executive Council were in, and I accepted it. I did not ask for it.
Comment on this
No, the Deputy did not ask for it; it was to get him out of a difficulty as well as to get anybody else out of it that I offered the inquiry.
Comment on this
The Deputy was going to make a case, a case that could be made if he had the real interests of the country at heart, that the abuses he thought or alleged were in existence among other things with which he was dissatisfied would not be remedied by a Debate here in which one member of the Executive Council would indict another——
Comment on this
Yes, or others. Now, I want to make it clear that it was not, in my opinion, fair to say that the Executive Council were bound to produce every document. I asked for some indication as to what the documents were. It is impossible when dealing with a large number of documents to keep track of them, to remember from whom one got a letter. A member of the Executive Council gets a large number of letters. A large number of letters come into my office every day. Some of them I never see, and many of them I never want to see, and to keep track of all these and to remember any one letter from any person or any persons dissatisfied is beyond my capabilities. Deputy McGrath has stated we have 150 officers in the Army who had service in other armies—I do not think he used the words ex-British. The total number of officers we have at present serving in the Army, who had service with other armies—some, a very small number, of whom had pre-Truce or pre-Treaty service with us—including an ex-Russian, an ex-Belgian, and an ex-Frenchman and some Germans, is 71.