Death of his Majesty King George V. - Imposition of Duties (Confirmation of Order) Bill, 1936—Second Stage.
Contributions 146–303 of 467. This sitting's record is too long for one page, so it is split into 3 parts.
No. 10 of 1936 ›
The other point I wish to mention is this: that it was possible to make this agreement proves conclusively that the British cannot justly be charged with trying to crush out our economic life, as several Ministers and members of the Fianna Fáil Party are fond of putting it. If they wanted to do that they needed none of the advice which Ministers absurdly suggest they got from Deputy Cosgrave and his friends. They could have taken the obvious course of placing an embargo on all Irish goods of every description. They confined themselves to collecting by tariffs the money that rightly or wrongly—and I express no opinion on the legal question, being merely a layman—they believed to be due to them, and while the President may be annoyed with them for having done so, he cannot reasonably say that they showed any spirit of malice or revenge. Indeed, if the United States of America—and this is the reference to war debts which I promised Deputy Davin—treated Great Britain as Great Britain has treated us, and allowed in enough British goods for the tariffs on them to make good payments of war debts, I fancy that Great Britain would have been exceedingly gratified, and the world in general would have thought that America was treating her well.
Comment on this
I am not responsible for any deductions Deputy Belton makes. I shall say nothing more except that I shall be deeply disappointed if the Government fail to make a strenuous effort before the end of 1936 to settle all disputes with Great Britain, or at the worst, to settle the financial dispute with Great Britain. I believe that they can succeed in doing that if they try. Only by friendly relations with Great Britain can we lay the foundation of reunion with Northern Ireland. The President has been speaking of our rights as a mother country whose children have helped to build up Australia, Canada and New Zealand. Let us not forget that maternity has its obligations and opportunities as well as rights, and that we give little evidence of appreciating the obligations of kinship when we advocate separation, or when we seek to weaken the principle of allegiance to the King, by which the whole fabric of the Commonwealth is held together.
Comment on this
Deputy Davin made one effort to get this discussion back into the atmosphere of reality and, for a time, I thought Deputy MacDermot was going to co-operate in that effort. An air of unreality has again been created, and, in view of the nature of the matters to be discussed and their very practical importance, we should keep our feet as firmly on the ground as possible. There is a motion before the Dáil to be discussed, and that motion was moved by the Leader of the Opposition. It asks the Dáil to reject the trade arrangement made with Great Britain and to refuse to implement that agreement or to pass the legislation required for that purpose. That is the purpose of the motion before us. No reasons were advanced from the Opposition Benches for the adoption of that extraordinary course. I think Deputies of the Opposition were probably shocked by the speech they heard from their leader. The Opposition are probably as deeply shocked as we were astonished by his speech. We are astonished because we had expected from him a clear, concise statement of the reasons which induced his Party to table that motion for our consideration. He proposes that we should refuse to implement that agreement recently concluded. But we heard no reasons. It is true that the motion itself asks that the passage of the Bill should be prevented, so as to provide for negotiations to be held forthwith with the British Government for a comprehensive settlement of the matters at issue between them and us.
Deputy Davin asked a number of pertinent questions relating to the matters at issue between the British Government and the Government of the Saorstát. These questions should not have to be asked. One would have thought that the Leader of the Opposition would have taken the opportunity afforded him when speaking in support of this motion to have given his conception of what these issues are, and upon what lines the settlement of the dispute should be attempted. Does Deputy Cosgrave include amongst the issues in dispute between us and the British Government the question of Partition, the question of the Oath of Allegiance and the question of constitutional changes recently effected? Are negotiations to proceed forthwith for a settlement of these matters before any arrangement of any kind in relation to trade are to be made between Great Britain and ourselves? We are entitled to know the point of view of the Opposition on these questions. We should not have to ask them for their views. When the Party opposite decided to table that motion they must have known that these questions would be asked. They must have contemplated the possibility of their being asked to explain not merely the reasons why the trade pact should not be implemented but also upon what basis this immediate settlement should be attempted and on what issues should negotiations take place? I hope that some subsequent speakers from the Opposition side will attempt to answer these questions. It was the duty of the Leader of the Opposition to have dealt with these matters. His failure to do so is very surprising indeed.
In fact we heard nothing from Deputy Cosgrave that had any very definite bearing either upon the trade arrangement for the exchange of commodities with Great Britain, or on the matters dealt with in the amendment. The speech was merely a further revelation of the mentality which members of his Party bring to bear upon all questions affecting the relations of this country and Great Britain. Deputy Cosgrave told us that the British were willing to settle the issues associated with the land annuities, and right through his speech there ran the assumption, that if there was failure to effect a settlement, and if there was reluctance to have these issues brought forward with determination, the fault must lie with the Government of this country. He could not conceive the possibility that the British Government could be otherwise than fair, reasonable, and generous in their relations with us. That mentality is deep rooted amongst the members of his Party, but one would have thought that the leader of that Party would have made an attempt to justify the assumptions upon which his amendment is based and upon which his speech was framed.
He told us that this arrangement for the exchange of goods with Great Britain was an admission that we cannot do without the British market. It would not occur to him, or to any of his colleagues, that it might be taken as an indication that the British Government has realised that there is here an important market for their produce, for their coal, for their machinery, for their cement and manufactured goods. That would not occur to them. That idea was not expressed in any of the speeches made by their representatives, either in this House or outside it, or in the amendment tabled in relation to the Bill we are now discussing. Not merely had we in the speech of Deputy Cosgrave,—a speech which was merely re-echoed in more vehement terms by Deputy O'Sullivan—that revelation of the mentality of the Opposition on this matter, but it was an indication of their ability to forget, where it is convenient to forget, the origin of the economic war, and the part they played in instigating it. The imposition of duties on our cattle, and the measures restricting the movement of goods between Great Britain and ourselves were not inherent in the land annuities dispute. The land annuities dispute was a legal dispute, a matter affecting the interpretation of statutes, and was capable of determination in a legal way if there was any desire to effect such determination. When the British Government decided to avoid any attempt to effect a legal determination of that issue, and to force acceptance of their point of view on the Irish people by the application of economic pressure on this country they were acting upon suggestions made to them by Deputies opposite. Deputy MacDermot may contend, and possibly may rightly contend, that the British Government did not need these suggestions; that they would have thought of these measures for themselves. That does not lessen the guilt of those in this country who toured from one town to another during 1932 making speech after speech, telling the British Government that if these measures were adopted, and if economic pressure was applied in our country, the people would be induced to change the Government, to abandon the policy this Government stood for, and to reverse their position on the land annuities and accept British dictation.
Comment on this
Is Deputy Mulcahy's ability to forget so efficient that he has no recollection whatever of the speeches he made, or the speeches of Senator Blythe, Deputy O'Higgins, and of the speeches that every member of that Party made during the period? They came to the Dáil and announced after these duties were imposed, that within three months we were going to be broken, driven from the position we had taken up, that we would find it impossible to carry on unless we sought terms from the British Government. At the end of December, 1932, I said here that the economic war was won. I meant it. It was then clear that economic pressure would not intimidate our people and that they were not going to be beaten by these tactics, that they had resolved to stand firm. My contention on that point was demonstrated emphatically at the election which followed one month later. Once it had become evident that the people were not going to abandon the position we took up on the land annuities issues, or to surrender what we believed to be our rights, in consequence of the damage done to our economic organisation by tariffs applied against us, then the economic war was bound to end at some stage. Once that became clear we had won.
These tariffs upon our agricultural exports, and the measures adopted by the British Government to defeat us on the land annuities issues, had their reactions on this country, and they are very serious reactions. In the early days of the operation of the tariffs it was a matter of grave concern to the members of the Government what these reactions were going to be. We knew that they were going to have bad effects upon the national economy, upon the prosperity of our farmers, on our prospects of promoting industry and upon our plans to promote employment. We knew that, and we were not even too sure that they were not going to have such an effect that it would be impossible for us to maintain our position. But we determined to stand firm, and we have demonstrated that it is possible for us, despite these measures, to proceed with our recovery programme, to proceed with our plans for the reorganisation of agriculture, the development of industry and the promotion of employment. Perhaps we have made less rapid progress than we would have made if circumstances were different and if these particular measures had not been adopted against us by the British Government. Nevertheless, we have made progress. The fact that Trade pacts are now being made with the British may as well be due to the fact that they recognise that the advice given them by the Opposition was bad advice, that the tactics they adopted were not going to have results, as to realisation on our part that it is necessary to maintain our agricultural exports in present circumstances. The coal-cattle requirements of last year had beneficial results for this country. It is because they had beneficial results, and consequently decreased the power of the Opposition to continue their wrecking tactics, that they are now endeavouring to prevent the implementation of this agreement which continues and extends the old one. Their sole reason for opposing it is because it is going to have beneficial results for this country.
Comment on this
It takes away the only foundation there was for the campaign they conducted in the country. They told farmers what they expected would flow from the economic war just as they told the British Government that the imposition of these duties would produce immediate surrender here. They were proved to be wrong. But they set out to achieve the same results by other means. Deputy Belton is concerned if bailiffs are evicting farmers in order to make them pay the annuities. Who campaigned around the country to prevent them paying the annuities, and organised gangs of people to intimidate those who were paying, and organised boycots to intimidate shopkeepers?
Comment on this
On a point of explanation. This pact is paying the annuities. That is what the Minister is advocating, but sheriffs are being sent out to collect them again. Do not talk balderdash. Get to business.
Comment on this
That campaign to prevent the payment of annuities and rates was initiated by the Opposition in the hope that they would destroy agriculture, and they built upon that destruction for the resurrection of the blighted hopes of their own Party. They failed, and to-day the land annuities are being paid voluntarily, now that intimidation has ended.
Comment on this
The farmers have paid their annuities four times over. I think the Minister has got a nightmare and does not know where he is.
Comment on this
I am sure the Deputy will be glad to hear that the amount of arrears of land annuities outstanding is negligible.
Comment on this
The amount of arrears of the land annuities outstanding is of no consequence. It is a much smaller percentage of the total to be collected than, say, the Deputy's Party is of the total membership of the House.
Comment on this
Where is the alternative market gone that the Minister promised the gulls of farmers who voted for him?
Comment on this
The principal alternative market is at home. I have frequently pointed out, and tried to get the Deputy to understand, that the principal alternative market for our farmers is here at home, and that market is being developed.
Comment on this
Deputy Cosgrave says that this trade arrangement with Great Britain is not a satisfactory settlement. Of course it is not a satisfactory settlement: it is not a settlement at all. It is not being put forward as a settlement. It is an arrangement for the exchange of coal against cattle and of cement against bacon for the year 1936, an arrangement which is beneficial to us and no less beneficial to the other party to it.
Comment on this
They are getting the annuities due. The Minister will agree to that. He should not be hypocritical any longer, but should come to business.
Comment on this
I am anxious to get to understand Deputy Belton's attitude to the arrangement. He objects to the payment of £4 5s. per head on cattle over two years old going to Great Britain, and, because he objects to that, he wants to defeat the Bill so that the amount will be £6 per head.
Comment on this
Deputy Belton has a motion on the Order Paper asking the Dáil not to pass this Bill. If it is not passed, the arrangement falls, and if it does the tax upon these cattle will be £6 per head——
Comment on this
And because the Deputy objects to it being £4 5s. he wants to make it £6. That is about as sensible a proposition as I have ever heard coming from the Deputy.
Comment on this
We have not agreed to the imposition of any duty. We have agreed to this: that we will take coal and cement against cattle and bacon to a corresponding value; that we will reduce certain duties which operated against British goods to an amount corresponding to the reductions which they have effected in certain duties affecting our goods. We have agreed to nothing else.
Comment on this
In consequence of this arrangement we are reducing by this measure certain duties affecting British goods. If we do that, they are going to reduce certain duties which they have imposed affecting our goods.
Comment on this
I kept it, and I gave him more comfort than he got from the Government during the last four years.
Comment on this
The effect of the pact made last year, which merely provided for an exchange of cattle against coal, without any modification of the duties and without covering any other commodities, was very beneficial. No matter what Deputies opposite may seek to contend to the the circumstances of farmers last year and of the country in general were, in consequence of it, better than in the previous year, just as in the previous year they had been better than in the year before that. The exports of cattle increased by over 150,000 head in number and by over £1,000,000 in value. Not merely was there an increase in the number of cattle exported but there was also an improvement in prices. The price of cattle improved because of the wider opportunities for trading that were afforded by the arrangement. In August, 1934, the margin of difference between the price of fat cattle in the Free State and in Great Britain was 15/- per cwt. There is always, of course, a margin of difference between the price here and the price in Great Britain, a margin which represents the cost of transport and the profits of the middlemen engaged in dealing in cattle for export from this country. That margin, as I have said, was 15/- per cwt. in August, 1934, and it came down to 9/- per cwt. in August, 1935. Yet the agreement of that year provided for no variation of the duty. There was no variation in the duty, and yet our cattle prices improved as against the prices in Great Britain. This year a further and more substantial improvement can be effected. The motion which the Deputies opposite have on the Order Paper is designed to prevent that happening, because if it does it is going to be detrimental to the interests of their Party—to destroy their chances of getting increased support in rural areas. That is the sole reason why they are opposed to the arrangement. They have given no other reason for their opposition to it. It is true that Deputy Cosgrave said that he was not anxious to make political propaganda out of a discussion on this matter, but he had the grace to leave the House when his associate, Deputy Professor O'Sullivan, was making his speech.
Comment on this
Of course, the position would be good if there were no tariffs, and some day we will get to that position, but not by the path of surrender. That is the path that the Deputies opposite want us to take.
Comment on this
They profess to believe that it is only a question of going over, hat in hand, and asking for a settlement and getting it. They know well that it is nothing of the kind. They know full well that the issues involved here are of much greater significance for our people than the mere amount of the land annuities. If the British Government got it into their heads that we could be forced to abandon our rights, to give in upon any issue in dispute between us by the application of economic pressure and the imposition of tariffs on our agricultural exports, then that power would be used not merely in relation to the land annuities but on every occasion when there was a majority in the British Parliament to support the use of it. If we allow ourselves to be defeated upon this issue by these means, what hope is there that we will offer a more vigorous resistance to them on some future occasion when, perhaps, something more important may be at stake?
It is my conviction that, because of the improved conditions here and because of other circumstances that may have a bearing on our position, it will be possible to get to the position which Deputy Belton visualises, but only by the path of fair negotiation: of two equals meeting, one to give and the other to concede an equal amount. On that basis negotiations can proceed at any time. We are prepared to settle the economic war at any time on terms which, in our opinion, are favourable and fair to the Irish people.
What then is to be gained by these perpetual references to the losses sustained by our farmers in consequence of the economic war? We know that there are losses. The farmers themselves know better than anyone else what they have lost, and it was the farmers who put this Government into office, not merely once but twice. Deputies opposite will some day realise that the farmers of this country have the fire of patriotism in their veins, that they have a clearer appreciation of what is in the national interest than the time-serving politicians who profess to lead them, and that they are not going to be induced, by the crocodile tears of people whose only hope is to climb back into office on the backs of the farmers, into deserting the policy they endorsed when they put this Government into office. They took the step of putting this Government into office in 1932 under circumstances which were operating to deter them from that action. They had been told, not merely from political platforms, but from other platforms, that the installation of a Fianna Fáil Government in office was going to mean red ruin and revolution; that it would mean the destruction of trade, the destruction of confidence, the flight of capital from the country, and many other evils. Although the farmers had been told that repeatedly, and from many quarters, nevertheless they took that decision in 1932 and, having taken that decision under these circumstances, and all these prognostications having been proved to be unfounded, and all those prophets of evil having been proved to be frauds and humbugs, they are not likely to reverse their decision just now when we are moving forward from the effects of the economic war, and now that we can expect that, regularly each year, there will be an improvement on the position already attained. They are not likely to go back now merely because certain people on the benches opposite think that they are better fitted to hold office than those whom the people chose for that purpose.
Deputy Cosgrave is shocked by the fall in prices of agricultural products in the Saorstát, and that, he says, is the case for the Opposition motion. Has there been a fall in agricultural prices only in this country? Is this the only country affected? Has the fall in the prices of agricultural commodities been any more severe or greater in this country than in other countries?
Comment on this
Let us keep to modern times, for the moment. During that period the agricultural price index in Great Britain fell by six points, or 5 per cent. During the same period, the agricultural price index in the Saorstát fell by one point, or 1¼ per cent. There was, relatively and absolutely, a greater fall in agricultural prices in Great Britain for that period than we had in the Saorstát.
Comment on this
As Deputy Keating will not obey the Chair and cease interrupting, I must call on him to leave the House now.
Comment on this
Surely that fact, and the knowledge which can be gained from the columns of the newspapers concerning the circumstances of agriculture in all countries of the world, would have induced the people opposite to realise that we had a problem to face irrespective of the economic war, a problem which was there before the economic war started, and a problem which is still there. In 1931, the price of cattle was tumbling down. The price of butter and the price of bacon were falling at that period. When even the free-trade Minister for Agriculture of the Cumann na nGaedheal Government deserted every principle he had advocated in the previous ten years and came to this House with motions for the imposition of protective duties on these commodities, surely they realised then that there was a fundamental weakness in our whole economy, and that these duties had to be advocated and protection given if we were to secure prosperity for our people, irrespective of world conditions. That weakness was there, and that weakness will always be there so long as we are depending for all our prosperity, and for the maintenance of our whole economic organisation, upon the sale in one market of a limited range of products. There is a possibility of giving security to our farmers, and it is based on the market here at home. It is true that we will always have, for many long years to come, a surplus of agricultural products, but so long as we have needs which we cannot supply ourselves, and in so far as we will always have to import from other countries goods that are necessary and goods that might be classed as luxuries, and are in a position to offer a market for these goods here in this country, then so long will we be able to find an outlet for our agricultural surplus. Upon the basis of exchange; upon the basis of giving our cattle in return for coal, our bacon in return for cement, our eggs in return for oranges, or on any other basis you like—that is the sound basis on which to conduct international trade. We are getting on to that basis, and it will be merely a necessary enlargement of our economic activities, the greater part of which will be centred upon the home market. We can organise agriculture sufficiently to secure that irrespective of world conditions, fluctuations of prices in the world market, or the alarums or excursions of foreign politics, our farmers, nevertheless, will be able to maintain themselves by supplying our own requirements; and, at the same time, we can increase the market for these requirements by the development of our industries and the opening up of our resources of one kind or the other so as to employ our own people in the production of the other goods we need. We can only have security on the basis of a self-contained economy —not 100 per cent. self-sufficient or self-contained, but so far as we can make it capable of carrying on, even if circumstances outside our control should shut off outside markets or outside sources of supply.
Deputy Cosgrave told us that the agricultural economy which existed in this country previous to the economic war was built up over a long period of years and with great difficulty, and that it brought prosperity to our people. That agricultural economy, of which he is talking, collapsed in 1931, and it is the agricultural economy which, in the previous decade, sent 250,000 of our people out to America hoping to find in the United States the opportunity to earn a livelihood which they could not find at home. That is the economy that is being destroyed, and not merely by our action. We would have had to destroy it any way, perhaps, but we certainly would have had to reorganise it on the lines I have suggested. That does not mean that we will not export cattle or that we will not export bacon or eggs or other agricultural products. It does mean, however, that the kernel of the whole system, the firm foundation upon which the structure will be founded, will be the market here at home, and that it will not depend on trading in Great Britain. But, so long as the British Government require to import cattle or to export coal; so long as they require to import bacon or other agricultural products and to export machinery or steel; so long will it be possible, irrespective of other considerations, to effect trade deals of the kind the Dáil is now being asked to approve. These trade deals in no way detract from our political or fiscal freedom. They are the type of bargains which any country in our circumstances would seek to effect.
Comment on this
And if we get into new circumstances in which we may want no coal, new circumstances in which we may want no machinery or any other of the products which the British might want to sell us, then we will have to try to adapt our organisation and economy to these circumstances. Let me assure Deputies that the price of cattle is going up. It is going to go up because of this agreement, and yet there are Deputies here who are going to vote against it, and for the rest of this year they will be going to their constituencies and explaining to their constituents that they did nothing of the kind, and if they did, it was a mistake on their part. The price of cattle is going to go up; it is going up and it is going to go up more.
Comment on this
The English markets will rule the prices here in spite of you and President de Valera. You will have to go by the English prices in spite of all your up-in-the-air talk.
Comment on this
It is about time the farmers got some of their own back. You let them in for plenty of trouble.
Comment on this
We did not put on the duty—you did. The people opposite were the originators of that plan. They devised it. It was in their office it was thought out. They were the first to speak about it in public. If the British Government acted on their advice it was merely due to this fact, that the British Government did not know them as well as we do.
Comment on this
Deputy Cosgrave, in the course of his rambling remarks, told us that agricultural employment had undoubtedly increased. Nobody denies it, he said. It is the first time that anybody in his Party has admitted it. In the past when I produced figures to show that agricultural employment was increasing there were Deputies opposite alleging that the figures were cooked; they would not believe it. They did not conceive it possible that under a Fianna Fáil administration there should be more people employed in agriculture, whether for wages or as members of a farmer's family, than there were at any other time, even in the period when the Deputy was President of the Executive Council and Deputy Hogan was Minister for Agriculture. The fact is that there are more employed now, and the number is steadily increasing.
Comment on this
On one occasion Deputy Cosgrave read the trade and shipping statistics of this country through a mirror. He read them in such a way that he put the exports on the import side and the imports on the export side, and then he said that we had a favourable balance of some £20,000,000. He is doing the same still.
Comment on this
Deputy Cosgrave talked about a reduction in the number of horses sold. He must have been looking at the import figures again. If he will only look up the export figures in the excellent returns which my Department makes available for all Deputies, he will find that the number of horses sold, exported, is increasing quite substantially.
Comment on this
The Deputy did not refer to the price. He merely mentioned that the number decreased. He is wrong; it did not decrease, but it increased. In fact there is a greater volume of agricultural production now than in any year.
Comment on this
There is a greater volume now than in any year, even in the years when the Deputies opposite were in control.
Comment on this
The value of the horses exported in 1935 was £1,049,000 as against £932,000 in the previous year. The Deputy is wrong both ways.
Comment on this
It is quite true that prices are down. If the Deputy were here a little earlier I would have pointed out to him that in the 12 months prior to August, 1935 the agricultural prices index figure in this country fell by one point and in the same period the British index figure fell by six points, representing 1¼ per cent. here as against 5 per cent. in Britain. I pointed out that there was a universal decline in agricultural prices and that the decline was not confined to this country but rather was it due to circumstances which are universal. They are not circumstances which would be remedied by the adoption of the Deputy's motion. I propose to conclude by asking Deputy Cosgrave—he will not be allowed to speak a second time and perhaps, for the sake of his Party, that is all the better—to get some other one of the leaders of that Party, some responsible Deputy—I bar Deputy Dillon—to tell us, in relation to his motion, why he thinks that it is possible to effect this favourable settlement that he refers to. He said that a favourable settlement can be achieved. On what ground does he base that belief and on what ground does he think we should seek the favourable settlement? You cannot effect a favourable settlement without making concessions as against the advantages to be secured. What concession would Deputy Cosgrave authorise a delegation going over to get this favourable settlement that he tells us is available, to make? If the Deputy is not prepared to tell us that, will he at least do this, answer the questions put to him by Deputy Davin —to state what are the matters at issue and the grounds upon which a settlement must be effected before he is prepared to pass this Bill?
Comment on this
Will the Deputy tell us what he meant when he put down the motion? I think that is not unreasonable. What are the matters in dispute arising out of which he thinks we could get a final settlement?
Comment on this
Will the Minister say what he has been asked for in the nature of concessions? The Minister made some reference to figures in relation to agricultural employment. He said the figures have gone up. Since 1931 there are 400 additional persons in permanent agricultural employment getting 3/- a week less wages; in fact, less money is being distributed in wages all over the country.
Comment on this
The Minister for Industry and Commerce referred to Deputy Cosgrave's speech as being a rambling statement. I think everybody in this House, irrespective of Party, will agree that if Deputy Cosgrave's speech was a rambling statement then the Minister has brought us on a world tour. At the point where he sat down I was hoping that he was going to begin to discuss the settlement or pact that was arrived at between this country and Great Britain. Instead of that he treated us in a rather violent way to his more or less characteristic mass of exaggerations, inaccuracies and evasions. Then in a most light-hearted manner he gave the debating lie to the case that was made by himself and his colleagues just three months ago in this House. What was the case made by the Minister for Industry and Commerce and by the Minister for Finance when the Guarantee Fund Bill was introduced here to neutralise and violate a case before the Irish courts? Was it not that this, that and the other thing would have to be taxed, that the money in arrears by way of land annuities could not be spared or could not be collected without imposing the most intense and unjust hardship on the very poorest people in the country? To-day he comes in, and in his usual Coué style, in order to get round an awkward moment in a debate he tells us that the total arrears of annuities in this country are negligible.
Which way is it? When are we going to get a little bit of the truth? When are we going to get a little bit of consistency? When is this practice going to cease, of making statements from the Government benches to the House and to the public that will be contradicted by the same people the following day? It is that instability in the Government over there that has caused instability right down through the country. We have troubles with Great Britain, but our biggest trouble is the trouble created by the reckless disregard of truth that is becoming characteristic of the Government Front Bench. As far as any discussion, or attempt to discuss either the Bill or the motion is concerned, what does this amount to? A series of questions shot out at us as to what are the issues between this country and Great Britain. Under Providence, is there anybody who knows the Presidential mind, or is there anybody who knows the difficulties the President is capable of producing, tomorrow, next week or next month? The greatest factory in this country is the factory over there for the creation of difficulties and obstacles. Originally the country was led to believe, rightly or wrongly, that the economic war arose out of the intention of the Irish Government to retain the annuities, and the case was made that they had a clear mandate from the people for that. Are we to take it from the Minister for Industry and Commerce that the breach has been considerably broadened since, that there are a number of insuperable obstacles in the path of peace since then? Why not say so then, rather than ask us what these obstacles are? Are we not entitled to know who placed these obstacles in the path of peace? Why, when and by what authority were they created, and, further, what are the obstacles?
We are asked do we propose a settlement or a removal of the boundary, an attempt to remove partition, and we answer "most certainly." We are asked for suggestions. The path that you have been treading for the past three years, for the past 13 years, is a path leading directly away from any hope of ending partition. Your speeches in Ennis and elsewhere for the past six months, in my opinion, have done irreparable harm to any hope of ever, in your time, removing partition. If there is to be any hope of removing partition by friendly negotiations between this country and Great Britain, it would be brought appreciably nearer if there was a firm statement from the Government of their intention to adhere to the clauses of the Anglo-Irish Treaty which defined our relations with Canada, Australia, South Africa and Great Britain. We talk about a mother country, and we pursue a policy that is harmful, not only here in our own home but that would have the result of cutting the connection between the mother and her children in other countries of the association of nations to which we belong—not only that, but of lopping off a limb from the mother country herself.
We were told by the Minister for Industry and Commerce three years ago, on the return from Ottawa and in an interview given by the Vice-President, when the air was thick with rumours of a settlement, and when friends of the Fianna Fáil Party were buying cattle by the score, that if a settlement had not been actually reached, at least they had prepared the way for an early settlement. I believe those people were not uttering falsehoods. I believe they faced up to their job in Ottawa, and that if they did not actually bring a settlement, they prepared the way for an immediate settlement. Who blasted the bridge? Who robbed the Irish people of the fruits and the benefits of the settlement that was made there in Ottawa? Instead of putting questions to us, as to things at issue at the moment, and how to surmount them, will the Government Bench let us know what were the terms and the outlines of that provisional settlement? Time and again there have been negotiations. Time and again there have been speeches made by members of the British Government. Time and again they have indicated, not only the desire to settle but that they were prepared to make very considerable financial concessions, if it were not for the political difficulties. What are those political difficulties? When did you get a mandate to obstruct a settlement on the ground of political issues? Four years after the start of this insane wrangle, are we not entitled to ask and to hear either from this side or the other side of the water what are the best terms on offer? No junta or group has the right to refuse, in secret, terms of benefit to this country. What is the maximum offer? Are we going to hear them from the President? What was the maximum offer that led the Vice-President, the Minister for Agriculture and the Minister for Industry and Commerce to come back from Ottawa and state that they had made a settlement? What were the terms offered them?
Comment on this
In a public interview, published in the Irish papers, and not denied until the President found it politically convenient to deny it here six months ago.
Comment on this
Will the Deputy give the date? This is the first time we have got near something tangible.
Comment on this
The one bogey before the Presidential mind is a settlement. That is the one thing he dreads, that is the skeleton in the cupboard, because if there were a settlement between this country and Great Britain, all the maudlin prating by which he upholsters every platform on which he stands would have to be discarded, and he would have to settle down to serious common-sense work, a thing he is utterly unsuited for.
Comment on this
Of course we can get it. Go out now and look at the Press of the week of the return of our delegates from Ottawa.
Comment on this
As the Deputy is responsible for the statement, it is up to him to prove that it was made.
Comment on this
The Deputy made that statement several times, and will not be put off his stride by the whole front bench opposite. The President does not like me to ask, or to say, that the people of Ireland are entitled to know what is the maximum offer. We have been three years suffering under this foolish political war. The people have suffered heavy losses, and they are entitled to know whether the maximum offer is sufficient compensation for the damage done and for the losses suffered. We have been three years engaged in this economic war, and after three years of political debauchery, when homes have been ruined and people sent to their graves and evictions in every county in the country, we have at least in this particular pact an indication that at last there is a realisation of the gravity of the situation and of the hardships and injustices suffered by our people.
All the high principle, initiated with his tongue in his cheek by the President and with patent insincerity about never paying one farthing to Great Britain, has been suddenly discarded and thrown overboard. All the cheap claptrap about retirement from public life rather than approve of the payment of as much as 1/- to Great Britain has been forgotten, and we have in this pact something that brings us up against realities. No Minister or Deputy who has spoken so far in this debate has shown he was sufficiently brave to tell the House the two sides of the pact and exactly what it means.
We are asked to sanction a particular pact between two countries at the height of what was termed an acute state of war, and provide a monopoly, for an alleged enemy, of the whole of the coal trade of Ireland, to provide for an alleged enemy a monopoly of one-third of the cement trade of the country, and to reduce by 50 per cent. the tariff or tax upon all electrical apparatus that comes into Ireland, and to sell at a disadvantage sugar, saccharine and a number of other commodities. That is one side. That is what the British get here and over there. By this agreement we are arranging to pay, by way of land annuities, £2 on every beast between six and 15 months old; £3 on every beast between 15 months and two years old; and £4 5s. on every Irish animal exported over two years of age. It could be argued, prior to this particular arrangement, that Britain was collecting the annuities in virtue of her might and our poverty; that they were bleeding the people in this country white when they were imposing what you might call "Jimmy Thomas tariffs." But from the day that this Government made their pact the £4 5s., fixed to the horns of every animal going over there, is as much a de Valera tax as a J.H. Thomas tax.
This is the first time since the economic war squabble was started that you have a financial pact and arrangement under which you agree to pay 100 per cent. of the sum alleged to be in dispute. Britain gets our coal monopoly, she gets one-third of our cement trade, she gets definite concessions over every other country with regard to our steel, iron and sugar imports and, on the other side, she gets an absolute guarantee of the payment of the land annuities. The Irish farmer pays these taxes, and the Irish farmer also pays half the annuities at home, and in addition he suffers a loss in the home market in the price of his cattle equivalent to the tax on the exported cattle.
I am one of those who never expected either a national outlook or a common-sense outlook from the present Government. I did expect a mathematical outlook, but the type of mathematics displayed in connection with this particular pact would be frowned on if produced by imbeciles in an imbecile war. If you are going to pay the annuities in full why not pay them without all this economic war business? Payment in full would relieve the tariff and allow remission under other heads and would produce an elevation in the price of cattle sold in the home fairs equivalent to the price of beasts sold abroad. This pact is not national, business like or mathematically sound. It is the production and the work of a group of fanatical politicians who consider their own political theories and their own absurd utterances as of more importance to the people of this country than the trade and welfare and even lives of those who have to live in it. We have gone through three years of political recklessness; we have thrown valuable cattle away; we have slaughtered hundreds of thousands of calves; we have erected factories for the destruction of cattle and for turning them into everything—pig meal, sausages, boots and table ornaments. We have discovered that under Fianna Fáil Administration we can make everything and anything out of cattle except money. But those who produce cattle and rear cattle and till the land to feed cattle are interested only in making money out of the stock they breed and feed.
My main objection to this partial settlement is because it is a definite national retreat and because it lowers entirely the prestige of this nation of ours by the very manner in which it was conceived and carried out, the shame-faced manner in which it was presented to the Dáil, the way it was put through with no Minister big enough to go over and do his job, and stand over it when it was done. It was a hole-and-corner secret arrangement by the Government that spoke and shouted about secret agreements. What constitutes a secret agreement? Is it because it is negotiated without the knowledge of the people? If so, what knowledge had the people of Ireland or the Irish Parliament of the negotiations which led up to this particular pact? If it is that which constitutes secrecy, there was never any agreement or pact or treaty negotiated and put through in such a secret way as this. If it is not that, is it the particular date on which it is submitted to the Dáil for advocation or endorsement? It is an accident that we are considering it to-day. If we are considering it, it is no thanks to the Government; it is because of the energy and the efforts and the challenge of the Opposition in this House. Only for that, it would never come before us.
I hold very strongly that the one thing which constitutes secrecy in international agreements is that those agreements are negotiated wholly and entirely by people who cannot claim and never did claim to be representatives of the people. The much-abused and libelled and slandered Civil Service of this country was held up at every cross-roads by Deputies opposite as an organisation in the grip of the Masons, with no national outlook, with nothing in common with the people of Ireland, but I thank Providence that when we reached a phase in our history when Government Ministers funked their responsibility and shirked their obligations we had civil servants of the type and class and manhood to do not only their own job, but to shoulder the responsibilities shirked by Ministers and go abroad to negotiate a trade agreement in a time of difficulty. But that is not their job. They are not and never were representative of the people of this country. They have no authority to negotiate on behalf of the people of this country. There were eight or ten men elected and there are eight or ten men paid for facing such responsibilities, taking such risks, and representing their people in times of stress and difficulty and delicacy. How was it that there was none of them to do it? How was it that full-time civil servants, representing nobody, had got to go over and pull the chestnuts out of the fire? That is my main objection to the whole manner and method in which this particular piece of business was carried out. Another objection is that you are making yourself, by the act of an Irish Government, and, if this goes through, by the act of an Irish Parliament, responsible for paying 100 per cent. of the annuities, and getting no compensation for the losses and the hardship and the trouble of the last three years. Further, if you are going, through a vote of the Dáil, to make yourselves responsible for paying the annuities in full, then it is better to pay them direct from one Department to another, and you would not have to give trade monopolies and all kinds of concessions to the nation and the people that you are fond of describing as our ancient enemy. There is an amendment down here demanding that a Second Reading should not be given to this Bill until there is an effort made to arrive at a comprehensive settlement of the whole question. As I said earlier, there is no matter of principle now involved.
Comment on this
Once you can settle 25 per cent. of our trouble no principle arrives into it. The only principle in existence at the moment is the amount of principal and interest you are paying Great Britain. Principle is laid at one side. You have discarded that stand. You have evacuated that front. The only case made here to-night was that this partial settlement was one of business, one of pounds, shillings and pence; as Deputy Davin said, a bread-and-butter agreement. If it is boiled down to that point, if there is merely a difference about money matters, if there is no principle involved, if civil servants, with no representative authority, with no right to speak for or on behalf of the people of this country, could negotiate a settlement which drew down all the exaggerated phrases used by the Minister for Industry and Commerce and others opposite, how much bigger, how much more far-reaching, how much more beneficial a settlement could be obtained if the President or his Ministers would follow the path blazed by the Irish civil servants and go over themselves to undertake their responsibilities? Is it that they do not know their jobs? Is it that they consider they would be bested around a table? Is it that they look on their ability as being inferior to that of the civil servants? Is it that they lack courage or that they want capacity? We are entitled to an answer. We are entitled to an answer from the Party that secured the votes of the majority of the people of this country by saying: "Put us back to dictate the terms of peace." Is that dictation? It is nationally humiliating and it is degrading that having gone into a war—no matter how unwisely, foolishly, fanatically and recklessly— we should have our tails between our legs so early, and should hoist, through civil servants, the flag of surrender, and even then an ignoble and unmanly type of surrender.
Each one of us has got to stand up in his own shoe leather. This kind of hollow activity through proxies is over-abused in this country. We have a President wearing a silk hat by proxy at Westminster, and strutting round Clare in a caubeen. You can sin by proxy, by authorised proxy just as gravely as you can sin directly, and all this hollow humbug and putting proxies up to do the work that we are either afraid or ashamed to do ourselves is only earning for the President and the Government of this State, from the lips of everyone, the term "Proxy President" and "Proxy Government."
You were elected to do certain work, to grapple with certain difficulties, to face certain responsibilities, not the least of them being to negotiate on behalf of the country every time and everywhere that difficulties arose between this country and any other country. Accept the motion. Do away with this cowardly system of acting through proxies. Face up to your own job. Make a courageous effort on your own, as representatives of the Irish people and as members of the Irish Government. If you make an effort, openly, bravely, boldly, and if you fail, then you will at least have gained the respect of people over here as well as of others—the respect which is due to a body of men constituting a Government that faced up to their responsibilities, even though and even when it meant taking a grave political risk.
Comment on this
I approve of the Bill before the House mainly because it establishes for the first time in the relationship between this country and England what the real trade position is between the two countries. For a long number of years various people at various times have indicated that association with England was absolutely essential in order that our trade should continue at the normal rate which made it possible for this country to continue to exist. The argument advanced during all these years was that even close association with England was essential for the very existence of this country. It has been and is the argument to-day of those who continue to assert that the interests of this country could best be served by association some way within the Empire. That argument has been very largely over-exaggerated. It is true, of course, that the English market is, and for all purposes, as far as we can see, will continue to be a very essential thing to the life and industry of this country. But the assertion that the market is one that we have available only under given conditions which involve humiliation on the part of the people of this country by accepting a status subordinate to that which is the wish of the people, namely, the independence of the country, has been very largely blown away by the pact we are now discussing.
This business arrangement clearly puts before us that the business arrangements between these two countries are for the first time established on that basis upon which all sound business should be established, that is, that there is an advantage to both parties in the contract. England has entered into this contract with no gratuitous intention towards the farmers or Government of this country. I do not think any of the Opposition will deny that England has entered into the contract because her industry has improved and there are possibilities of improvement in her industries as a result of it. We, on our part, have entered into the contract for similar reasons. We have thereby established a bargain which we assert and are sure will be in the best interests of the community here. England, on her side, has made a contract which she feels will be of equal value to her people, thereby establishing again, I assert, for the first time, a real business arrangement as regards the exchange of commodities between these two countries. It can no longer be asserted that the English buy our goods out of consideration for us. No longer can it be asserted that were it not for the good-will of England this country's whole market possibilities would cease. It is a good contract; it is a business contract.
A good deal of the opposition has been directed against it because Deputies say that some way or other there is a principle involved, and that that principle has been sold; that in entering into these negotiations with England the principle of the land annuities debt, which forms the greater part of the moneys in dispute between this country and England has been admitted by the Government. Of course, that is absurd. As a matter of fact, you cannot destroy a principle if a principle is not involved, and there is no principle involved here. This is simply a trading transaction between two peoples who enter into negotiation to see how far both their interests can be served. Both come within the contract. They were at liberty to go into it, and, when they went into it, come out of it, if it did not suit them. There is an ordinary business deal, and no more. There is no principle in the penal tariffs against our cattle and farm produce going into England. There is only the unprincipled action of England, in the first instance, in applying such tariffs. As to the land annuities, the Government were well and strongly advised that we had a legal claim to retain them. That was the case which we made.
It has been asserted that we should face up to the situation and negotiate direct with England on the question. We have done that. Our Government wrote to the English Ministers and told them that these sums of money were not legally due and that we would refuse to pay them until some court, fairly set up, would decide that they were due. Negotiations were then opened. The British Government replied and said that "within a prescribed area you may have that court which you desire." We, of course, refused to accept the prescribed area and said we should have the right to select it from the widest range we considered advisable. Without considering our right, other than within the prescribed area which England determined, she applied penal tariffs. There was no principle involved there. It was a question of England, with all her might, declaring these penal tariffs against us for no other purpose than to steam-roll us into submission. It was an unprincipled act, not made anything less unprincipled by the fact that the Opposition had directed such a course three years previously. It was an unprincipled course to adopt.
We made this contract with England, but remember that we did not give away this principle. We did not say that England had a right to collect the annuities. We did not call off the economic war. We did not take off the tariffs which we had applied against British goods coming into this country, only to the extent that we found necessary in order to make an equitable contract for the exchange of goods. We have completed that contract. But we have not for a moment admitted that the application of the penal tariffs by England was justified in the smallest degree. We have not admitted that the land annuities and the other sums in dispute are legally due by this country. It is still our contention that they belong to this country and we will continue to hold them, as we are in honour bound to hold them, until the matter is satisfactorily settled by some form of court in a position to arbitrate upon them.
I am very much surprised at the high moral rectitude of the Opposition on this question of bargaining. If they pointed out in what degree this bargain was wrong, if they showed wherein the imports which we have agreed to accept from England and the tariffs which we have agreed to reduce on the import of these commodities from England showed anything more than what would be a reasonable set-off for the tariffs which England has agreed to withdraw from our produce going into England, I could see some justification for the opposition. Such a form of criticism coming from the Opposition would really be useful. But there was not one word of argument to justify the action. There was merely opposition, and that, translated, means that the Deputies opposite prefer to have £6 per head charged against the cattle leaving this country rather than £4 5s. 0d.
It has been urged by Deputy O'Higgins and Deputy Belton that a better form of arrangement would be to collect the annuities as heretofore and transfer them to England. That is really magnificent advice at this stage. Is not that the sort of mentality that has made the economic war necessary? I think it was Deputy O'Higgins who stated that a declaration on this question by the President would go a long way to solve the matter and ease the situation and clear the path for the elimination of this dispute. I am confident that what would even now go a long way to end the dispute between this country and England would be if the Opposition would make a clear, definite statement that, if they come back to office, they will never again agree to pay these disputed sums of money to Great Britain unless the conditions asked for by this Government are complied with. If there was a clear, definite statement from the Opposition Benches on that question a great advance would be made towards clearing the road to a complete and satisfactory settlement of the matters in dispute between this country and England. I suggest that point for consideration to the Opposition. Some day or other I should like to hear a pronouncement from some of the Opposition leaders on that question and how they propose to deal with it. Our bargain is a commercial bargain. We have sold no principle. It does not require any vivid language to describe it beyond saying that as a trade bargain it is a good bargain.
Comment on this
Our Ministers have not directly taken part in these negotiations. Ordinarily, trade negotiations are conducted by civil servants. We have gained in these negotiations and have got back so much by way of benefit leaving other negotiations to come on. If we have not succeeded in bringing about a full and complete settlement of all matters in dispute, we can say this that in all the negotiations and settlements that the Government have brought about up to the present, at least they never sold a principle, they never bartered for sale a county, they never gave up the cattle of Ireland or the right of Ireland to a settlement of the moneys in dispute. We retained that right for determination by the court which alone has the right to settle it. We have never betrayed the claim of this country to its national independence, and if bullocks and even farmers themselves have suffered, they are content to suffer in order to retain at least the dignity of this country in their negotiations with England so far as essential principles are to be maintained. If our bargains are not all that could be desired, they are at least open, commercial dealings between two peoples.
Comment on this
This pact is the Government's act of renunciation. Almost everything that the Ministers, from the President down to the Parliamentary Secretary, said four years ago is now renounced by this pact. When the economic war was started we were told by several Ministers—particularly the Minister for Finance—that there were certain things that the British could not do. One was that they could not collect annuities off our cattle. The Minister for Finance was excessively precise on that point. He said it did not matter—I think he said—a button whether it was 10 per cent., 20 per cent., 40 per cent. or even 100 per cent. that the British put on our cattle, because everybody knew that the British would have to pay this tax themselves. The economic war was not long in progress when even the Minister for Finance was disillusioned, and he and the other Ministers realised that the British would and could collect the annuities.
This has been called a war and accepted as a war for four long weary years. When the Government started the war they made the farmers the shock troops. They were not, mind you, volunteers. They were conscripts and against their will they were shoved by the Government into the forefront of the fight. All sorts of persuasions were held out to the farmers to keep them fighting, to keep them from breaking ranks. We had bounties of all kinds and other inducements offered to the farmers to hold out. Some of these inducements did not really reach the farmers at all. There were attempts made to fix prices—attempts that failed. There were other manipulations from all of which the Ministers one by one ran away. They substituted new plans. We had calf slaughter and, I regret to say, manslaughter as a consequence of this unfortunate economic war. The farmers are still in the front-line trenches. I think on the whole it will probably be admitted that they held out longer than any shock troops in history.
I do not assume that very much will be gained by going into all the particulars of this economic war. The facts are there and they are known to everybody except, perhaps, the Ministry who ought to be the first to realise the consequences of their actions. The Minister for Industry and Commerce, in the course of his speech, made one extraordinary pronouncement. First, he lectured us and taunted us with having four years ago told the people what might happen as a consequence of the action of the Government. The Minister spoke about the unnational record of this Party and said that we persuaded the British to take certain action. He said that we were culprits because we told the people what was obvious to any man of average intellect. We told the people what the British would do in certain circumstances. That was what they did subsequently. The Minister characterised us as traitors because we foresaw that. The Ministry claim they are themselves patriots. Their patriotism is revealed in the statements of the Minister for Industry and Commerce who a few moments ago said that the Government were aware of what would happen four years ago. They did not mention it but they were aware of it. He said they knew there would be certain reactions because of their policy. "We knew that but we did not say it," he said. Yes, it would be unnational to say it. Here surely is a remarkable statement. He said: "We were not even sure that these reactions would not be such as would make it impossible to maintain our position." They were not even sure when they started this economic war that they could maintain the fight. Yet, they are nationalists and we were traitors. The men who induced the unfortunate people of this country to engage in a war that they themselves believed was so chancy that at times before they entered into it they were not sure they could maintain their position.
I have already said that they ran away from the contention that the British Government could not collect these annuities. We next had them setting out to say that the British market was gone whether we engaged in this economic war or not, that in the year 1932 the British market for our agricultural produce was dead and gone. It has now been proved that the British market is really not dead and gone. The farmers of this country will need a new baptism to be absolved from the Government's original—I was going to say sin, but I will say— indiscretion. We were told that there were to be alternative markets. The alternative markets, it seems, if not stillborn, are at any rate finding the fight for existence exceedingly difficult. They are so delicate that they are not of much use to anyone. We have a curious phenomenon in this particular war or fight; we have two pacts. The first pact was made 15 or 16 months ago, when the Government gave a little more away than they gave in the second pact. They swopped good cattle for bad coal. They were lectured because they gave away good cattle without any relation to the other terms of the pact. After 12 months they came to their senses a little and renewed the pact, with additions. The Minister for Finance, when opening the debate, said that the Executives both here and on the other side had suffered loss. That is quite true as far as our Executive is concerned. It is scarcely true as far as the British are concerned. I admit that on comparing the latest pact with the original one the British have suffered a monetary loss.
The Government here did not take the precautions in the original pact that should have been taken. If the British accepted 160,000 or 180,000 extra cattle, knowing that they wanted to collect only a certain amount of money, it was obvious that an arrangement could be made to reduce the head tax on the revised total of cattle which they took. That was not done. Owing to the criticism of this Party the Government has done in the recent pact what they failed to do in the original one. To that extent the British have lost what ought to have been conceded in the first pact. In lieu of that, we have now given the British other concessions by way of a reduction of certain tariffs on imported goods. Perhaps some Minister could make a fair guess as to the exact sum represented by these concessions. We have no facts upon which to base an estimate. The Government must have some figures, but they have not given them so far. They may come out later in the debate.
I do not see where this pact offers any particular benefit to the agricultural community. The Minister for Industry and Commerce said that prices in England had risen in a few months last year. There were perhaps the usual seasonal changes in prices in Great Britain, but the prices that the British gave us for our goods last year or this year will not depend on this pact. Prices will depend on the demand for our cattle that exists in England. I am glad to say that the demand for our cattle still exists in England, notwithstanding anything the Minister said, then ran away from, but now admits. The mere fact that the British Government were able to deal with 160,000 or 180,000 more cattle last year than during the previous year, without reducing prices, was proof that there was room in the British market for our agricultural stock. The hope expressed by the Minister, that there would be larger exports of cattle than in previous years, is in itself an admission that the British market, instead of being dead, is flourishing. We have had two pacts in the middle of a war. It is time we had a real armistice. If the Government entered into an armistice with their chief enemy they would have everyone in this House behind them and there would be a breathing space, a dropping of weapons on both sides for a few months, in an attempt to hammer out a decent and final pact. Perhaps the Minister for Finance would not agree to that.
I want to mention one point about this pact of which there has been very little mention. This was a trade agreement, but it was a trade agreement of good cattle for bad coal. That is what it means as far as coal imports are concerned. We gave the British a monopoly in coal and they are taking advantage of it. From every part of the country there are complaints about the quality of the coal that is now being sent here. Unfortunately every housewife knows all about it. Perhaps householders in Dublin get better coal, but in the country many people find it exceedingly difficult to cook meals in ranges because of the bad quality of the coal. The Government might have put a clause into the agreement providing that if we send first-quality cattle to Great Britain, in return they should send us first-quality goods, and not the tail-end of their produce at enhanced prices.
Now, when four years ago we ventured to tell the people what was likely to happen, because of the action the Government were taking we were called traitors. That was the term applied to us because we did our duty to the people, clearly demonstrating to them what, in our view, would be the consequences of certain action then taken. At the risk of having the same epithet hurled at me now, I would like to call the attention of the Ministry to perhaps another serious consequence that may eventually result if this unfortunate war is indefinitely prolonged. It is common knowledge that, when a particular action is permitted to continue indefinitely, it has a tendency to become permanent. The British farmers, having been accustomed for four years to the imposition of a duty on our agricultural produce: in other words to a restriction on their competitors, may, if this war is indefinitely prolonged, become so accustomed to this particular form of tariff as to deem it right to ask their Government for its continuance. Our Government in this pact, by admitting the principle of the collection of this tax, have gone a long way to provide support and argument for those who, henceforward, may demand its continuance in Britain. That is a danger which, I think, Deputies should advert to: that what we have suffered by way of tax on our agricultural produce during the last four years may eventually become a permanent thing. For that reason we are entitled to ask the President and members of the Government to take every precaution to see that this war is not indefinitely prolonged, to act on the terms set out in the amendment, and to ease the conflict by getting down to a real settlement with the British. This, I think, is a favourable time for a settlement—to do something to put the country back to the position it was in in 1931.
Comment on this
I think the Opposition have made a rather studied attempt to avoid the terms of this pact in the hope that the people of the country may not see that there is any benefit in it for them. I do not want to exaggerate its benefits in any way, but I would like the House to understand what exactly are the benefits that might be expected by agriculturists from the agreement. There has been a great deal of talk about cattle. Cattle, of course, are the most important agricultural export dealt with under the agreement. Listening to the speeches from the Opposition, one would imagine that there is some very big restriction on the export and output of cattle from the country at the moment. If any Deputy cares to study the question for himself he will find that from the year 1926 to 1932 there was an average annual export of 724,904 cattle in those years. Take the year 1935 as compared to those years. In 1935 we had exports to Great Britain of 670,000 cattle; to other countries, 20,000. We had a larger consumption at home of 40,000. We had cattle dealt with in the factories which, for some reason or other, the Opposition think is an inhuman way of dealing with them. They seem to think it is more inhuman to kill cattle in a factory than on the premises of a butcher. At any rate there were 50,000 dealt with in that way. These figures give a total of 780,000 which is well above the yearly average disposed of during the ten years when there were unrestricted exports from this country. In addition, if we import the amount of coal that it is estimated we may import during the year, there will be an even larger export of cattle this year than last year to Great Britain.
Comment on this
I am sure the Deputy will give them then, but not now.
Comment on this
I am talking about the possibility of getting rid of all our cattle.
Comment on this
Without burying them, we have an opportunity, I say, of getting rid of more cattle and are getting rid of more cattle now than during the ten years when we had unrestricted exports. We have, at any rate, a larger market, which will create a better demand for cattle, and will, therefore, mean a better price. The reduction of the duty less bounty will mean on the average of all cattle an increase in price of £1 per head. Therefore, there should be, as a result of this pact, an increase of at least £1 per head on cattle. It is likely to be more, because there will be a larger market for exports and killings at home. Deputy Belton in his speech said that he would be inclined to make a direct barter arrangement rather than the arrangement we have made. In other words, he said that he would be inclined to give one cwt. of cement or 1½ cwt. of coal for a cwt. of beef. That would be a most extraordinary bargain, in my opinion. What I felt at the time was that the Deputy had made some mistake, but later in his speech he came back to it again and gave the same figures, so that under the Deputy's arrangement he would exchange 15 cwt. of coal, worth about 15/- for a ten cwt. beast.
Comment on this
I am telling the House what Deputy Belton's arrangement would lead to. In addition to the benefit resulting from the increased price for cattle which may be expected under this arrangement, there will also be an increase in the price of sheep of 5/- per head. We export on the average about 300,000 sheep per year, and we consume at home about 600,000 sheep. Everyone in the House agrees that it is the export price that rules the price for the sheep killed at home. Accordingly, there will be an all-round increase on 900,000 sheep, which will amount to about £250,000 a year.
Comment on this
There is no bounty in this case. It is a case of 5/- tariff less, and, undoubtedly, there should be that much benefit to the farmers unless there is something very wrong about the economic laws either on this side or the other side. There should be at least that benefit to the sheep-breeders of this country. There will also be a slight advantage to dog-breeders. That has not been mentioned and is, perhaps, of no great consequence, but at least it is something. I am taking into account the new bounties as well as the new duties, and I say that, as far as the farmer goes, he gets those advantages. Then take the case of the Minister for Finance. As a result of the removal of those bounties on cattle and horses the Minister saves somewhere from £450,000 to £500,000, but part of this will be paid in bounties to other agricultural produce. We will be able to give better bounties to other agricultural products than otherwise we would have been able to give, and that will mean an increased price for these commodities also. The trouble is, of course, that we do not get these things without giving something in return. The Deputies who have spoken against this pact appear to have a very big grievance because we have promised to take all our coal and one-third of our cement from Great Britain. If one did not know much about the history of this country when a Cumann na nGaedheal Government was in power, one would imagine that we had coal-boats coming to this country from all over the world at that time. As a matter of fact, however, for the whole time that Cumann na nGaedheal were in power, up to the year 1932, no coal was imported into this country except British coal, with the exception of one year—1926, I think—when there was a strike or something of that nature in Great Britain. During all that period when the Cumann na nGaedheal people were in office we took nothing but British coal, but now we are told that we are getting bad coal. What is the difference between the coal coming in now and the Cumann na nGaedheal coal? Surely the coalfields have not changed. Surely the coalfields are the same as they were when the people opposite were in power. It only gives one an idea of the ridiculous arguments used by the people opposite when they want to pick holes in anything whatsoever.
Then take the case of cement. We are blamed for giving part of our cement quota to the British. From the year 1924 until 1931 we imported from two-thirds to three-fourths of our cement each year from Great Britain. That was under Cumann na nGaedheal, but now the people opposite are absolutely dissatisfied to take any cement whatsoever from Great Britain. The reason, of course, is because it is embodied in this agreement. Is it not a strange thing that the Opposition approved of a pact last year, a pact which was made for coal and cattle, and that they should now disapprove of an advance on that pact? If I remember rightly, their leaders at that time—Deputy MacDermot was with them then, and perhaps he had some good influence on them, and I think Mr. O'Duffy was with them also—made speeches, without exception, throughout the country agreeing with the pact that was made at that particular time. This particular pact is an advance on that. In fact, I think that what has been said here already is the truth: that the advance is likely to lead to benefits for this country, that agricultural prices are rising, and that it may not be so easy for the Opposition in future to get the farmers to complain. The adverse balance is going down. The hope of bankruptcy—that dismal prophecy that we heard here every three months in the last four years, that within the next three months we would be bankrupt—is disappearing and is becoming more or less of a joke. Accordingly, with this advance that has been made, with prices improving, and with the adverse balance going down, the Opposition are beginning to think that they have no great chance of getting back, and therefore they have objected to this agreement. That bankruptcy bogey was always three months ahead, and now we have the same idea introduced into Deputy Cosgrave's speech. Deputy Cosgrave, when talking here to-day about the dire consequences of this particular pact, said that the evils of this dispute would affect the country long after the present Government has disappeared. In other words, he is asking the people again to look forward to the evils that are to come because he is not able to make a sufficient case out of the evils of the present—just like the bankruptcy bogey of the last three or four years. Then Deputy Cosgrave, having drawn this gruesome picture for the Irish people, went on to talk of his two favourite subjects, finance and horse-breeding. He gave us a lecture about sterling blocks and non-sterling blocks, about dollar blocks and gold blocks and so on.