Prohibition of Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems Bill 2026: Second Stage
Seanad speakers strongly backed the Prohibition of Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems Bill 2026, arguing that machines should never be allowed to select and kill human beings and citing reported use of AI-targeting systems in Gaza, Ukraine, Lebanon and Iran. Proponents said Ireland should follow its disarmament legacy by banning the use, development, stockpiling, transfer and investment of these weapons, and by rejecting “meaningful human control” that is only nominal. Fianna Fáil and the Government did not oppose the Bill, but said it was premature to legislate nationally before international definitions and a treaty framework are agreed through the UN Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons process. The Minister of State said Ireland shares the Bill’s humanitarian aims and is active internationally, but warned that the Bill’s definitions could be too broad and unworkable as drafted.
No. 56 of 2026 ›
I welcome the Minister of State, Deputy Ardagh. The combined opening speeches of the proposer and seconder shall not exceed 16 minutes. All other Senators have six minutes, the Minister of State has 15 minutes and the proposer has five minutes in which to reply.
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I move: "That the Bill be now read a Second Time."
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I welcome to the Gallery guests of one of our ushers, Damian Kelly: Mícheál Smith, treasurer of Fórsa; Julia Flood, vice president of Fórsa; and the Dublin City branch executive of Fórsa. They are most welcome to Seanad Éireann and I thank them for being here. Anois, an Seanadóir Higgins.
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I am sharing time at 11 minutes and five minutes.
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I welcome the Minister of State to the House. I also thank the experts who have worked with me on this legislation, and Stephen Reid from my own office for his work on its development.
One of the moments when I was proudest of Ireland was being there when Ireland hosted the negotiations which led to a global ban on cluster munitions. Cluster munitions were land mines from the sky, weapons which by their very nature hurt unknown targets at unknown times in the future, were unpredictable in their effect, and were outside the realms of international humanitarian law because their consequences were unknown. What we did know was that their consequences were very often at the expense of civilians and children. Ireland led the discussions that led to the global ban on these horrendous weapons. That is why when people talk about Ireland stepping up and playing our role, I always think that Ireland plays its role, and the role it has played has been in peace and disarmament. That is our outsized role, and it is the greatest contribution a country makes in terms of reduction of casualties and of death.
We are now at a moment when not only are we seeing a very worrying rollback, with countries leaving the land mine and cluster munition treaties and returning to the use of these unconscionable weapons, but we are also seeing horrendous new weapons which are dealing death at a scale and with mechanisms which were unimaginable in the past. Lethal autonomous weapons have been described by the Secretary-General of the United Nations, António Guterres, as morally repugnant. Pope Leo, in his encyclical, spoke about the horror of entrusting an algorithm with the power to select who is worthy or not without bearing responsibility for that judgment, and about the damage that does to human possibilities and political responsibility. He highlighted that artificial intelligence does not remove the intrinsic inhumanity of the conflict. In fact, it brings about conflict more quickly, renders it more impersonal, lowers the threshold for resorting to violence, transforms defence into threat prediction and reduces victims to data.
The legislation I am proposing now comes in a context. I will dive a little bit more into autonomous weapons in a moment. Not only are we seeing horrific weapons being used with consequence around the world, but we are seeing a turbo-powered development of such weapons. As they are coming about, they are being experimented with. They are being used in Iraq and Iran, and on the population of Gaza. They are being trialled and tested on the most vulnerable people in the world. This is being done in the context of more money being pushed towards defence than we have seen in almost 60 years, and more money being poured into AI. The two drivers - the AI industry and the defence industry - are having vast amounts of money thrown at them in the kind of "move fast and break things" epic we have seen in tech in the past. In this instance, what is getting broken is humanity and people, and indeed our international humanitarian law and those ideas that there are standards even within war.
As a sense of how these are used, I could use quotes about Project Maven, which was initially developed by the Pentagon and is now available in all contexts. It can identify approximately 1,000 targeting decisions in an hour. It can choose and dismiss targets in the battlefield. One director, the vice admiral, has said that America wants to use it for everything, not just targeting. I know my colleague will speak more on Israel, where we have seen the Gospel - a machine-learning algorithm - used to produce potential targets so fast that Israeli officers described it as a "mass-assassination factory". A similar system, Lavender, at one point identified 37,000 potential targets. When those in Israeli intelligence have spoken about how it felt about to use these weapons, they have downplayed the role of human oversight. They have said that they would invest 20 seconds for every target at this stage and do dozens of them every day. They have spoken of how they had zero added value as humans, apart from as a stamp of approval. I know my colleague will speak of other systems, including Hello Daddy, where by their nature, the targets effectively are children.
These weapons are being used and trialled, and there is a giddiness in their adoption. This is happening with more money than we can imagine coming from two directions, yet there is a massive lacuna in terms of legislation, accountability and structures. The EU AI Act, which maybe gets spoken about in relation to other areas of AI regulation, with all of the concerns which come with the omnibus and others, explicitly does not deal with the area of military or defence or even dual-use, which is something Ireland needs to have a strong moral eye to, given the very large number of dual-use goods, for example, that we export to Israel and elsewhere. Those are explicitly excluded from the EU regulatory context. The national context has not taken real action. Internationally, we know there is a process that has taken far too long to come to the point of maybe looking to an adaptation of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, even though we know the General Assembly of the UN has also said it will look otherwise for treaty action or for action on this. There is a gap in the governance at a time when the escalation and the funding are immense.
I want to touch on a couple of the key components in this legislation. Our Bill seeks to restrict the use, stockpiling, production, transfer and development of and investment in lethal autonomous weapon systems. It would effectively ban the Irish Government and indeed the Defence Forces from utilising this classification of weapon. It would curtail direct or indirect investment of public funds into this area and indeed the transit of weapons through this territory. We take our definition from the definition that I know the Government has looked at in its engagement with the UN process, which is the International Committee of the Red Cross, ICRC, definition, which looks at lethal autonomous weapons or any weapon with autonomy in its critical function, or any weapons system that can select and attack targets without human intervention. These are commonly known as killer robots. The killer robot campaign makes a number of very important points, which I will not have time to elaborate on in detail but I want to touch on.
One of the key issues here is digital dehumanisation. Technology should be empowering all members of society rather than reducing us. Used against people, it simply profile-pattern matches and processes human beings as data. Fundamentally, machines do not recognise people as people; they simply recognise them as a set of patterns or pieces of data to be processed. It is one of the most essential dehumanisations applied to the most vital decision, which is whether a human lives or dies. If this goes to the area of machine decision making, there are risks to other areas of our lives such as the question of exacerbating existing inequalities. What we know from many algorithmic areas and areas where AI has been applied is that it absorbs and amplifies prejudices and discriminations.
For example, I mentioned Maven. In certain contexts, its accuracy drops below 30%. In relation to policing, we know that AI measures that have targeted and strongly impacted minority groups, in particular, ethnic minorities.
Alienation has been shown to lower the threshold to war. One of the crucial aspects of the processes that are under way is definitions of meaningful human control. In my Bill, I make it clear that someone sending an instruction to what kind of targets they would like is not meaningful human control and does not satisfy that standard. There is a huge danger that we will move to the so-called bias, where 20 seconds are given to press the button. Crucially, machines cannot make those complex ethical choices. Under the law, military commanders have to judge the necessity and proportionality of each attack. They have to distinguish between civilians and military targets. That means not only understanding the weapon systems they are using but understanding the context in which they are used. That context and those consequences cannot be properly reflected if we move towards autonomous weapons.
I thank Professor Luke Moffett from Queen's University Belfast who has done great work on this issue and also on warification. These kinds of weapons cannot identify a boat on which people are waving a white flag or making radio communications that they are shipwrecked. In Gaza, drone operators could not identify World Central Kitchen vehicles because they were using infrared and the organisation's logo did not show up. Those who make an attack cannot necessarily see that a children's school bus is coming up right alongside their target because they are focused on their target. This is what happens when we lose human control. After the loss of control, as Pope Leo mentioned, comes the idea of political responsibility and accountability being lost. We lose track of who can be blamed, and even what happened because some of these systems operate with such a black box that there is not only a lack of understanding about what should be done but also a lack of understanding of what happened. In that regard, we need that understandability.
At this time of this arms race, I urge that Ireland show leadership, support this Bill and be a strong driver of the push, internationally and at national level, for a prohibition on these arms and weapons. I look forward to the Minister of State's response.
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I am proud to put my name to this Bill alongside my colleagues Senators Alice-Mary Higgins, Lynn Ruane and Eileen Flynn. I commend Senator Higgins on the amazing work she has done on it.
It is shocking to think that we need legislation such as this or that we have to write into law what should be self-evident, namely, that a machine must never be allowed to decide to take a human life. Yet, here we are. I hope the Government will rise to meet this moment. We are living through a moment in history where the decisions we make, or fail to make, about emerging technology will define what kind of world we leave behind us. The question before us is not abstract. It is this: should a machine, powered by artificial intelligence, be permitted to decide to take a human life without any human being making that decision? My answer is an unequivocal "No", and I believe this Bill reflects that answer in law.
Lethal autonomous weapon systems, weapons that can select and attack targets without human intervention, are not science fiction. They exist. The Kargu-2 drone, used in Libya in 2020, is widely documented as the first recorded case of a lethal autonomous weapon being deployed in an armed attack. We are debating not a hypothetical future but a present danger.
Lest anyone think this is purely theoretical, we need only look at what is happening in the world around us. There is extensive and deeply disturbing evidence that AI-targeting systems, tools that select human beings as targets with minimal oversight, have been deployed in conflict zones with catastrophic civilian casualties. Two systems in particular have been documented by Israeli investigative journalists in the context of Gaza. The first, as my colleague has said, which is called Lavender, used AI to generate a list of up to 37,000 Palestinians marked as targets. The second - I find it almost impossible to say this without feeling emotional and without it catching in my throat - is called Where's Daddy? or Hello Daddy. It was designed specifically to wait until a man returned to his home and his family and then signal the army to strike. How outrageous is it to kill them all, at home? That is not warfare governed by law. That is not meaningful human control. That is a machine waiting at a door. The civilians of Gaza - the women, children and fathers - have paid an unimaginable price. This Bill says "Never again" and "Not in Ireland's name".
What makes these weapons so profoundly troubling is not only their lethality; it is the removal of human, moral agency from the act of killing. When a machine pulls the trigger, who is accountable? Is it the programmer, the manufacturer or the officer who deployed it? International humanitarian law is built on the assumption that human beings make decisions and can be held responsible for them. Lethal autonomous weapons shatter that foundation.
The Secretary-General of the United Nations, António Guterres, has said these weapons are morally repugnant and has repeatedly called for their global prohibition. He has set a deadline of 2026 to conclude a legally binding international instrument. We are in that year now and here in this Chamber, we have an opportunity to add Ireland's voice in a meaningful legislative way. Ireland has been a co-signatory of UN General Assembly resolutions on this issue and has spoken at the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, but words and co-sponsorship must be backed up by action.
The Joint Committee on Artificial Intelligence heard expert testimony that autonomous weapon systems would face fundamental obstacles complying with international humanitarian law. Academics, civil society and legal experts all pointed in the same direction. Ireland should now legislate for it.
We have done this before. Ireland was the first signatory of the nuclear non-proliferation treaty. We played a leading role in the Convention on Cluster Munitions and the anti-personnel mine ban convention. That legislation is not something to be proud of and then set aside. It is something that we have to live up to. This Bill is how we live up to it.
This legislation will prohibit the Irish State from using, stockpiling, producing, transferring, developing or investing in lethal autonomous weapon systems. Critically, it goes further than simply banning the weapons themselves. It prohibits the investment of public money - the Minister of State's money and my money - in their development. Ireland will not fund the automation of killing.
I have spent years arguing in this House that Ireland must not be complicit, through trade, investment and silence, in violations of international humanitarian law. That same principle applies here. If we allow lethal autonomous weapons to be developed, transferred or funded without restrictions, we become complicit in a future where machines decide who lives and who dies. That is why I am so proud to support this Bill today.
This is not an anti-military Bill; it is a pro-humanity Bill. It says that wherever force is used, a human being must remain accountable. It says that the decision to take a life must never be delegated to an algorithm.
I urge every Senator in this House to support this Bill. The world is watching whether national parliaments are willing to act. Let the Seanad show what Ireland is. I will leave every colleague in this House with one final thought - the day will come when our children or grandchildren look at us and ask what we did when they wanted to let machines decide who would live and who would die and if there was something that we could do to stop it. Let our conscience be clear and let us vote for this Bill.
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It gives me great delight to welcome my colleague, the Minister of State, Deputy Catherine Ardagh. It is the first time I have had the chance to address her formally and officially as Minister of State. As a former Senator, she has a special understanding of, and support for, the Seanad. I wish her well in her important portfolio and congratulate her.
On behalf of Fianna Fáil, I welcome this debate. Fianna Fáil will not oppose the Bill.
I acknowledge that the motivation for this Bill is grounded in humanitarian principles, for which Ireland has been a long-standing international champion. It is in keeping with Ireland's established policy position on disarmament, arms control, non-proliferation and, of course, human rights. However, the Bill is somewhat premature in seeking national legislation before international agreement is found on core concepts, including essential legal definitions. When Ireland has legislated previously in respect of arms control, it has done so on the basis of relevant international agreements in which legal concepts, norms, terms and definitions are widely agreed and understood. Discussions at international level to establish an agreed set of norms, terms and definitions in respect of lethal autonomous weapons systems, LAWS, or the use of artificial intelligence in the military domain are at an early stage.
It is important to affirm Ireland's long-standing position that the use of autonomous weapons systems to identify, select and engage targets without any or nominal human involvement is fundamentally incompatible with international humanitarian law and the principles of distinction, proportionality and precaution which underpin it. At the same time, it is neither timely nor possible to legislate nationally in the absence of an agreed international approach. The breadth of both the definitions and the reference to components of autonomous weapons systems would be likely to bring a broad range of commercial products within its scope and would be unimplementable in practice. The fact the Bill proposes to create criminal offences in this respect underlines the need for precision and certainty when seeking to introduce prohibitions of this nature.
Regulating LAWS requires comprehensive and detailed work to establish rules around the full life cycle of these systems, from design to deployment. A large body of international experts is currently working to establish common international definitions of autonomous weapons systems, their development and deployment, as well as the broader uses of AI in the military domain. This includes international AI dialogues on technical, ethical and legal elements. Ireland is active, alongside like minded partners, in seeking to establish international regulation of LAWS. The primary forum for these efforts is the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons and its group of governmental experts, GGE, on LAWS, in Geneva. The approach and elements for any future international instruments are still being developed and efforts are at a delicate stage with a decision on a path forward to be taken by November of this year. Ireland has been influential in helping to shape this process and will continue to advocate for a progressive outcome in the months ahead. We recognise the urgency of controlling the use of autonomous weapons systems and we are at the forefront of negotiations internationally. The Minister and the Government are open to further engagement while international efforts continue.
The Bill contains elements that are similar in nature to the provision of the Cluster Munitions and Anti-Personnel Mines Act 2008. That legislation was enacted to enable Ireland to give effect to two existing international conventions, namely the 2008 Convention on Cluster Munitions and the 1997 Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction. Notably, the relevant definitions in the 2008 Act replicate the definitions in those conventions which themselves have been the subject of extensive negotiations among states. Enacting national legislation now without knowing what the agreed approach to regulating laws at the international level will be, would pre-empt the outcome of the ongoing GGE process. The difficulty in proceeding on a stand-alone basis is illustrated by the fact that the Bill proposes to prohibit LAWS by reference to the definition of autonomous weapons systems which has been used as a working definition by the International Committee of the Red Cross, ICRC, in circumstances where it is not itself advocating for an outright prohibition on LAWS.
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It is great to see the Minister of State here today. It is the first time I have seen her since her elevation. I congratulate her on her appointment and wish her the best of luck with her portfolio.
I thank the Civil Engagement Group for bringing forward this legislation. It comes at a timely moment. We know about automation in weapons systems. There were radical changes in the automation of weapons systems during the 20th century and that has continued into the 21st century. However, the concept of an autonomous weapons system is an entirely new one that would take human beings completely out of the decision-making process. By way of illustration, during the D-Day invasion and subsequent invasion of Germany and liberation of France in the Second World War, it was the very first time we had these combined arms operations. At the height of that battle, the state of the art in terms of command, control and communication meant that when they were at their absolute maximum capacity, commanders could make maybe three or four real time, meaningful battlefield decisions in any 24 hours, at the level of division and above. It was about four decisions per day. Fast forward to the 21st century, thinking of operations such as the invasion of Iraq and Afghanistan, with changes in technology, logistics, supply, communications, digital communications and so on, they were able to increase that to maybe 24 to 30 decisions per day. With the use of AI and target acquisitions systems like Palantir and others, during the recent air campaign against Iran, the Israelis and the United States were able to perform up to 1,000 battlefield decisions per day. That is faster than human thought. That is not an autonomous weapons system; that is still one that is controlled by human beings. However, they are now controlling systems that operate faster than the speed of human thought and, in that context, they slaughtered thousands and thousands of people. There is a direct correlation between the increase or developments in technology, and lethality.
We have to understand the context in which we are bringing this legislation forward. Senator O'Loughlin mentioned international treaties and conventions, and they would be my preference. However, we live in a world where the United States and Russia have acted without any regard to international law. Donald Trump and Benjamin Netanyahu did not declare war on Iran and Lebanon. They did not have the pretence of going to the UN Security Council. They just attacked a neighbour, like medieval kings crossing into another territory to decapitate their leader. Reprehensible as they are, they killed the Ayatollah. I have no sympathy whatsoever for the Iranian regime and I do not mourn their passing, but I do mourn the passing of international law. We have to show leadership, and if we have to do it at national level, it will create the precedent and create moral pressure.
The other issue with these autonomous weapons systems, in all of the desktop, IT-enhanced modelling they have done, they tend towards escalation, without the human component contained within them, because there is no moral dimension or sensitivity contained within them. Why is this happening at the moment? In the early nineties the US Secretary of Defense had a conference in the Pentagon and called in all of America's defense contractors and told them that, basically, they were all fired.
It went from having hundreds of defence contractors to just five, including Boeing and Northrop Grumman, because of the peace dividend from the end of the Soviet Union. Donald Trump has brought together over 50 defence contractors and is obliging them to carry out defence work. In Silicon Valley, Google has the motto "Don't be evil." A lot of tech companies in Silicon Valley have traditionally stepped away from military contracts. That has changed. It is now referred to by the tech bros as the defence tech gold rush.
We are on the threshold of the proliferation of autonomous weapons. We are at a transformational point. A system that is operating faster than the speed of thought may be overseen by people such as Xi Jinping, the ayatollahs, Benjamin Netanyahu, Donald Trump and Vladimir Putin. We must show leadership in our own little way. I am glad the Government is not opposing the Bill. This is an opportunity to show leadership. As somebody said, we must be able to tell our grandchildren that we did everything in our power to stop this.
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I am sorry, Senator. I was only asking you to move nearer the microphone so that the transcribers could hear what you were saying. I call Senator Andrews.
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Like Senator O'Loughlin, this is my first opportunity to wish the Minister of State well on her elevation. I wish her the very best. It is a great opportunity for her. It is a great moment for her and I wish her well.
I thank Senator Higgins for introducing the Bill, which we support completely. I would be concerned if anyone were to oppose it and it is welcome that the Government is not opposing it. Like Senator Clonan, I think it is something we should introduce at a national level to set an example and send out a message that we are going to do our part. We should be very proud of Ireland's record when it comes to promoting disarmament and non-proliferation of immoral and unnecessarily brutal weapons. Ireland was central to the nuclear non-proliferation treaty and led the way early on when it came to nuclear disarmament. Likewise, we were key to the Convention on Cluster Munitions, as well as the anti-personnel landmines convention not too long ago. Leading the way on the prohibition of lethal autonomous weapons is a meaningful way that we can add to this legacy in the modern day. That can be helped on its way with this common-sense legislation.
Much like landmines and cluster munitions, lethal autonomous weapon systems pose an inherent and unnecessary risk to non-combatants and are completely contrary to accepted values, human rights and international law. We have seen the devastation that they inflict in Lebanon and Gaza. It is horrendous. There is no soldier present to distinguish between civilians and enemies and there is no officer providing oversight or taking responsibility. There is only a computer programme to kill in the most efficient way it is able to do. It completely separates warfare from basic humanity and morality, making it essentially impossible for individuals to be held to account for lethal actions from these weapons. I do not see how anyone could be happy for these sorts of weapons to be used in future wars but, unfortunately, power and money, and the big powers, are investing in that technology. It is depressing in many ways when you think about it. The United States, China, Russia and, no doubt, other countries are developing AI-powered weaponry with advanced killer robot autonomous drones already being deployed in Ukraine. There is a very real risk that this will become the new arms race with every major military power pouring resources into producing the most lethal and powerful AI weaponry possible, free from any human notions of morality or compassion. A future in which wars are waged by artificial intelligence is no longer just science fiction. It is a terrifying prospect.
It is worth noting that Ireland has already taken very positive steps in calling for the regulation of these weapons at an international level and has supported these efforts within the United Nations. Since 2018, the UN has maintained that lethal autonomous weapons systems are politically unacceptable and morally repugnant, and has called for their prohibition under international law. That is why we need to lead by example. We can do it. The current Secretary-General reiterated this in 2023 and called on member states to each adopt, by 2026, a legally binding instrument to prohibit lethal autonomous weapon systems that function without human control or oversight, which cannot be used in compliance with international humanitarian law, and to regulate all other types of autonomous weapon systems. Enacting this Bill would be a step towards this objective and would give further credibility to Ireland's calls for the prohibition of these weapons systems internationally.
We are living in an exceptionally dangerous and unstable world. That makes our position as a militarily neutral country all the more important both for our own security and as a means of promoting disarmament and peace abroad. I hope that the Government will support this legislation. It is not opposing it, but is it supporting it? There is a difference. I hope the Government will remain committed to protecting Irish neutrality and our ability to be a positive force for peace on the international stage.
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I thank the Civil Engagement Group for its work in bringing forward this important Bill. It has the full support of the Labour Party and the Cross-Party Group in the Seanad. It is a Bill that deals with what is fast becoming one of the most pressing issues of our time, which is the proliferation of autonomous weapon systems. We are already seeing the rapid expansion of the use of these systems in conflicts, wars and illegal wars across the world. The illegal bombing campaign waged on Iran by Trump's America and Netanyahu's Israel in recent months was the moment we first saw these weapons used at such a mass scale but it was not the first time they have been used. The wars in Ukraine, Gaza and Lebanon have also seen artificial intelligence used for the targeting of strikes.
However, the scale we saw in the attacks on Iran was new. In the first 24 hours of the US-Israel waged war, the US struck over 1,000 sites in Iran. That was an assault twice the size of the initial attacks of the Iraq war 23 years ago and was enabled by these systems and by AI. We have now clearly entered a world where powerful men without any respect for international law are not just waging illegal wars but are able to do so with a brutality and magnitude that was unthinkable before the development of advanced AI. That is not to say that unthinkable acts and wars did not take place before this but this is the scale that we are dealing with now because of these systems and this technology.
There are obviously significant ethical issues here. In recent years, we have seen international law undermined at every turn and leaders operating with impunity. AI weaponry threatens to pour fuel on that fire. Fundamentally, when AI makes a mistake in a conflict, who can we hold responsible? For those of us who have not yet given up on the conviction that international justice and international law are our only way to ensure peace and prosperity, this is not an academic question. It is vitally important for the future of humanity.
Last month, as Senator Higgins said, Pope Leo spoke out against the use of AI in war and on this I agree with him. It is not clear whether the horrific strike on a girls' school in southern Iran on the first day of the war was targeted using AI or if it was the result of a shocking human error but there is at least some faint hope that somehow, someday, justice could be delivered if a human is found responsible. If it was an AI system that picked that target, where does that leave us?
It is also most worrying that we are seeing the targeting of other minorities in recent wars and illegal wars. The gamification of disabled people is one example of what is happening. This is extremely worrying and is a matter we should all be concerned about.
We cannot ignore that there are fundamental existential questions for us as a species. Handing over the control of deadly weapons to unaccountable machines, with seemingly no guard-rails, is something we should all agree is unacceptable.
We can have no faith, however, that the hubristic, narcissistic leaders in ultimate control of these systems are giving this the slightest thought at this point. This was made crystal clear by the vicious way the Trump Administration responded when, earlier this year, the AI company Anthropic asked the US military to put in place the simplest safeguards for the use of its models in autonomous warfare. Clearly, men like Trump have no interest in any limits or safety measures on the use of these weapons systems, and this should worry us all deeply.
Turning to today’s Bill, Ireland cannot be complicit in this chilling new form of war. The Bill will ban the use, sale and transit of autonomous weapons or their components in Ireland. This is a crucial step in maintaining our neutrality and our moral standing in the world. Ireland has been a leader on disarmament for many decades and it is essential that we lead from the front as the sinister use of automated weaponry is rapidly expanding. We simply cannot allow our country to be complicit.
The Government is on record as agreeing that this is the new front in the disarmament movement. Last year, the Tánaiste told the Dáil that Ireland regards the area of autonomous weapons systems as one of the most pressing issues facing the modern disarmament agenda. If the Government is serious in that sentiment, then it needs to not just not oppose this Bill but to fully back it and commit to backing it on all Stages in both Houses. We need to see work globally to push for a treaty banning these weapons and we need to see it urgently. Ireland also needs to lead from the front. We need to make it clear that we will not be complicit in the use of these weapons before any treaty can be agreed. This is why we must back this Bill.
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Déanaim comhghairdeas leis an Aire Stáit as a post nua. When the topic of autonomous weapons comes up for discussion, as it increasingly does, many people of my age get a flashback to the Terminator films, which saw a time when travelling cyborg, Arnold Schwarzenegger, was sent back to 1984 to assassinate Sarah Connor. The AI identifies and kills women called Sarah Connor in the knowledge that it will eventually get the right one. It seemed very far-fetched to me when I was growing up in Bandon in County Cork in 1984 that an AI called Skynet might be dispatching a killer robot into the past to eliminate an individual woman. It does not seem too far-fetched now, though, in the era of Palantir, Anthropic and SpaceX, that the targeting of an individual by a machine could be a reality in just three years' time.
At the moment, we live in an era where countries deploy assassinations and accept the so-called collateral damage, or killing and maiming of innocent civilians, as being okay. I am thinking of the pager attacks on the Hezbollah leadership that killed and maimed children and other innocent civilians along with the intended targets. This terrorist attack was designed specifically to cause maximum injury to the targets. In the attacks that killed the Ayatollah Khamenei, the decision was made in the full knowledge that he was likely with his family. His daughter, granddaughter, daughter-in-law and son-in-law were killed in the attack. On the first day of the Iran war, the US launched an attack in an attempt to kill members of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard. It hit a school, a primary school, and murdered 156 civilians, including 120 children. A person made that decision to target that complex, that building, based on human intelligence gathered by the two supposedly greatest intelligence agencies in the world, Mossad and the CIA. A person made the decision to give the green light for the attack on the ayatollah based on the assessment that his death warranted the deaths of those around him. In the case of the pager attacks, a person at the highest level of the Israeli Government made the decision that they were going to explode devices not knowing who was holding them but knowing that wives, parents, siblings or even children of the intended target would have access to the device or would be in close proximity to them.
A person has to live with their conscience knowing that they pressed "Go" on a decision based on human intelligence. They also have to live with the consequences that that might mean answering before a criminal court or a higher court for taking that action. Between 7,500 and 10,000 people have been killed by the US and Israeli forces in Iran and Lebanon since the start of the most recent conflict. The deaths of Palestinians in Gaza are nearly tenfold that number, with the figure standing at over 73,000 people. Individual people will be held accountable for these war crimes in the future. Every time an Israeli settler or soldier makes a decision to squeeze the trigger to kill an unarmed Palestinian and every time an American service person directs a smart bomb into a school, they are committing a war crime. The use of autonomous weapons systems removes that liability. It removes any accountability by an individual for unleashing a weapon which will kill and kill until it has accomplished its mission. This is not science fiction: this is science fact.
The Ukrainian military has confirmed that two years ago it deployed AI-controlled quadcopter drones known as Terminators on the front line, killing Russian soldiers. The AI model searches for and interprets targets. The maker of the drone said that, "We just launch it and we know everything will be dead – everything that will be found there in this particular area will be dead. There is no connection to the drone at all, you cannot see the video, nothing ... Everything it sees will be killed".
This Bill could not have come at a more appropriate time. I commend the Civil Engagement Group on bringing forward this legislation. The restrictions we have seen the US place upon AI models such as Anthropic's Mythos 5 and Fable 5, the export of high-end AI chips and the attempts by the Trump regime to control Anthropic, Palantir and other tech companies is a recognition of the potential for the explosion of autonomous weapons. These, however, are not attempts to rein in the destructive power of autonomous weapons but an attempt to control and stay ahead of every other country on the planet.
The advent of autonomous weapons systems predicted in science fiction books and films has arrived. We must now do everything we can not just to control and regulate killing machines but to forbid the development, testing, stockpiling, retention and use of autonomous weapon systems in this jurisdiction and lead the way in eliminating them throughout the world. In time, this Bill may be seen as the first step in a future treaty for the non-proliferation of autonomous weapons. I commend the Bill and its author. Maith sibh. We have an opportunity now to show leadership here and we have started to do so. Tús maith leath na hoibre. The work has started, but we all need to work together now to make sure it continues. I welcome that Fianna Fáil is not blocking this Bill. I urge that it fully support this legislation going through on all Stages in the two Houses.
Comment on this
I thank the Minister of State for being here. I welcome the Bill being brought forward by Senator Alice-Mary Higgins and my Civil Engagement Group colleagues. It is powerful and pertinent legislation. It is calling for a moratorium on the design, production, sale and use of autonomous weapons. It is in line with calls from the UN to introduce international legislation to ban their use outright.
These weapon systems, which include advanced drones to target and apply force, operate without any human oversight. They are programmed to hunt and they are programmed to kill. They lack empathy and the ability to make ethical judgements, and, ultimately, they are unaccountable under international law. As we have heard before, the Secretary General of the UN has called these weapon systems morally repugnant and said they have no place in our world.
The threat these weapons pose to human life and human rights cannot be overstated. Increasingly, we are seeing the reduction of meaningful human control in the design and implementation of AI systems as the technology continues to evolve. This technology only serves to accelerate our own digital dehumanisation and we must, therefore, work collaboratively on an international level to halt the race to the bottom in the evolution of autonomous technologies. This is what we are seeing now: a race to the bottom to have the most effective AI technologies which are used to murder civilians.
I would not normally cite the Pope, but as we have already heard, he has recently called for the disarmament of AI, citing his serious concerns that AI poses an extreme danger to humanity and lowers the threshold to war. This is a warning that should be alarming to all of us and we must heed it. Since 2014, UN member states have been debating proposed regulations on autonomous weapon systems under the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, but so far there has not been a consensus on the definition of "lethal autonomous weapon systems". There has not been a clear roadmap on how to effectively legislate for what constitutes meaningful human control. We must, therefore, act domestically. International agreements are the best solution, but in lieu of that, we must have our own domestic legislation. As was said earlier, Ireland could lead on this issue. We could be the first to do it and then have it rolled out elsewhere.
Since 2014, in the meantime, the IDF has used AI technology to target and kill Palestinian civilians. The Lavender AI programme, very sweetly named, automatically scans surveillance databases to generate the names of thousands of suspects for targeting. Lavender can identify targets in just 20 seconds, without any human oversight at all. The IDF uses the programme Where's Daddy? It uses AI technology to track and target Palestinians through their mobile phones. It then marks the exact moment when they return home to their families. Daddy comes into the house and the Where's Daddy? technology triggers an attack, usually at night. Entire families have been targeted and murdered using this form of weaponised AI.
Far from being accidental casualties and a consequence of AI's tendency to get things wrong, these practices are designed to deliberately kill as many people as possible with minimal personnel needed. Rather than minimising harm, these AI tools have effectively turbocharged the pace and scale of deadly force but repackaged it under the guise of algorithmic efficiency, often against civilians. What was once decision support by AI has evolved into decision automation and the effects on human lives are devastating. Across the board, we as legislators are constantly sprinting to keep up with the rapid evolution of AI technology.
Where appropriate, AI technology should be harnessed to support human decision-making that promotes well-being and positivity in society. However, in the use of AI in autonomous weapon systems, the human element is entirely removed. People cannot reason with an algorithm or an AI weapon. They cannot question it or talk down to it, and drones cannot be tried in a court of law. What is worrying is the opacity with which artificial intelligence is learning and making decisions. In many cases, we simply do not know how AI is making automated decisions. It operates within this black box. We have no oversight of it at all. AI is really good at crunching numbers and analysing vast volumes of data quickly but it struggles in situations where context is essential. Another worry with AI is the inherent discrimination built into its systems, which we cannot discern. The question is: who is programming the algorithms?
AI is superior in one way, in that it does not suffer from cognitive bias but when it is fed biased data, which is always the case, it takes that bias and runs with it. Concerns around bias have come up in the policy debates on autonomous weapons but the topic has not been considered or explored in depth. It is important to understand how bias in autonomous weapon systems threatens compliance with international humanitarian law, and the legal implications of this have to be addressed. We have heard chilling reports of drone strikes on civilians in Ukraine, Gaza, Lebanon and Iran. What is frightening is states' inability or unwillingness to draw a red line that states that using drones in AI to target humans is wrong and a step too far.
The Campaign to Stop Killer Robots notes that the vast majority of states are in favour of introducing binding legislation to regulate and prohibit autonomy in weapons systems. As far back as 2019, Irish people were cognisant of these harms, when 81% of people surveyed were in favour of a ban.
There is still a lack of understanding of how these weapon systems work and it is crucial to emphasise the existential threat posed by the proliferation of the autonomous weapons. We need to devise solutions to restrict their use. We have grown accustomed to AI recommending podcasts we might like to listen to and certain products it pushes us to buy, and we have serious concerns about that, but AI is also recommending human targets to the US and Israeli militaries, and militaries all over the world. It is recommending different people that they can kill. Anthropic's large language model, Claude, assisted the US military in recommending strikes in Iran. AI recommended the targets and the soldiers pulled the trigger. More than 1,000 targets were struck within a 24-hour period, including many residential areas. That is violent on an unprecedented scale.
The US military uses AI technology to save time in identifying as many targets as possible. Human beings are simply reduced to data points. They are sorted, scored and processed for elimination. Elimination, of course, is death. It sounds dystopian but it is happening today. It seems that Iran is a laboratory and the US and Israel are acting as scientists, testing their toys on a civilian population. We also know there is significant money to be made in this industry. It is a big money-making industry and introducing legislation to ban further development and use of autonomous weapons will probably not go down with major tech and military companies but any rules to safeguard human lives have to be prioritised.
The risk to human life and human rights is too great and it is for that reason that I hope the Government will not only not oppose this Bill, but seek its quick processing through both the Seanad and the Dáil. I note a point made by Senator Higgins in 2024 at the Joint Committee on Education, Further and Higher Education, Research, Innovation and Science when she was scrutinising legislation on Horizon funding, which is that we are seeing Horizon funding support cross-fertilisation into these types of civil and defence dual-use technologies and AI technologies. We therefore need to explore where that funding is going and whether it is going in to support the use of automated weapons.
Comment on this
I thank all the Senators who contributed to the debate. I particularly thank Senator Alice-Mary Higgins and the Civil Engagement Group. I have known the Senator for a long time. She has been at the forefront of discussions and legislation relating to peace and disarmament in this House as well as non-proliferation. Many Senators raised the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the Convention on Cluster Munitions, and the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention. All the legislation cited relates to international conventions and treaties that Ireland played a lead role in and are the result of years of international negotiations. Senator Higgins noted her involvement in the Convention on Cluster Munitions. In relation to what we are doing on an international and EU footing, we are again seeking to play a leading role internationally in driving agreement on the prohibition of lethal autonomous weapon systems.
There is significant consensus across the House relating to the aims and goals of the Bill. Ireland regards the control of LAWS as one of the most pressing issues facing the modern arms control agenda. Their development and deployment raise serious ethical, moral and legal questions and the possibility of contravening international humanitarian and human rights law. The use of such systems to identify, select and engage targets without any or nominal human involvement is fundamentally incompatible with international humanitarian law and the principles of distinction, proportionality and precaution that underpin it.
The Government strongly believes that there is a need to maintain meaningful human control of all weapons systems, including any systems that may be developed. Our position is that, for such systems to comply with international humanitarian law, context-specific and value-based judgment by human beings is required and, therefore, the retention of human command and control is critical. Systems that do not incorporate such human command and control must not be developed, must not be deployed, and must not be used. A point made by Senator Stephenson was that you cannot bring a robot to court.
Ireland is active, alongside like-minded partners, in seeking to establish international law in relation to lethal autonomous weapons systems. The primary forum for these efforts is the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, CCW, and its group of governmental experts on lethal autonomous weapons systems in Geneva. The approach and elements for any future international instruments are still being developed and efforts are at a delicate stage. Ireland has been influential in helping to shape this process. We are actively engaged in seeking a progressive outcome to its existing mandate, which concludes in November. Its mandate is to agree a set of elements of a future international instrument governing LAWS, without prejudice to its nature. Many states, including Ireland and its EU member state partners, are seeking a two-tiered approach of prohibitions on systems that cannot be used in compliance with international humanitarian law, and regulations on others with appropriate safeguards.
In addition to the process ongoing in Geneva, Ireland has been active across a range of international fora seeking to ensure ethics and human rights are respected in emerging military technologies. Along with all other member states, we supported the 2024 Political Declaration on the Responsible Military Use of AI and Autonomy. Ireland has participated in all responsible artificial intelligence in the military domain summits in the Netherlands in 2023, Korea in 2024 and Spain in 2026. Ireland has also engaged and supported research and discussions between states, international organisations, civil society and academia on addressing and mitigating bias in the use of Al, including in the context of discussions on lethal autonomous weapons systems.
Addressing these systems and the wider issue of AI in the military domain, is a cross-government issue. Officials from the Departments of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Defence, Enterprise, Tourism and Employment and the Defence Forces are working collaboratively to advance Ireland’s progressive stance. This is something they will continue to do as the use of relevant systems continues to grow and the need for guardrails becomes ever more clear. In the Government’s view, it is essential that the broadest possible number of states come to agreement on what relevant terms surrounding these weapons systems mean. This should naturally further lead to agreement on the actions that need to be taken to ensure compliance of such systems with international humanitarian law across their entire life-cycle, including design, development, employment and deployment.
That brings me to our debate this evening. I thank Senator Higgins for her contribution to the developing public debate in Ireland on these emerging weapons systems and on the use and potential abuse of AI in the military domain. These are questions of vital importance that touch on questions of international law but also on public morality.
As a republic founded on values and a commitment to upholding international law, including international humanitarian law, and as a country with a long and proud track record of promoting disarmament, arms control and non-proliferation, the issues that the Senator raises demand our attention. I acknowledge the work of Senator Higgins and the other sponsors of this Bill in seeking to raise awareness and advance public debate on these issues. I acknowledge also the contribution that the sponsors are making by initiating consideration in these Houses of appropriate legislative and regulatory responses that we should seek to put in place as a country in response to these developments.
The Government understands and shares the motivation for this Bill grounded as it is in humanitarian principles for which Ireland has been a long-standing international champion. The Government shares the view that autonomous weapons systems that cannot be used in compliance with international humanitarian law and the principles of distinction, proportionality and precaution need to be prohibited. We also want to see clear regulations on those that can through meaningful and effective human command and control. These are fundamental principles that are shared across this House.
It is the Government's view, however, that while we do not oppose this Bill, we believe it is premature to seek national legislation before the necessary international agreement is first put in place on core concepts, including essential legal definitions. These legal definitions are an essential basis for legislation that can successfully address the range of complex legal and regulatory issues raised by this Bill. There are a number of issues which form the basis of our position. I will set them out carefully for the House.
Regulating lethal autonomous weapons systems requires comprehensive and detailed work to establish rules around the full life cycle of these systems. A large body of international experts are currently working to establish common international definitions on autonomous weapons systems, as well as broader uses of AI in the military domain. As I have mentioned, the Government is actively engaged in these efforts. Any national legislation would need to accord with international understandings when they are in place. This is important for a number of reasons.
The breadth of both the definitions and the reference to "components" of autonomous weapons systems in the Bill would be likely to bring a broad range of commercial products within its scope such that it would be potentially un-implementable in practice as currently framed. These are the dual-use products discussed by Senator Higgins. The fact that the Bill is proposing to create criminal offences in this respect also underlines the need for precision and certainty when seeking to introduce prohibitions of this nature.
When we have previously created national legislation with respect to arms control, we have done so on the basis of relevant international agreements, which contain widely agreed and understood legal concepts, terms and definitions. This has been the case in respect, for example, with regard to the Cluster Munitions and Anti-Personnel Mines Act 2008.
By contrast, this Bill seeks to prohibit autonomous weapons systems on a stand-alone basis rather than under the auspices of a dedicated international instrument. In so doing, it seeks to introduce and establish a definition of and prohibition on "autonomous weapons systems" that does not have international consensus. Furthermore, it comes at a time when Ireland is actively engaged in the dedicated international forum at the UN seeking to achieve consensus on the key elements of a potential future international instrument.
Ireland believes the elements identified through that UN process in what is called the rolling text maintained by the chair of the UN group of governmental experts provides a sufficient basis to move to negotiations on a legally binding instrument. Indeed, this Bill includes some elements of language that has been included in versions of that rolling text itself. While the Government’s focus is on trying to help secure a mandate for negotiations of an instrument, we also recognise that finding consensus will be a significant challenge at a time of low international trust and high international tensions. Some states will prefer a non-binding series of guidelines to complement existing obligations under international humanitarian law. Others may wish to keep the discussion going on definitions with no clear end. The Government is fully aware of the challenges and is preparing for different eventualities that we may be faced with after the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, CCW, review conference in November. Ireland is ambitious in its approach and is working to secure the best outcome in these negotiations.
Enacting national legislation now without knowing the agreed approach to regulating lethal autonomous weapons systems at the international level could pre-empt the outcome of the ongoing UN process. The difficulty in proceeding on a stand-alone basis is illustrated by the fact that the Bill proposes to prohibit lethal autonomous weapons systems by reference to a definition of "autonomous weapons systems" that does not fully accord with the current working international definition or the Government’s aim of prohibiting some systems and regulating others.
It is instructive to consider the experience of other jurisdictions. Elsewhere, some parliaments have agreed resolutions on the need prohibit and control autonomous weapons systems. Iceland was the first state to pass a parliamentary resolution in 2016 expressing support for a ban on the production and use of what it characterised as fully autonomous weapons systems. Notably, the resolution called on the government to monitor the issue at the UN and other international fora. In Belgium, the issue has been somewhat recurring in recent years with parliamentary sessions to discuss and debate adding such systems to the country’s list of prohibited weapons through national legislation. No such effort has succeeded, although supportive parliamentary resolutions have been passed. Ultimately, states have uniformly recognised the importance of seeking an international agreement. At present, many states rely on instituting rules on the use of autonomous systems through military policies or doctrines to align with their obligations under international humanitarian law. How they interpret those rules and compliance may vary thereby highlighting the issue with individual solutions to collective problems.
I will highlight some examples in the Bill to illustrate the definitional challenge. To begin with, the use of the word “lethal” to describe relevant autonomous weapons systems has been contested over the years, including by Ireland, as lethal does not suggest a system that can injure or cause damage to a civilian object - any object that is not a military objective. By way of compromise, there is now a provisional working characterisation in the current version of the UN rolling text to broaden the scope to encompass injury and damage. It states that "a lethal autonomous weapon system can be characterized as ... a combination of one or more weapons and [functionally integrated] technological components, that can identify, select, and engage a target, without intervention by a human" operating the system. The characterisation further states that it does not exclude systems that have been developed or programmed by humans and have the ability to determine potential targets from preprogrammed profiles. Similarly, a system is not excluded if it does not result in loss of life or cause damage or destruction to objects. What is within or outside scope of a future agreed definition is for future negotiation.
By contrast, this Bill on lethal autonomous weapons systems defines those very systems in a way that is narrower than that being proposed at the international level. It is, therefore, different to existing international understandings. This highlights the core of the definitional challenge, which has meaningful implications. Criminal penalties, which are proposed in the Bill, would not be enforceable without clearly understood or international agreed definitions.
The Bill references prohibitions on the transport or transfer of components of an autonomous weapons system within the jurisdiction of the State. This would go well beyond existing international proposals and would likely prohibit a wide range of material and intangible systems, both hardware and software, that could be used for everyday commercial ICT purposes or legitimate military purposes under appropriate controls. I do not believe that is the intent of the Bill but it could well be the effect with far-reaching implications for industry and the defence of the State. It is unclear how in practice one would control the acquisition or disposal of pre-products given examples of such items include technologies with regular civilian uses.
With regards to elements of the Bill that seek to prevent the use of public moneys for lethal autonomous weapons systems, this is something Ireland has successfully pushed for at the EU level. For example, actions ineligible for EU funding under the European defence industry programme, EDIP, include those related to lethal autonomous weapons systems that operate outside a responsible chain of human command and control or that cannot be used in compliance with international humanitarian law. This is a position we are continuing to carry forward on a principled and legally consistent basis as EU programmes evolve to match the critical security environment in Europe.
While the absence of international consensus on core definitions poses challenges for legislation nationally, I reiterate that the Government broadly supports the motivation behind the Bill, which is why we are working assiduously to find a comprehensive international solution. This will remain the Government’s objective. The Government recognises the urgency of controlling the use of autonomous weapons systems and is at the forefront of international efforts in that regard. We will continue to work with like-minded partners drawing from the expertise of academia and civil society partners towards an ambitious and comprehensive international solution and on that basis, to advance efforts to address the legal, humanitarian and ethical issues presented by lethal autonomous weapons systems. National-level discussions that have due regard to international developments can complement this ongoing work. The Government is open to engagement at national level, including with the sponsors of this Bill, while these international efforts continue with a view to achieving an ambitious and robust outcome that will lay the foundations for future work.
Comment on this
Before I call Senator Higgins, I welcome Deputy Edward Timmins to the Gallery. He is accompanied by Tom Barrett, Audrey Scott and Mary. I hope they enjoy their visit to Leinster House and to the Seanad especially.
Comment on this
I thank the Minister of State for her response and congratulate her on her appointment.
I am glad the Government is not opposing this Bill. I am very happy to continue to engage. Stephen Reid, the drafter of the Bill, who I thank, is also very keen and willing to engage. In bringing this Bill forward, we are very much aware of the international process and the timeliness of the Bill. I reject the suggestion that it is not timely; it is extremely timely. A couple of crucial points are coming, with the discussions of the group of government experts taking place in September and the meeting in November on the conventional weapons treaty, at which it will be decided whether action will be taken.
In the background, we know that if there is a failure to move forward on this issue and bring it within the remit of the conventional weapons treaty as an international instrument because, which requires consensus, there will be pressure, rightly, for action through a stand-alone global treaty. There has already been pressure in the resolutions passed by the General Assembly of the United Nations. That process is under way and it is my belief that Ireland will go into that process and those discussions stronger in a context where we can say national legislation has been discussed and that the Government is, rightly, under pressure as a result of ambitious national legislation. In this case, there is something different from the nuclear non-proliferation treaty negotiations, which occurred in a context where nuclear weapons were not being used every day.
The reason there is a particular urgency with this is that we know these treaty processes take time. I am very happy to work on the definitions as we come through it, but we also need to be strong in pushing those definitions. There are huge, dangerous areas of wiggle room here. What will meaningful human control mean in the final definitions? Will that be diluted? As regards the idea that there may be certain areas where it cannot be used in compliance with international humanitarian law, what will that mean in effect? Will it deal only with the targets or those contexts that we have talked about? Will it deal with the inadvertent contexts? The fact that the targeting was of a military target does not excuse someone because it may have been a military target on a road shared with civilians. There are huge nuances and questions in this regard. Those definitions matter and need to be teased out but it needs to be done from a position of ambition and strength.
We do not wait to see what falls out; we go in to shape what is going to come out of that process. If what is shaped from the process in terms of the conventional weapons is not ambitious enough, then Ireland will need to lead on a global treaty. Ireland will also need to lead, if that treaty process is too prolonged, by taking national action, which can then be amended. Not only am I open to my Bill being amended as it progresses, but if there is an international treaty that takes two or three years, we cannot be in a lacuna in the meantime. This is different. We were told these weapons would make everything more precise. More than 20,000 have been killed by the most advanced targeting technology in the world and it chose to allow the killing of 20,000 children. What we have increasingly seen is that these weapons do not allow target selection to be narrowed; what they do is around expansion. It is effective, not in the sense of narrowing what is done, but in the sense of "maximum lethality". That is the industry phrase. It describes 1,000 deaths where, in the past, there could have been 100 or 50 deaths. That is the context.
We cannot afford to have inaction from Ireland or even just to wait for the international processes at UN level when the decisions that are fanning the flames of this process are being made. I will highlight four issues. While Ireland has the Presidency, the multi-annual financial framework, which is going to give a huge amount of money to military and defence spending, will be negotiated and decided. The new European security strategy will be negotiated. Ireland is hosting a European conference on AI in September. The Horizon funding will negotiated. What we do not want is for all those decisions to get made without any governance framework around military use of AI and autonomous weapons. We do not want money being directed that way. I urge that the security strategy reaffirm the position on cluster munitions and landmines, to which, sadly, some of the SAFE funding has gone. We become complicit in spending money collectively at European level if that money goes to these weapons and we allow Horizon money to be invested in their development or allow industry supports to AI that allow the industry to develop these weapons. We do not want that money to be spent and that momentum to occur while we are waiting to progress the international treaty. That is why it matters that Ireland, as a neutral country, goes into those negotiations saying that while we want international action, we have a national concern and national action which we want to be reflected in the collective European decisions. Ireland being strong on this and showing leadership on it cannot wait two, three or four years while we see the vulnerable of the world used as laboratory targets.
I welcome the offer of engagement and I accept it. The Minister of State mentioned the new definition and the components that make it up. The technological components are in the new definitions. It is not the same as dual use, solely. It is where those components are the building blocks and have been shown to be the building blocks. The Minister of State described it herself. It is a building block to build these weapons and we need to legislate against the building blocks, rather than simply say, "We sent you the Lego and you put it together into an autonomous weapon gun". We need to tackle those, especially as Ireland is already vulnerable on this given our sad exposure to complicity in relation to dual-use goods. This is one dual-use area where we absolutely need to draw a red line. I thank the Minister of State and all who spoke in support of the Bill.
Comment on this
Before I put the question, I welcome Councillor Anna Grainger and Councillor J.P. Durkan and their guests to the Gallery. I also welcome guests of the Minister, Deputy O'Callaghan, and Deputy McGreehan. I hope they enjoy their visit to Leinster House.